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ABSTRACT
This thesis uses Venezuela as a case study to test the potential 
viability of the neo-structural perspective of economic development.
The theoretical perspectives of structuralism, neo-liberalism and neo­
structuralism are discussed and critiqued in their ability to provide 
for economic development. Analysis is made of the change of the 
Venezuelan model of development from an inward-oriented to an outward- 
oriented model. Venezuelan development is traced from the adoption to 
the eventual demise of the inward-oriented model. The evolution toward 
outward-orientation is discussed within the context of the global, 
regional and national forces that contributed to the demise of the 
inward-oriented model and debt crisis.
The implementation of the neo-liberal/IMF adjustment model in 
February of 1989 is outlined and consideration is given to the early 
results of the adjustment program. As a result of domestic resistance 
to neo-liberal principles and the state's continued intervention and 
identification of structural goals, the emerging Venezuelan model is 
identified as neo-structural. The Venezuelan model is a synthesis of 
neo-liberal methods and structural perspectives. It is outward- 
oriented and its policies are based on the traditional IMF model, yet 
it identifies structuralist goals for its development program.
The viability of the Venezuelan neo-structural model is evaluated 
in terms of its ability to fulfill its defined goals of: 1) sustained
economic growth; 2) growth with equity; and 3) national self­
determination. Conclusions drawn from the Venezuelan case study 
indicate that the viability of the neo-structural model depends on 
finding the optimal balance of the state and market. The outlook for 
Venezuelan development under the neo-structural model is pessimistic, 
suggesting that neo-liberal market forces dominate the state’s ability 
to intervene to achieve structuralist goals.
Conclusions, drawn from the Venezuelan case study, are discussed 
in light of their indications of the ability of a developing nation, 
through a neo-structural model, to set its own economic, social, and 
national priorities. General conclusions indicate that the global 
market increasingly dominates the developing nation-state's ability to 
achieve nationally defined goals.
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INTRODUCTION
The study of political economy deals with the relationship 
between the state and market in a national and international context. 
Throughout economic history, national economies have been largely 
characterized as market or state-led. Since World War II, the 
developing nations of Latin America have traditionally sought economic 
development behind a state-led model. In the last decade, many of 
these countries have experienced a shift to outward-oriented, market 
economies as a result of pressure from international lending agencies 
and the world economic climate. An emerging synthesis model argues for 
a shift toward an outward-oriented economy while maintaining a strong 
state to ensure equitable growth and preserve national control over its 
economic resources.
Venezuela provides an appropriate and timely case study for the 
discussion of a developing nation's ability to balance the state and 
market in the context of a global economy. In 1989, the Venezuelan 
administration, led by President Carlos Andres Perez, made a major 
change in direction in the nation's economic policy. Previously the 
economy had been directed toward the state-led development of domestic 
industrialization and the stimulation of the domestic market. The 
change in direction, known as El Gran Viraje [the Great Turn], replaced 
this protected, introverted economy with a free market economy focused 
toward international trade.
Venezuela is a medium-sized Latin American country with a
1
2population of just under twenty million (Republic of Venezuela 1991; 
Ugalde 1990), slightly greater than the population of Mexico City or 
New York State (World Almanac 1991). Demographically, Venezuela is 
young, with nearly forty percent of its population under the age of 
fifteen? largely urban (83%); and ninety percent literate (BID 1988? 
Republic of Venezuela 1990). Geographically, Venezuela is located on 
the northern coast of South America and is bordered by Colombia on the 
west, Brazil on the south, and Guyana on the east. Caracas is its 
capital and largest city, and is the center of commerce, government and 
communications.
The Venezuelan economy is dominated by petroleum, its primary 
export. Venezuela was a founding member of OPEC and continues to hold 
an important role in the cartel.
The political system has been democratically elected since the 
1958 overthrow of a dictatorship. Its executive branch is led by a 
president elected for a five year term, who is then not allowed to hold 
a second term until ten years after the end of the first. The current 
president, Carlos Andres Perez, is in his second term, having also 
served as president from 1974 to 1978. The legislative branch is made 
up of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. The Congress is dominated by 
two major political parties, Acolon Democratica [Democratic Action 
Party] which is President Perez's party, and COPEI, the Comite de 
Organizacion Politica Electoral Independient [Social Christian Party].
Venezuela's shift to an outward-oriented model follows that of 
the majority of its Latin American neighbors, enabling Venezuelans to 
learn from and better understand the difficulties and complexities of
3an outward-orientation. This experience, combined with the 
contemporaneous nature of the change, makes Venezuela an appropriate 
case study for an examination of nature of the synthesis model and an 
analysis of its viability.
CHAPTER 1 
OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
This study considers economic development in the global economy, 
placing particular emphasis on the simultaneously contradictory and 
complementary roles of the market and the state. Research seeks to 
determine a developing nation's potential to choose its own path of 
economic development in a global context of increasing economic 
homogeneity. National economic self-determination, a nation's ability 
to choose its economic priorities and the means to achieving them, is 
threatened by ideological, economic, and political pressure toward a 
free market economy and participation in international trade. Is it 
possible for a developing nation to resist global forces, maintaining 
national self-determination, and yet achieve sustained economic growth? 
Under what conditions and in what balance can the economic benefits of 
a market-based economy be combined with the self determination and 
social compensation of state intervention? The current Venezuelan 
attempt at market-based economic growth "with a human face" is 
important to this discussion. Its evolving social-market economy under 
which a strong state attempts to regulate and redistribute benefits of 
a market economy is treated as a case study.
CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Two conflicting trends are acting on the world situation: the
market-driven force of economic globalization and the state-driven 
force of nationalism (Gilpin 1987). One moves toward mutual, although
4
5unequal, interdependence and seeks to eliminate barriers, while the 
other seeks to protect and compartmentalize the world into controllable 
sovereign areas (Heilbroner 1985, as discussed in Gilpin 1987).
Aided by the development of advanced transportation and 
communication networks, the world is increasingly becoming a global 
economic unit. The elimination of international capital restrictions1 
is facilitating global mergers, international collaborative agreements, 
and huge transnational companies (Morss 1991; Tussie 1987).
Increasingly complex corporate structures make the "national identity" 
of corporations difficult to determine. Frequently corporate 
ownership, administration, and labor are located in two or more 
different countries, internationally separating various functions such 
as design, production, marketing and consumption (Morss 1991; Reich
1990).
In such an economy, the nation-state is increasingly seen as an 
obstacle to progress (Streeten 1991), and economic power is replacing 
military power as the dominant force (Prestowitz, Tonelson & Jerome
1991). New international actors, such as transnational corporations 
and international organizations, are emerging to compete with the 
nation-state as the dominant institution2 (Morss 1991). National
*It is important to note that while international capital 
restrictions are being lowered, restrictions on the international 
movement of labor are not. For example, the U.S.-Canada-Mexico free 
trade agreement does not extend to citizen mobility.
2Morss (1991) identifies three emerging world actors: 
transnational corporations; international organizations, such as the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the United Nations; and 
special interest groups such as global environmental groups and Amnesty 
International.
6borders are decreasing in significance as technology permits 
communication and financial transactions to be carried out with little 
regulation (Morss 1991).
At the same time, however, issues of territoriality and national 
sovereignty continue to be significant. The nation-state maintains an 
important role in protecting its industries, borders, and citizens, 
both in developing and developed nations. Contemporary evidence of the 
persistent importance of national self-interest in the global economy 
abounds. The Persian Gulf War, the near break-down of trade talks 
during the Uruguay Round of the GATT 3 (Economist 1990a, 1990b, 1990c, 
Prestowitz et al. 1991; Samuels 1990; Streeten 1991), the formation of 
competing regional market blocs (Prestowitz et al. 1991, Streeten 
1991), and growing U.S. trade protection (Aho & Stokes 1991; Samuels
1990) all indicate that national self-interest has not been subjugated 
to the global economy.
The state and the market have theoretically been defined as 
largely contradictory forces, representing two polar positions between 
which a historical pendulum swings. The contradictions between the 
state and market have created a cycle of "ideological currents" of the 
"best" type of economy. Ideology favors first the benefits of an 
unhindered market and expounds the failures of state intervention, and
3GATT, or the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, is an 
international organization based on Geneva, Switzerland. GATT works to 
liberalize world commerce based on neo-liberal principles of potential 
benefit to all from world trade (Lieberman 1988; Prestowitz, Tonelson & 
Jerome 1991; Tussie 1987, 1988). The Uruguay Round, focussed toward 
the elimination of trade barriers in agriculture, has been largely 
unsuccessful (Wolf 1990). Criticism of the GATT has grown and the 
organization has been pronounced "dead" by a leading U.S. economist 
(Economist 1990b, 1990c; Prestowitz et al. 1991; Wolf 1990).
7then decries the failures of an unrestricted market and renews the 
belief in state intervention as a regulator and distributor (Ibarra
1991). Throughout economic history it has been periodically discovered 
and subsequently forgotten that over the long-term, an unregulated 
market produces unsustainable social disparities and monopolistic 
enterprises that eventually cancel the virtues of the market. State 
intervention over the long-term, on the other hand, tends to lead to 
inefficiency and low productivity as public agencies innovate slowly, 
invest excessively, generate fewer goods of lower quality and fix 
prices with little relationship to production cost (Ibarra 1991; Wolf 
1988).
The contradictions between the market and the state are 
illustrated in the competition between three sets of ideological values 
that posit the "desirable” result of economic activity: 1) equality
versus efficiency; 2) public right versus private right; and 3) 
economic justice versus economic liberty (Ibarra 1991). Equality, 
public right and economic justice are intimately associated with state 
intervention in an economy, while efficiency, private right and 
economic liberty are a result of the supreme value of a market economy.
Recent history, however, has evidenced an "accommodation of 
power" between the market and the state, suggesting that perhaps over 
the long-term, the two forces together might indeed be compatible, 
balancing each other to reduce the negative effects of both (Ibarra
1991). While no economy has ever been purely free market or completely 
state regulated, there have been various explicit attempts at a mixed 
economy, with varying levels of success. A changing global climate,
8however, means that there are both new possibilities and new challenges
for the success of a market-and-state economy.
With the breakdown of the Bretton Woods international financial
system in the 1970's 4, the unchallenged global leadership of the U.S.
was weakened and the world entered into a post-hegemonic period,
resulting in a degree of confusion the world order had not experienced
since the years between the world wars (Streeten 1991). Although its
present leadership may not admit it, the United States is declining as
a world power, leaving the world system in a leadership vacuum not yet
filled by the likely candidates for global leadership (Japan, or a
consortium of world powers, including the U.S., Japan and the European
Community) (Streeten 1991).
The changing world climate provides both new challenges and new
opportunities to developing nations. The decline of traditional
economic and political arrangements is stimulating a reordering of the
world economy, in which smaller, developing nations may have the
potential to achieve a new insertion into the world division of labor
(Sunkel & Zuleta 1990). As summarized by one author:
The lack of world leadership by a single power presents us 
for the first time in history with the opportunity to 
create a world order based not on dominance and dependence, 
but on equality, pluralism and cooperation (Streeten 1991).
4The Bretton Woods International Financial system was a result of 
a meeting of 44 nations in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in 1944. The 
purpose of the organization was to "minimize the relevance of national 
borders in international exchange." The Bretton Woods system was an 
attempt to replace the gold standard with a new international financial 
system to insure stable exchange rates. Bretton Woods collapsed in 
August 1971 when the U.S. suspended the convertibility of the dollar 
into gold, followed by the immediate floating of all major currencies 
(Lieberman 1988).
9TWENTIETH CENTURY LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT
Recent Latin American experience illustrates varying levels of 
cooperation and competition between the state and market as the region 
sought economic development. Within the context of recent Latin 
American development, three models of development can be identified.
Prior to the 1930's, an outward-oriented, free international 
trade model dominated, under which Latin American countries supplied 
primary export products to the world market. Traditional exports 
included minerals such as copper and petroleum, and agricultural 
products such as coffee and cacao. The exports were usually generated 
from large-scale, export-oriented production centers such as foreign- 
controlled mines, plantations or ranches. Development could be 
characterized as "enclave" in which the benefits of the exports did not 
reach the rest of society.
After World War II, as a reaction to the collapse of the 
international economy in 1929 and 1930, Latin American nations 
implemented an inward-oriented development model, generally known as 
"import substitution industrialization" (ISI). The model emphasized 
domestic development behind the protection of a powerful state. 
Throughout Latin American an inward-oriented industrialization process 
was begun which emphasized developing the capacity to domestically 
produce goods for consumption in the internal market. The state took 
on new responsibilities such as the allocation of investment funds, 
regulation of exchange relations, and import/export regulation to 
protect nascent industry from international competition.
Inward-oriented industrialization allowed developing nations to
10
reduce their dependency on imported foreign goods, but increased their 
dependence on the imported foreign capital and technology needed for 
the development of industry, infrastructure and agro-industry 
facilities. This import dependency, combined with the effects of 
recession in the developed nations in the 1980's constituted the major 
force behind the Latin American "debt crisis".
This debt crisis provided international funding agencies and the 
governments of developed nations with the leverage to "encourage" the 
re-opening of protected economies under a neo-liberal model throughout 
the 1980's (Ibarra 1990; Williamson 1990). While accepting the re­
institution of market principles, however, some Latin American nations 
evidenced a continued commitment to the role of the state in the 
economy as a means to learn from past experience and avoid enclave 
development. This search for "optimal intervention" based on 
accommodation between forces of a national state and global market is 
illustrated by the case of Venezuela in the 1990's. The principles of 
the economic theories of structuralism and neo-liberalism are being 
synthesized into a state-and-market model which is emerging in Latin 
America as "neo-structuralism".
Venezuela followed the general twentieth century patterns of 
development of the rest of Latin America, although with important 
differences. With the discovery of large petroleum reserves in the 
1920's, Venezuela ceased being an exporter of primary agricultural 
products and became one of the world's largest suppliers of petroleum. 
Venezuela adopted the ISI model more than a decade after most of the 
region. Income from petroleum supported the purchase of manufactured
11
imports, reducing the need to produce domestic substitutes. A trade 
treaty with the U.S. limited Venezuela's ability to impose tariff 
restrictions and regulate the flow of imports, further delaying 
industrialization within Venezuela.
Once the concentrated attempt to spur national industrialization 
was begun in the 1950's, petroleum income proved to be vital. 
Venezuela's particular version of the inward-oriented/import 
substitution growth model, known as sembrar el petroleo [sow the oil 
wealth] into the economy, was based on using oil income to develop 
modern industry and a productive agricultural sector, while 
contributing toward an equitable income distribution and a social 
"welfare state".
By the early 1970's Venezuela had nearly completed substitution 
of consumer goods. Like its neighbors, however, in the ensuing drive 
to develop heavier industry, Venezuela became dependent on imported 
technology and machinery and thus accumulated foreign debt and a 
balance of payment deficit. Complicated in the 1980's by a recession 
in the developed countries, which produced lower income from petroleum 
exports, as well as suddenly higher interest rates on the foreign 
loans, Venezuela found itself in a situation of financial 
disequilibrium. Buoyed by substantial international reserves,
Venezuela successfully renegotiated its debt in 1986 without succumbing 
to IMF conditionality, while at the same time recognizing the need to 
implement changes.
Beginning in 1978-79, ISI began to be abandoned in favor of an 
outward-oriented, market-based economy. Cemented in 1983 and 1989 with
12
devaluations and major macroeconomic restructuring, Venezuela changed 
its plan of development and sought to develop behind an outward- 
oriented model with strong state intervention. In the years since the 
change of model, debate continues as to the viability of the market- 
and-state model and Venezuela's potential future development.
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
This research considers the neo-structural market-and-state 
development model emerging in Venezuela and seeks to determine its 
future viability. Is it possible for a "middle-income" developing 
nation 5 with considerable resources to formulate a development 
strategy to protect its national interests when internal policies and 
the most important economic sector are subject to international 
influences?
Analysis of this question, based on the Venezuelan case study, 
depends on a clear understanding of Venezuela's historical development 
as well as the forces that influenced the recent change of model.
First of all, the thesis asks, "what were the political and economic 
conditions leading to the abandonment of the inward-oriented model and 
the adoption of an outward-oriented model?"
The thesis argues that the Venezuelan economy under the import 
substitution model did not achieve its goals of sustained economic 
growth, sectoral balance and protection of national self-determination. 
The effects of persistent structural problems, together with the 
negative impact of world economic events, resulted in economic
5A s Venezuela is characterized by World Bank and IMF designations 
(World Bank 1989; IMF 1990).
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disequilibrium and crisis. (Alvarez 1989; BCV 1990; Hausmann 1990; 
Marquez 1983; Martz & Myers 1986).
Venezuela's outward-orientation evolved in an international 
context of an increasingly global economy, a regional context in which 
nearly every country in Latin America had already "opened up" 6, an 
economic situation in which negotiations with the IMF could no longer 
be avoided, and a domestic context of increased competition and 
disharmony.
Secondly the discussion considers the shape that the outward- 
oriented model in Venezuela has taken. How has outward-orientation 
been adapted for Venezuela? Will the emerging model be able to attain 
its promised results? Analysis suggests that while the newly 
inaugurated administration of Carlos Andres Perez implemented an IMF 
adjustment model based on neo-liberal principles, the consolidation and 
maintenance of the strong role of the state and preservation of 
structuralist principles and goals suggests resistance to neo-liberal 
principles and the adoption of a neo-structural model. Venezuela's 
neo-structural model has three objectives: 1) sustained economic
growth; 2) growth with equity and 3) protection of national self- 
determination. Theoretical conclusions suggest that while the strength 
of the neo-structural perspective is its recognition of a synthesis 
between neo-liberalism and structuralism, specific guidance for 
balancing the state and market is lacking. Macro-economic evaluations
6For an overview of policy reform in the 1980's in ten Latin 
American and Caribbean countries see Williamson (1990). For specific 
examples refer to Kamm (1991a) for a discussion of Brazil and (1991b) 
Argentina; to Bulmer-Thomas (1988) regarding Costa Rica; and Rivera 
(1990) for Chile.
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suggest that while Venezuela's attempt at a mixed economy is 
theoretically designed to protect its domestic economy, the market- 
oriented reforms actually make Venezuela more susceptible to the forces 
of economic globalization, and have in fact increased Venezuela's 
vulnerability to external forces.
Conclusions, as supported by the Venezuelan case study, argue 
that the synthesis of neo-liberal methods with structural goals does 
not provide a viable development path as global market forces dominate 
the developing nation-state and make the attainment of structural goals 
unlikely.
METHODOLOGY
This project is a descriptive case study of Venezuelan economic 
growth under two development models. The primary objective is 
exploratory in nature by attempting to identify the various domestic 
and international forces that contributed to Venezuela's historical 
development, evolution of the new model, and the potential viability of 
that model.
My interest in Latin America and in the field of development, in 
conjunction with a fortuitous opportunity to study in Venezuela, 
provided the original focus for the project. I identified the primary 
issues and questions regarding the current economic situation through 
informal conversations and interviews with Venezuelans, and content 
analysis of newspapers and weekly magazines. The conclusions are based 
on an inductive analysis of data, as well as the secondary-source 
analysis of Venezuelan and foreign observers and economists.
Data collection and observation were carried out during four
15
months of research in Venezuela in the spring of 1991. Institutional 
sponsorship in Venezuela was provided by the Venezuelan Institute of 
Scientific Research (IVIC), under the guidance of Sociologist Luis 
Llambi, who largely guided the formulation of the theoretical 
questions.
The choice of method as inductive analysis of archival 
information was based on the desire to make the most of the opportunity 
to do research in Venezuela, while compensating for the weaknesses of a 
first-time foreign investigator. Intermediate Spanish-speaking ability 
precluded highly structured interviews of government officials, or 
participant observation of a more micro subject, but was sufficient for 
library and government office communication and informal conversations.
Data was collected from a variety of government agencies, private 
research institutes and private economic firms. Government sources 
include: CORDIPLAN (the national planning agency); the Venezuelan 
National Library; the Central Bank of Venezuela, especially the 
departments of National Accounts, Publications, and the economic 
library; the Central Office of Statistics and Information, the Central 
University of Venezuela, the Ministry of Agriculture and the library of 
the Institute for Scientific Research. Private research institutes 
included the Latin American Institute for Social Investigation (ILDIS) 
and the Latin American Economic System (SELA). Monthly or quarterly 
reports published by private economic firms were collected from Maxim 
Ross and Associates, MetroEconomla and VenEconomla.
Data sources include: the weekly, monthly and yearly economic 
data from the Central Bank; official government publications by
16
CORDIPLAN and the Republic of Venezuela; annual publications of the 
World Bank and the IMF; and articles from the daily newspapers 
especially the Spanish-language papers, El Nacional. El Universal. 
Economla Hoy, and the English-language Daily Journal.
Secondary Venezuelan analysis includes the reports published by 
the private economist firms, the journal of the Central Bank, the 
critical analysis of the monthly magazine SIC, selected articles from 
economic magazines such as Numero. and various other articles and 
books. Secondary sources published outside of Venezuela include 
Economist Intelligence Unit. Latin American Weekly Report. Latin 
American Economic Report, and various other relevant journal articles 
and books. The data is both quantitative and qualitative in nature.
Seven interviews were conducted. Two interviewees are economists 
from the Central Bank (who wished their names and exact departments to 
be kept confidential); an economist from a private consulting firm; a 
PDVSA economist in charge of industrial transition and petroleum- 
related export promotion; a corporate planner in CORIMON, one of 
Venezuela's largest private sector firms; a consultant in the financing 
department of the Ministry of Agriculture, and a CORDIPLAN analyst and 
part-time professor of political economy at the Central University.
The interviews were based on opportunity and formal introductions, and 
were in no way an attempt at representativeness. In fact, all but one 
could be classified as members of the group of young "technocrats" who 
are assisting in the implementation of the adjustment program. All 
were professional observers of the economy, however, and conversant 
with both the negative and positive aspects of the new model.
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ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
It has been the goal of Chapter One to provide an overview of the 
research focus and process. The discussion of the contemporary context 
of development and twentieth century Latin American development supply 
a contextual and historical backdrop for consideration of the 
Venezuelan case.
Necessary understanding of the relevant theoretical perspectives 
on Latin American economic development is provided in Chapter Two. The 
neo-liberal and structural perspectives are defined and compared. This 
is followed by a discussion of the weaknesses of the two perspectives 
and the resulting synthesis into neo-structuralism.
Chapter Three outlines the inward-oriented model as it was 
implemented in Venezuela and focuses on the major role played by the 
Venezuelan state, the dominance of petroleum in the economy, and the 
persistent influence of international actors, particularly the United 
States, in Venezuela's economic history. The chapter asks "why did 
Venezuela abandon the inward-oriented model," and argues that import 
substitution did not achieve its goals of sectoral balance, full 
industrial development and national self-determination. The effects of 
remaining structural problems, together with the effects of 
vulnerability to the world economy, resulted in economic disequilibrium 
and crisis that forced a change in economic development model.
The emergence of the outward-oriented model is the focus of 
Chapter Four, which outlines the major policy changes and shifts in the 
role of the market and the role of the state in the Venezuelan economy. 
The chapter suggests that Venezuelan decision-makers adopted the only
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real choice presented, that of an outward-oriented model. An 
increasingly global economy, a regional trend toward open economies and 
a domestic crisis in which negotiations with the IMF could not longer 
be avoided; mandating lowered protectionism and increased participation 
in international trade. The chapter then analyzes the changes in the 
Venezuelan economy since 1989; considering the short-term results of 
the adjustment, as well as the long-term trends as they appeared in 
mid-1991. The Venezuelan model is analyzed theoretically and compared 
with the neo-liberal and neo-structural models, considering the 
complementary and contradictory nature of the market and state. The 
chapter concludes that while the Venezuelan model evolved into an 
outward-orientation as a result of its global, regional and domestic 
context, the government implemented a neo-liberal/IMF model. Domestic 
opposition and the maintenance of the strong role of the state suggest 
the preservation of structural principles and the adoption of a neo- 
structural model.
Chapter Five analyzes the future viability of the Venezuelan 
state-and-market model in the global economy. The neo-structural model 
as it is emerging in Venezuela sets forth three goals: 1) sustained
economic growth; 2) growth with equity; and 3) national self- 
determination. Analysis concludes that Venezuela's ability to maintain 
sustained economic growth is still dependent on petroleum and therefore 
its growth potential remains tied to the world petroleum market. 
Venezuela's ability to work toward a better distribution of wealth, to 
generate full employment and to eliminate extreme poverty is unlikely 
as the necessary state expenditure is limited by debt servicing
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obligations, an unstable world petroleum market, and IMF and World Bank 
hostility to public sector spending. Two important issues with a 
major impact on Venezuela's ability to maintain national self- 
determination remain undecided: 1) whether Venezuela will allow
foreign participation in its petroleum sector; and 2) whether Venezuela 
will remain as a member of OPEC. Venezuela's ability to set its own 
course depends on the state's maintenance of control in the petroleum 
sector. If Venezuela revises its constitution to allow for foreign 
participation in the petroleum sector, and if Venezuela withdraws from 
OPEC, PDVSA, the state oil company, will progressively lose its 
identity as a provider for all of Venezuela and become a transnational 
corporation for profit.
The Conclusions of the thesis consider the usefulness of the neo- 
structural model as a guide to economic development and the viability 
of a state-and-market model in general will be discussed based on the 
conclusions suggested by the Venezuelan case.
CHAPTER 2 
THEORIES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Throughout history, various theories of economic development have 
been proposed. In twentieth century Latin American experience, two 
theories have dominated. Neo-liberalism, which argues for development 
based on international trade and a global free market, and 
structuralism, which emphasizes domestic development protected from 
external forces by a powerful state. In the late 1980's, neo­
structuralism, a synthesis of the two perspectives, is emerging. 
NEO-LIBERALISM AND STRUCTURALISM COMPARED
The value of the free market was originally postulated by 
classical economist Adam Smith and David Ricardo around the time of the 
industrial revolution (Gonzalez 1989; Ibarra 1990; Williamson 1990). 
Since both believed that the state was the instrument of the ruling 
class, they argued for reducing state intervention so as to free the 
"invisible hand" of the market and thereby transfer major economic 
decisions from the ruling class to other individuals (Wilfred 1988). 
Smith and Ricardo concluded that the appropriate functions of the state 
in a market economy were to provide for national defense and protection 
of individual liberties, to provide an atmosphere where individuals 
could freely participate in a free and competitive market by insuring 
social and political stability, and to support the market through the 
provision and maintenance of infrastructure (Gonzalez 1989; Sunkel & 
Zuleta 1990; Wilfred 1988).
Classical liberalism fell into disuse as a result of the Great
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Depression and was replaced by Keynesian ideas postulating the need for 
the state to aid the market. The Keynesian model was based on state 
intervention in the economy through government expenditure to stimulate 
consumption (Gonzalez 1989; Wilfred 1988).
The "stagflation", concurrent stagnation and inflation, that was 
frequently attributed to Keynesian economics was said to be caused by 
the inefficiency of the public sector (Ibarra 1990; Wilfred 1988). As 
a result, in the 1970's, the economic trend turned toward the ideas of 
Milton Friedman and the Chicago School, known as "neo-liberalism" 
(Gonzalez 1989; Kay 1989; Sebastian 1990). While sharing the classic 
liberal theory of the importance of the market and the "classic" role 
of the state in a free market economy, the neo-liberals did not 
interpret the state as an instrument of the ruling class, but rather as 
a force working for the collective interest by providing goods and 
services that the private sector could not (Wilfred 1988). The goal of 
the state, therefore, is to achieve optimal levels of taxation and 
expenditure to support the collective good, but not to interfere with 
the market (Wilfred 1988). Hostility toward public sector 
participation and deficit finance attributed to Keynesian expenditure 
made the reduction of the role of the state a primary target of neo­
liberalism (Williamson 1990).
For both classical and neo-liberal economists, the market is the 
supreme coordinator of economic activity (Ibarra 1990; Wolf 1988). 
Uninhibited action by the private sector is identified as the best 
means of generating maximum efficiency and growth within an economy 
(Gonzalez 1989; Sunkel & Zuleta 1990; Wilfred 1988). Based on the
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rational decision-making of individuals, the price mechanism serves to 
balance supply and demand (Gonzalez 1989). Besides being rational, 
however, individuals are also self-interested, and will attempt to 
control or influence other's choices. For this reason, an uninhibited 
"invisible hand" will prevent manipulation and protect society (Wilfred 
1988).
According to neo-liberal economists, the market tends toward 
equilibrium and stability over the long-term, by constantly moving 
toward greater efficiency, and therefore becoming increasingly 
globalized. The optimal national economy, therefore, is outward- 
oriented, participating in the international division of labor through 
development of that economy's comparative advantage 1 and its insertion 
into international trade (Kay 1989; Wolf 1988).
With the adoption of the outward-oriented model, neo-liberals 
anticipate that each less developed country will find its own "niche" 
in the world economy, produce what that nation is most suited for, i.e. 
comparative advantage, and thereby contribute to the maximization of 
the world economy. They argue that comparative advantage offers the 
LDC's the chance to diversify trade, gain foreign exchange, and reduce 
internal prices by buying goods at a world market rate. A competitive 
market encourages technical adaptation, and will lead to the most 
efficient use of resources.
filler (1988) defines comparative advantage as "an advantage 
arising out of relative efficiency, which follows from scarcity of 
resources." The neo-liberal conception of comparative advantage 
assumes the existence of perfect markets in which a nation's 
comparative advantage arises primarily from "natural endowments" 
(Gilpin 1987).
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The nature of the world economy, from the neo-liberal 
perspective, is beneficial to less developed countries in that they 
have the ability to benefit from the experience and technology of the 
developed nations. A world economy of free international trade, 
specialization and international division of labor favors development 
within the LDC's, allowing them to maximize return from scarce 
resources through the exploitation of the economy's comparative 
advantage. International trade is a source of peace, providing common 
interest among diverse areas of the world, and is based on free 
exchange among equal partners to the mutual benefit of all participants 
(Kay 1989).
Neo-liberal theorists define the world system as two loosely 
joined sectors— traditional and modern— suggesting that development is 
simply a matter of transformation from traditional to modern. The 
forces to facilitate development are constantly in process within the 
world economy and are identified as the creation of new markets and 
supply sources to expand participation in the world economy, the 
monetarization of economic life, and the development of new products 
and techniques.
Inequality exists between nations, as it does between people, 
because of differing attitudes and motivations. Some value hard work, 
sacrifice and savings more than others, and naturally, they will be 
more successful (Wilfred 1988). Underdevelopment is a condition 
characterized by subsistence agriculture, lack of technical education, 
low levels of personal savings, weak financial systems, inefficient 
government policies and parasitic government bureaucracy.
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Underdevelopment therefore, is due to problems within the less 
developed nations themselves, caused by inadequate integration into the 
world economy and irrational state policy (Gilpin 1987).
The structuralist theory of economic growth was articulated as a 
response to neo-liberalism and is so called because of the assertion 
that development is hindered not by inefficiency, but by structural 
problems or "bottlenecks" that handicap the market-oriented system. 
Structuralists give greater weight to the political and social origins 
of economic events than neo-liberals, arguing that the specific 
historical context affects development potential and paths (Kay 1989; 
Wachter 1976).
Although structuralist ideas are not limited to Latin America, 
the articulation of the ideas and the import-substitution model that 
emerged following the Second World War was articulated by Latin 
American social scientists representing the Comision Economics, para 
America Latina (CEPAL)2 (Kay 1989). Developed by Latin Americans to 
explain the problems of Latin American development, the ideas were not 
a formal theory but a pragmatic approach to the specific needs of the 
region (Kay 1989; Lander 1990; Sunkel & Zuleta 1990).
Structuralist theory was originally developed in response to the 
economic crisis experienced throughout the world following the First 
World War and in the Keynesian ideological climate favoring greater 
state intervention in the economy (Ibarra 1990; Williamson 1990).
2CEPAL (or in English, the Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean, (ECLAC)) is an agency of the United Nations located 
in Santiago, Chile (Kay 1989). The ideas designated here as 
"structuralist" are also known as the CEPAL theory of development or 
the CEPAL school of thought.
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Largely dependent on primary exports, Latin American countries suffered 
severe economic disequilibrium as a result of the lack of export 
earnings and the inability to import manufactured goods traditionally 
purchased from the larger developed nations (Baer 1972; Kay 1989; Lopez 
1990).
Recognizing the need to reduce vulnerability to external shocks, 
the development emphasis became inward-directed, emphasizing domestic 
industrialization as the best means to stimulate overall development, 
assure economic self-sufficiency and political autonomy, and as the 
basis of military power (Baer 1972; Gilpin 1987; Kay 1989).
The structuralist perspective was based on the assumption that 
participation in international trade and in the world economy was not 
equally advantageous to all players. On the contrary, proponents 
argued that the world economy was composed of two units: the core, or 
those nations most developed and therefore most powerful; and the 
periphery, the underdeveloped and powerless. The world capitalist 
economy is biased in favor of the core, and market interaction between 
the two sectors increases the inequality between nations rather than 
lessening it, as the core dominates and benefits from relations with 
the periphery, at the expense of the periphery. Periphery nations 
remain underdeveloped because of unequal relations with core nations 
(Dietz & Street 1987; Gilpin 1987).
Development of the inward-oriented growth model was based on this 
underlying assumption that developing countries were extremely 
vulnerable to their world context. Recognizing the need to reduce this 
vulnerability to external forces in order to sustain growth, the
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emphasis turned from the free market, outward-oriented growth model of 
the pre-war years, to a protective, inward-oriented growth model.
Two forces are identified as the mechanisms of the differential 
relations between the core and the periphery: technological progress
and deteriorating terms of trade. According to structural theorists, 
it is the nature of technical progress that creates the cycle of 
exploitation of the periphery by the core. In the core, new technical 
developments are spontaneously generated from within, and are diffused 
throughout the society, raising worker productivity and thereby 
increasing wages. In the periphery, on the other hand, technology is 
nearly always introduced from the outside, and is generally restricted 
to those sectors producing raw materials. This increases production in 
the primary sector, leading to unbalanced development in the economy as 
a whole. Accompanied by a shortage of capital due to low savings and 
elite consumption patterns that imitate the advanced countries, this 
results in technology which replaces workers rather than absorbing 
them. National unemployment rises, creating a decline in real wages. 
This results in cheaper commodity prices for the goods purchased by the 
core countries, completing the cycle, and returning the benefit back to 
the core (Dietz & Street 1987; Gilpin 1987).
The process of advantage generated for the core by technological 
progress illustrates the second mechanism of advantage for the core, 
that of the declining terms of trade. Developed concurrently but 
independently by two theorists of the United Nations, Raul Prebisch in 
Chile and Hans Singer in the United States, the Prebisch-Singer thesis 
postulates a trend of steadily declining terms of trade for the
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periphery. The thesis argues that those nations specializing in 
production of raw material and other primary products, which includes 
the majority of developing nations, will face a deteriorating position, 
based on differential demand between the price for primary products and 
for manufactured goods. Income grows faster in the core countries, and 
based on Friedreich Engels’ law, they argued that as income rises, less 
of the income is spent on food (Dietz & Street 1987; Kay 1989; Gilpin
1987). This results in a greater demand for manufactured goods in 
relation to primary products, forcing the primary exporting countries 
to continually export more to maintain growth. This process is 
compounded by the development of new technology which produces food 
substitutes or products requiring less raw material inputs (Kay 1989).
Attempts at development are also hindered by internal structural 
problems that are of historical origin and are indigenous to 
underdeveloped nations. These problems are identified as: 1) the
continued pattern of external insertion into a world economy that 
contributes to impoverishment of underdeveloped nations; 2) the 
predominance of a disarticulated pattern of production3 that is based 
on concentrated technology incapable of absorbing labor; and 3) the 
persistence of a structure of income distribution that is concentrated 
and exclusive and that illustrates the incapacity of the market system 
to reduce poverty (Lander 1990; Sunkel & Zuleta 1990). These internal 
structural problems, that were created or continue to be exacerbated by
According to deJanvry (1981), two types of disarticulation exist 
in periphery nations: 1) sectoral disarticulation in which linkages
do not exist between productive sectors; and 2) social disarticulation 
in which linkages do not exist between the return to capital and the 
return to labor.
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unequal external relations, prevent development and keep periphery 
nations in a self-perpetuating state of underdevelopment (Dietz &
Street 1987; Gilpin 1987). From the structuralist perspective, the 
poor are poor because they are poor. To a neo-liberal, on the other 
hand, the poor are poor because they are inefficient (Gilpin 1987).
Obviously, such different foundational ideologies result in 
drastically different models of development. Structuralism proposes an 
inward-oriented model with a strong state to stabilize and protect the 
domestic economy, while neo-liberalism calls for an outward-oriented 
model based on the "invisible hand" of the market and unregulated by 
the state.
The development model set forth by the neo-liberal perspective is 
a passive one, allowing the forces of the market to work. The market 
strategy depends on an outward-oriented economic policy based on 
international trade through the exploitation of comparative advantage 
and supported by a competitive exchange rate and low tariff protection. 
Economic growth is supported by internal savings and effective 
investment (Sunkel & Zuleta 1990; Williamson 1990). The role of the 
state is to maintain social control and infrastructure and to 
facilitate the operations of the market, to encourage "discipline" in 
spending, and to actively promote development of the nation's 
comparative advantage and its promotion on the world market (Williamson 
1990).
In contrast, based on the core/periphery thesis, and the theory 
of declining terms of trade, structuralists proposed a state-led model 
to diminish the influence of the core and stimulate the periphery to
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development. The structuralist growth model, better known as Import 
Substitution Industrialization (ISI), was implemented throughout Latin 
America during the post-war period. The goal of ISI was to develop 
domestic industry to produce manufactured goods which could be 
substituted for imports. The model proposed rapid industrialization 
with the state protecting infant industry from external competition and 
stimulating consumption of the domestically manufactured goods.
Under the inward-oriented model of growth, the state played a 
strong role in the planning, financing and control of industry, as well 
as acting as direct producer. Often characterized by a high level of 
nationalized or state-owned industry, the state served as primary 
investor in the development of new industry potential, as well as 
builder of infrastructure. Protection from competition was provided by 
control of import licensing, ration of foreign exchange, and 
manipulation of macro-economic policies such as currency exchange 
policy, interest rates, and import/export tariffs. Development and 
maintenance of the increasingly urban labor force necessary for an 
industrialized state was provided through wage control and government 
regulation of cheap food policies.
The model was defined by two primary characteristics, 
introversion and sectoral balance. Introverted, meaning the strategy 
was internally focused, stimulating domestic production for an internal 
market that would grow by increasing consumption capacity of the whole 
population. Both supply and demand were internally based with the 
state stimulating production and consumption (Ibarra 1990; Kay 1989). 
Secondly, the ISI economic growth strategy sought to be sectorally
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balanced, emphasizing and developing the interdependence between
industry and agriculture (Hein 1980; Llambi 1982).
While industrialization was to be the focus, the import
substitution model advocated the importance of even development of the
agricultural sector as well (Marquez 1983). A strong agriculture was
needed to provide
1)foreign exchange from exports for the purchase of capital 
goods abroad; 2) capital for urban and industrial 
expansion; 3) cheap food for an expanding urban work force;
4) a pool of cheap labor for newly created industries; 5) 
raw materials for manufacture; and 6) a market for domestic 
manufactures (Grindle 1986:48).
The state, therefore, should also assume a strong role in 
agricultural modernization through investment, provision of 
infrastructure, and support through fertilizer and credit subsidies 
(Grindle 1986).
The definition of what constitutes "success" of the proposed 
model of development, as well as the allowable costs, are important to 
the understanding of the two theories and the development of the neo- 
structural synthesis.
Neo-liberals define growth as linear, gradual, and continuous.
The task at hand, therefore, is the immediate integration of the less 
developed nations into the open world economy, providing for the 
continued maximization of the market and therefore increased wealth for 
all of the world's peoples. The specific goal is self-sustaining 
growth that will guarantee productive employment, reestablish external 
market confidence and favor private initiative (Sunkel & Zuleta 1990). 
Progress is evidenced in the increase in wealth per capita, mutual gain 
surpassing relative gain in importance.
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In the short-term, not everyone will benefit, because not all 
participants have equal skills and motivation, but in the long-term all 
will benefit in absolute terms. For an economy that has had extensive 
state intervention, there will be some costs of adjustment to a market 
model. This will be evidenced in short-term adjustment during which 
the restructuring of national economies will be painful for those who 
have enjoyed the protection of a nationalistic state. Unemployment, 
the depression of salaries to stimulate profit, and a drop in economic 
activity are necessary to set the economy back on the market track, 
according to this theory (Gonzalez 1989; Sunkel & Zuleta 1990; Wilfred
1988). This readjustment pain is allowable, as is the loss of 
nationalistic self-determination, considering the benefits of 
integration into the world economy.
In contrast to the neo-liberal definition of growth as slow and 
steady, from the structuralist perspective, growth is uneven, unfair 
and unpredictable. The relative gain of the individual nation 
therefore is more important than the long-term mutual gain of the world 
economy as a whole. The goals of structuralist development theory are 
the attainment of sustained economic growth, growth with equity, and 
national self-determination.
To reach these goals, certain costs are inevitable. Moderate 
levels of inflation can be tolerated while the national economy works 
to remove some of the "bottlenecks" that are hindering development (Kay 
1989; Sunkel & Zuleta 1990). A certain degree of temporary foreign 
dependence may be necessary as the nation imports the capital necessary 
to stimulate its own industrial development, and benefits from the
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technology and skill that accompanies foreign investment.
Due to the unequal nature of the world economy, structuralists 
argue that individual nations are limited in their development 
potential. Therefore, a certain degree of national autonomy must be 
counterbalanced by cooperation with other LDC's through economic 
regionalism, commodity cartels such as OPEC, or united actions of the 
whole third world, such as the call for a New International Economic 
Order.
ANALYSIS OF NEO-LIBERALISM AND STRUCTURALISM
The primary criticisms aimed at the neo-liberal theoretical 
perspective are essentially the same as the weaknesses identified in a 
market economy. Over the long-term, the market produces unsustainable 
social differentiation, has a tendency toward concentration and 
monopoly, and does not provide the promised environment of perfect and 
fair competition (Ibarra 1991; Wolf 1988).
The neo-liberal model was constructed to explain the growth of 
industrialized nations (Sundrum 1990). The model ignores the social 
and societal context in which individual action takes place, reproduces 
the social relations embodied in them, and fails to acknowledge the 
failings of the market, instead focusing on the public sector as the 
source of all disequilibrium (Wilfred 1988; Sunkel & Zuleta 1990).
Critics of the outward-oriented model argue that comparative 
advantage is not static, but can be inhibited by problems of supply and 
demand. Supply problems, such as inadequate infrastructure, lack of 
market knowledge, and prohibitive packing and quality control 
requirements can hinder the development of non-traditional exports.
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Restrictions of world markets limit demand and a developing nation's 
export capability. The growing protectionism of the developed nations, 
increasing competition for market access among "newly opened" 
developing nations, the susceptibility of demand to recession or 
stagnation in developed countries, and the possibility of global over­
production, all put the less developed nations in a continued position 
of world vulnerability, calling into question the trust placed in 
unhindered market forces.
In response to neo-liberal praise of the success of the Asian 
newly-industrialized countries (NIC's), structuralists point out that 
the Asian success depended on a particular international context, 
ideologically as well as politically. Unlike most Latin American 
countries, the Asian governments did not face significant opposition 
from labor organizations. Export promotion efforts benefitted from an 
advantageous geographical location with access to resources and 
markets, profited from the active intervention of governments, and 
flourished in permissive world trade conditions.
Opponents to the neo-liberal perspective argue that the Latin 
American potential to exploit its comparative advantage is limited in 
that many of the smaller Latin American countries still lack machine- 
building capabilities. They would still have to import technology, and 
be forced to compete in a new world context in which potential 
competitors (such as the Asian NIC's) have had time to improve 
production and marketing skills and develop an appropriately skilled 
labor force. Foreign investment would still be required and would 
perpetuate the loss of national management control, creating a loss of
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initiative by national business (Sunkel & Zuleta 1990).
In contrast, neo-liberal criticism of structuralism focuses on 
the model's trust of and reliance on the state, arguing that too little 
attention is paid to monetary and fiscal matters. Structuralists 
unrealistically implement long-term solutions while ignoring short-term 
adjustment. Furthermore, structuralism is not theoretically well- 
developed and provides no formal model which economists can test 
against the neo-liberal model (Wachter 1976; Kay 1989). While the 
perspective successfully responds to the weaknesses of neo-liberalism 
it does not provide answers (Kay 1989).
Theorists of both camps agree on the immediate causes of the 
economic crisis in Latin America in the early 1980's. An international 
recession, including a drop in the prices of exports, accompanied by a 
rise in real interest rates and the debt-servicing obligations of the 
debtor nations, combined to create financial disequilibrium (Sunkel & 
Zuleta 1990). Most theorists also agree that the inward-oriented model 
as it had been implemented in Latin America was failing to create 
sustained growth. The two perspectives differ, however, in the 
identification of the underlying reasons for the exhaustion of the 
import substitution model, and therefore, in their explanation of the 
evolution toward outward-orientation.
Neo-liberals argue that while the immediate causes of the crisis 
might have been external, they only served to highlight the underlying 
causes of underdevelopment in Latin America. They point out that other 
developing nations that were as seriously affected by the international 
recession managed to recover (the Asian NIC's), and that Latin America
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has in fact exhibited a long-term decline (Sunkel & Zuleta 1990; 
Williamson 1990).
This decline can be attributed to the choice of wrong development 
policies, especially protectionist measures, allowance of overvalued 
exchange rates, the lack of incentive for savings, and the excessive 
role of the state (Sunkel & Zuleta 1990). Neo-liberals argue that 
abandonment of the inward-oriented model was inevitable because the 
very nature of the model is contradictory and the costs outweighed the 
benefits. The need to import raw materials, industrial inputs and 
machinery to develop national industry aggravates the country's 
economic situation rather than alleviating it by inherently leading to 
chronic balance of payment problems. Further, the national industry is 
inefficient because its development in a competition-free environment 
lead to inefficient production, wasteful expenditures, poor product 
quality, and poor management (Ibarra 1990).
Structuralists stand by the validity and viability of the inward- 
oriented model, but argue that weaknesses in its method and context of 
implementation contributed to its exhaustion. Structuralist proponents 
argue that there are several phases of the development of 
industrialization and that Latin American industrialization was not 
able to complete all the phases due to a restrictive international 
context, as well as factors of historical dependency (Kay 1989). The 
context of the model's implementation such as limitations of nation 
size, international price shocks, domestic and foreign political 
intervention, differential access to resources, and the availability 
and terms of foreign investment limited the success of the model.
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Problems were created by the policy measures that accompanied the 
model's implementation. Structuralists argue that industrial activity 
had been exclusively directed toward domestic markets rather than first 
toward substitution of imports and then towards export markets. The 
technology that was adopted was too capital-intensive for the labor- 
rich nations of Latin America, and industry did not absorb sufficient 
labor to stimulate growth. Due to this lack of industrial employment, 
as well as the inherent limitations of a country's size, the internal 
market was limited by the consumer's ability to buy goods. This should 
have been compensated for by regional integration, modernization of the 
rural economy, and a greater emphasis on industrial exports. Finally, 
proponents of the model argue that the protection needed by nascent 
industries had been exaggerated in its implementation, preventing even 
local competition, which resulted in an inefficient monopolistic or 
oligopolistic industrial structure. Lack of capital-building ability 
aggravated the economy's external vulnerability, and increased foreign 
control, while industrialization was being delayed by lack of 
government action on structural reforms such as land reform.
Defenders of the ISI model would add that attempts were made to 
adjust the model to account for the real-life problems that had 
developed, but that the world context inhibited change. By the end of 
the 1960's the need for change was apparent, and suggestions for 
programs of gradual adjustment had been proposed. But the "easy money" 
of the early 1970's disguised the need for change. The abundance of 
external financing available at negative real interest rates 
discouraged structural adjustment that could have corrected the
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underlying problems. Instead, the unchanged model, in conjunction with 
the borrowed money, created a situation in the 1980's where 
"unmanageable external debt, critical levels of internal debt, sudden 
financial disequilibrium, runaway inflation and a drop in the rate of 
investment" made the need for change drastic and immediate (Sunkel & 
Zuleta 1990:49).
NEO-STRUCTURALISM: SYNTHESIS OF NEO-LIBERALISM AND STRUCTURALISM
The priority for Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990's, 
as outlined by CEPAL, is "productive transformation with equity"
(Lander 1990). The goals of neo-structuralists are essentially three:
1) achieve sustained economic growth by achieving a more fair and 
efficient insertion into the world economy and reducing structural 
heterogeneity by working toward sectoral balance; 2) work toward a 
better distribution of income and wealth, increase productive 
employment, and alleviate extreme poverty; and 3) achieve greater 
national autonomy by generating technical change from within the 
countries of Latin America and stopping the negative transfer of 
resources to developed nations (Lander 1990; Lopez 1990; Sunkel &
Zuleta 1990).
Neo-structuralists preserve the basic assumptions about the 
nature of the world economy and the importance of sectoral balance of 
the original structuralists, but seek to achieve and go beyond the 
original challenge of industrialization toward sectoral balance and the 
development of comparative advantage (Sunkel & Zuleta 1990). Under 
neo-structuralism there is no longer an explicit commitment to domestic 
industrialization, and it is no longer imperative that every economy
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have its own industrial structure (Ibarra 1990).
Neo-structuralists believe that the pure neo-liberal model 
provides powerful rationale for the maintenance of the existing 
international division of labor, which favors the primary exporting 
sector and foreign capital (Kay 1989). The state under the neo- 
structural model, therefore, maintains a strong role, supporting 
production, managing foreign trade, stimulating indigenous 
technological development, and serving as distributor of resources 
(LAWR 19/3/85; Lopez 1990; Sunkel & Zuleta 1990)4. State policy should 
compensate for market disadvantages, support the development of 
comparative advantage, find markets for exports, and replace tariffs 
with export promotion measures (Sunkel & Zuleta 1990).
Neo-structuralists set forth a development strategy that includes 
reaching the goals of structuralism with the methods of a market 
economy. Whereas neo-liberalism focused on the market and 
structuralism the state, neo-structuralism plans for development in a 
mixed economy, behind a market-and-state model. Structuralists 
emphasized the inward-oriented stimulation of demand in the internal 
economy, neo-liberals the outward-oriented development of supply for 
the external market, while neo-structuralists plan for achieving a 
dynamic force of supply for both internal and external markets and 
maintain the internal demand-creating emphasis on employment creation 
and social programs (Sunkel & Zuleta 1990).
Sometimes called "neo-liberalism well-understood", or "neo-
4All dates given conform to the international form of 
day/month/year.
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liberalism with a human face" (Olivo 1991), neo-structuralism clearly 
attempts to combine the efficiency of a market economy with the social 
goals of structuralism and to find complementary roles of the market 
and state that will provide for optimal intervention.
Neo-structuralism is criticized by some for its lack of 
"ideologization", its use of technocratic language, and its break from 
the traditionally critical CEPAL position (Lander 1990). The plan 
shows excess confidence in the "goodness" of the state, trusting it to 
act in the nation's best interest rather than its own (Sunkel & Zuleta 
1990). The proposition also seeks to make long-term changes without 
explaining how to deal with short-term problems or how to affect 
structural change (Sunkel & Zuleta 1990).
The strength of the plan is its recognition of a synthesis, of a 
future path of development involving both the market and the state. 
Perhaps equality is best achieved through efficiency, and perhaps the 
attempt at a synthesis of state and market will be successful. The 
problem is that the plan gives no suggestions for where the middle path 
should lie, closer to state intervention or closer to market freedom. 
Optimal intervention is to be an experimental process.
The neo-structural proposal also attempts to deal with the 
"reordering of the world economy" and the possibilities and limitations 
that will be present for Latin American nations. The changing world 
economy, the uncertainty created by the events in Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union, the Gulf War, and the formation of regional economic 
blocs could have both positive and negative consequences (Sunkel & 
Zuleta 1990).
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Neo-structuralism is not the only conception of a market-and- 
state development model. The economic development of Japan, Taiwan, 
Singapore and Korea, and certain facets of U.S. economic practice have 
followed a path of varied amounts of state intervention in a market 
economy. Neo-structuralism, while not suggesting the exact method of 
attainment, puts forth clear goals of development for Latin American 
countries in a world context. The emerging Venezuelan development 
model clearly could be classified as neo-structural, and provides the 
opportunity to evaluate the potential viability of a state-and-market 
model in an increasingly global context.
CHAPTER 3
THE DEMISE OF THE INWARD-ORIENTED GROWTH MODEL 
While achieving a certain degree of import substitution and the 
development of considerable manufacturing capacity by the end of the 
1960's (Morales 1983), the Venezuelan economy under the inward-oriented 
model failed to achieve its goals of sectoral balance, greater national 
self-determination, and greater equity among its citizens. Despite 
strong state intervention, the economy remained dominated by petroleum 
and vulnerable to international market forces, while the internal 
market was limited by a regressive distribution of income and failure 
to create sufficient new employment. By the early 1980's, the effects 
of persistent structural problems, in conjunction with the negative 
impact of world economic events, resulted in economic disequilibrium, 
financial crisis, and the abandonment of the inward-oriented model. 
ADOPTION OF IMPORT SUBSTITUTION INDUSTRIALIZATION IN VENEZUELA
Venezuela had three primary objectives for industrialization 
under the inward-oriented model: 1) reduce petroleum dependence by
using oil revenue to develop the other sectors within the economy; 2) 
increase national self-determination and reduce vulnerability to 
external forces; and 3) stimulate the domestic market and contribute to 
equity through job creation and a more fair distribution of wealth.
In Venezuela, potential attainment of economic development was 
intimately associated with the resources generated by petroleum. At 
the same time, Venezuelans were also very aware of the economy's 
dependence on petroleum and the need to diversify the economy. A
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primary goal of ISI in Venezuela therefore was the use of petroleum to 
generate a sectorally balanced economy.
Petroleum in the Venezuelan economy illustrates the challenge and 
necessity of sectoral balance. Petroleum was first produced in 
Venezuela in 1914 (Hein 1980) and quickly replaced coffee and cacao as 
Venezuela’s primary export (Llambi 1982; Martz 1980). In 1920, 
petroleum accounted for only two percent of total Venezuelan exports, 
but by 1930 it dominated the economy by comprising over eighty percent 
of total exports (Maza Zavala 1985). It emerged henceforth as the 
single most determinate factor in Venezuelan economic development (Hein 
1980). Petroleum is not only Venezuela's most important export, 
traditionally comprising 90-95% of total exports (IMF 1988), it is also 
the single largest contributor to government revenue, usually 
accounting for at least two-thirds of total state income (Hein 1980; 
Martz 1985; Myers & Martz 1985; Republic of Venezuela 1990).
Petroleum provided important support for the initial 
industrialization process. The oil economy had created an internal 
market. Besides the wages and salaries paid to those in the petroleum 
industry, oil revenue supported growing infrastructural expenditures 
and an increasingly large public sector bureaucracy (Llambi 1982; Perez 
Sainz & Zarembka 1979; Sonntag & de la Cruz 1985). The petroleum 
industry contributed to the creation of a supply of labor necessary for 
industrialization by encouraging changes in the population 
distribution. Venezuela was changed from a primarily rural population 
with a slow rate of growth to an urban nation with a rapidly growing 
population (Llambi 1982; Sonntag & de la Cruz 1985). Finally,
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petroleum supported industrialization with a more than adequate supply 
of fuel resources (Sonntag & de la Cruz 1985).
The abundance of petroleum wealth in Venezuela made possible 
strong state investment in economic growth. The Venezuelan program of 
import substitution, sembrar el petroleo, or "sow the petroleum" was a 
strategy to use petroleum income to stimulate the development of the 
internal economic structure (Hein 1980; Martz & Myers 1986).
An important factor in Venezuela's interpretation of CEPAL's 
import substitution ideology was the fear of drastic sectoral 
imbalances that would inhibit sustained economic growth. Later named 
"enfermedad holandes," or the "Dutch Disease", the syndrome derived 
its name from the declining commodity production by the manufacturing 
sector in the Netherlands after the 1960's discovery of natural gas in 
the North Sea1 (Kamas 1986; Scherr 1989, 1991).
Focusing primarily on oil exporting economies, the Dutch Disease 
model seeks to explain the dangers of a primary export boom. Generally 
considered to be "lucky", the increase in income and improvement in the 
balance of payments following an export boom can create negative 
effects within the economy. Sectoral imbalance, caused by a large 
inflow of foreign currency into the boom sector, can negatively effect 
agricultural or non-boom industrial sectors, thus contributing to the 
displacement of traditional sectors (Scherr 1991). As explained by one 
author:
*It is important to note that the Dutch Disease is by definition 
the results of a "boom" in the primary sector, and does not attempt to 
explain the long-term effects of a dominant sector. Both are important 
phenomenon in Venezuelan economic history, but the ideas are not 
synonymous.
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The booming sector draws foreign exchange into the economy 
raising domestic demand and creating inflationary pressures 
on domestic prices... relative prices of products in 
different sectors are distorted by changes in the real 
effective exchange rate of the currency...the overvalued 
nominal exchange rate...will make prices for imported 
commodities appear even cheaper, and export prices higher 
for foreign consumers, further constraining domestic 
production of tradeable commodities (Scherr 1989:544).
In other words, the "unproductive profit" of petroleum rent
translates into an elevated amount of imports and overvaluation of the
currency. The extra income is directed toward the development of non-
transferable (and therefore non-exportable) goods such as utilities and
social services, at the cost of stagnation of the productive sectors
(Hein 1980; Karl 1986; Lopez 1989; Scherr 1991).
Venezuela, aware of the dangers of sectoral imbalance as early as
the 1940's 2, sought to combat the dominance of petroleum through state
management of petroleum income. The state served as distributor
between sectors, using petroleum revenue to invest in manufacturing and
agriculture, as well as to distribute to consumers through job creation
and social programs.
The second goal of Venezuela's ISI program was to reduce
international influence in its domestic economy, thereby increasing its
national self-determination. This meant not only the development of
agriculture and domestic industry to reduce the dominance of petroleum
as primary export, but also reducing its dependence on imports through
the import substitution of manufactured goods (Baer 1972).
2It was to avoid sectoral imbalance that Venezuela chose in 1940 
to implement an exchange rate system with differential rates for the 
petroleum sector and the rest of the economy. With small revisions, 
the system remained in effect until 1976 (Marquez 1983).
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The process of import substitution in Venezuela was inhibited 
from the beginning, however, by the direct influence of the United 
States through the Treaty of Commercial Reciprocity. Signed with the 
U.S. in 1939, the Treaty of Commercial Reciprocity imposed tariff 
limits on nearly 200 products, mostly consumer goods. The treaty, a 
result of a U.S. "trade offensive" in response to growing protectionism 
around the world, prevented Venezuela from implementing direct 
protectionist measures under its policy of import substitution (Marquez 
1983).
Beneficial to Venezuela because of the preferential treatment of 
its petroleum exports, the terms of the treaty were not truly 
"reciprocal". The treaty consisted of two lists, U.S. exports to 
Venezuela and Venezuelan exports to the U.S. A quantitative limit was 
fixed on each item listed, giving preference to treaty participants 
over other nations, by designation of "most favored nation". The 
unequal nature of the treaty can be seen in the number of products 
protected. Venezuela's list of exports to the U.S. contained 17 
products, while the U.S. export list included 178 products (Marquez 
1983; Perez Sainz & Zarembka 1979).
The treaty was revised somewhat in 1952 when Venezuela became 
angry at U.S. attempts to restrict the import of Venezuelan petroleum 
(Sonntag & de la Cruz 1985). The new terms allowed for the limited 
implementation of protectionist policies which served to support a 
"precarious" substitution of consumer goods, but continued to favor 
intermediate industrialization by facilitating the import of tools and 
machinery (Perez Sainz & Zarembka 1979; Sonntag & de la Cruz 1985).
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The treaty remained in effect until June 30, 1972, when Venezuela 
annulled it (BCV 1988; Perez Sainz & Zarembka 1979).
Although Venezuela was unable to close its borders to imports 
from the U.S., support for domestically manufactured goods depended on 
consumer demand in the domestic market. Stimulation of the internal 
market was the third goal of the ISI program. Both supply and demand 
were to be internally based (Ibarra 1990; Kay 1989), to integrate all 
Venezuelans into the economy as consumers and productive workers. The 
hope was that the redistribution of petroleum revenue would allow 
Venezuela to avoid the inherent zero-sum problems of the distribution 
of income and wealth and provide benefits for all Venezuelans (Karl 
1986).
As President Romulo Betancourt wrote in 1961:
We must dispel the happy theory that the oil derricks are 
producing an inexhaustible quantity of dollars and 
bolivars. The truth is that we are spending the proceeds 
of unrenewable, perishable wealth, and that we must spend 
it well, taking advantage of the extraordinary current 
situation of Venezuela to establish solid and durable bases 
for the Venezuelan nation (in Martz 1986:246).
This involved state expenditure through social programs to
provide income, and social services and to support development projects
that would stimulate employment. It was a state priority to use
petroleum revenue to extend education, health services, clean water and
electricity to the majority of its citizens (BCV 1988; Marquez 1983).
In addition to its influence on the development goals identified
under the inward-oriented perspective, petroleum also affected the
timing and process of industrialization (Perez Sainz & Zarembka 1979).
Revenue generated by petroleum served to delay the need for indigenous
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industrialization in Venezuela until the end of World War II, almost 
two decades behind its Latin American neighbors. This was largely due 
to the fact that the income from oil revenues provided for continuous 
expansion of import capacity (Karl 1986).
Although records show isolated industrial activity dating back to 
the 1850's, 3 "significant" industrialization began in the 1950's as a 
result of an oil boom which "literally forced the country into 
industrialization". Between 1950 and 1957, Venezuela accumulated large 
amounts of foreign exchange, more than doubled petroleum exports, 
tripled treasury reserves, and enjoyed manufacturing sector growth of 
313% (Karl 1986).
The basic strategy of import substitution identified three areas 
of concentration: 1) development of modern infrastructure; 2)
establishment of heavy industry to process Venezuelan natural 
resources, and 3) the substitution of manufactured and agricultural 
imports by locally-produced products (Hein 1980).
The actual process of industrialization in Venezuela can be 
divided into two stages, the initial stage between 1950-1957 and the 
second stage, from 1958-1973. While the traditional first stage in 
import substitution throughout Latin America involved the substitution 
of consumer goods, the process in Venezuela was characterized by a 
shift toward the development of intermediate goods (Perez Sainz & 
Zarembka 1979).
3In 1858 the first mechanized loom was in use in Venezuela, and by 
the early 1900's industry included textile mills, a brewery and 
factories producing cigarettes, nails, matches, glass and paper 
(Sonntag and de la Cruz 1985).
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The goal of substituting locally-made consumer goods for imported 
goods was undermined by the continued ability to import. Imports 
remained subsidized and supported by petroleum income, and the 
Commercial Reciprocity Treaty made it impossible to stop the flow of 
imports into the country. As a result, only a few sections of industry 
completed substitution during the first stage, and Venezuela remained 
one of the least industrialized nations in Latin America (Salazar- 
Carrillo 1986).
The beginning of the second stage in 1958, marked by the end of 
the Perez Jimenez dictatorship and the implementation of a democratic 
government, was evidenced by new state commitment to deepening the 
industrialization process. The implementation of protective measures 
differed again, however, from other Latin American nations due to the 
influence of the Commercial Treaty with the U.S. (Perez Sainz &
Zarembka 1979). A tariff structure was established but did not provide 
the main instrument of protection. Instead, state intervention in the 
industrialization process was implemented in the form of licensing 
quotas and duty exemptions. The increased state protective role during 
the second stage encouraged the previously skipped substitution of 
consumer goods, but continued to be focussed toward intermediate goods. 
By the end of the 1960's, half of all imports consisted of intermediate 
goods such as machinery and tools, while food and other consumer 
imports were progressively displaced by raw material imports4 (Perez
4It is important to note that restrictions were never imposed on 
the import of raw materials or capital goods due to high import 
capacity supported by petroleum exports (Perez Sainz & Zarembka 1979).
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Sainz & Zarembka 1979).
By the end of the 1960's, Venezuela had achieved some success in 
its attempt to develop under the inward-oriented model (Hirschman 
1968). Throughout the 1960s and 1970s imports were lower due to the 
success of domestic substitution (BCV 1988). By 1970, import 
substitution was basically completed in "food processing, tobacco, 
textiles, pharmaceutical, tires, glass and cement". (Banco Central de 
Venezuela, 1969, 1970, as cited in Perez Sainz & Zarembka 1979:11-12). 
DOMINANCE OF THE STATE IN THE INWARD-ORIENTED MODEL
The state was the predominate actor in the inward-oriented 
development model. This was evidenced in centralized state planning, as 
well as participation by the state in stimulating supply and demand 
within the domestic economy, through the transmission of petroleum 
revenue to the rest of the economy (Alvarez 1988; BCV 1988).
Beginning officially in 1958, the Venezuelan state promoted 
development by acting as primary strategist and planner of state 
priorities (Perez Sainz & Zarembka 1979). Centralized state planning 
was seen as the best way to achieve coordination of the development 
effort and to eliminate the wastes of a free market system, thus 
providing for the optimization of development resources (Caceres & 
Marval 1983; Levy 1968). Based on CEPAL identification of the 
disadvantages of peripheral economies and international terms of trade, 
centralized planning was chosen as a means to overcome structural 
barriers, counter external influences, and produce the internal 
development that the market mechanism had so far failed to generate 
(Caceres & Marval 1983; Levy 1968).
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In 1958, Venezuela created the Central Office of Coordination and 
Planning, or CORDIPLAN (Oflclna Central de Coordinaclon y 
Planificacion) (CORDIPLAN 1984). CORDIPLAN was responsible, in 
coordination with the administration, for the development and 
articulation of a clear direction for the future (Oberto 1971). This 
plan was based on formalized studies of the national economy and 
evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the previous plan 
(CORDIPLAN 1984; Levy 1968; Viana 1980).
The most essential concern of CORDIPLAN was with the allocation 
of public resources. Day-to-day activity was largely occupied with the 
evaluation and approval of budget proposals from various government 
entities and the formation of annual budgets for Congressional approval 
(Levy 1968). A special focus of CORDIPLAN was the oversight of 
sectoral allocation and investment decisions (Ciceres & Marval 1983; 
Levy 1968; Viana 1980).
Besides planning, the Venezuelan state also participated in 
stimulating both supply and demand. On the supply side, the Venezuelan 
government played an active role in production within all sectors but 
most importantly, in the production of petroleum.
After the discovery of petroleum reserves in Venezuela, 
concessions were granted to foreign oil prospectors to develop and 
market the reserves (Hughes 1984). The government taxed various 
aspects of the petroleum industry as a source of revenue, with the 
minimum lien frequently above sixty percent (Marquez 1983).
Even though the international companies had rights to the 
production of oil, the Venezuelan constitution preserved all subsoil
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rights for the state, meaning the right to extract petroleum, minerals, 
and everything under the soil remained the permanent property of the 
nation. Based on this constitutional right, Venezuela nationalized the 
steel companies in 1975 and the oil companies in 1976 (Hein 1980; Martz 
1980; Petras & Morley 1978), giving the state greater control over 
production of the two most important Venezuelan exports (Perez Sainz & 
Zarembka 1979).
Responsibility for management of the petroleum industry was given 
to a newly established state enterprise, Petroleos de Venezuela S.A., 
or PDVSA. PDVSA serves as a national holding company, owns the shares 
of all the operating companies, and has responsibility for the planning 
and supervision of all Venezuelan oil activity (Martz 1986; Republic of 
Venezuela 1990).
In addition to its direct responsibility for the petroleum 
industry, the state has also taken an active role as producer in non­
petroleum sectors. Beginning in the 1960's, the Venezuelan state began 
to participate directly in the production of petrochemicals and basic 
metals, industries requiring large initial capital investment and 
offering unprofitable returns in the initial stages. State-owned 
industry extended from steel mills and aluminum plants to petro­
chemical refineries producing fertilizers, explosives, sodium-chloride 
and liquid gas. Eventually, state production extended to also include 
cement, paper and pulp (Perez Sainz & Zarembka 1979), and various 
service entities such as hotels, the phone company, water and electric 
utility companies, financial institutions and social service 
enterprises such as hospitals and housing agencies (BCV 1988).
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By 1979, the state accounted for 41% of the country’s total gross 
domestic product (GDP), compared to 14% in 1970 (Morales 1983), while 
six of the ten largest enterprises operating within Venezuela were 
state-owned (Morales 1983; Petras & Morley 1983). By 1985, besides the 
22 ministries of central government administration, the public sector 
included 68 "autonomous institutes", 174 state enterprises and 36 mixed 
companies, including the Caracas metro, arms and salt industries, 
television and radio stations and the Caracas race track (LAWR 
26/4/85).
In addition to its role of direct producer, the Venezuelan state 
also served as an important promoter of industrialization through its 
role as allocator of resources between the petroleum sector and the 
rest of the economy. The active participation of the state as 
investor began in the 1940's, when the state provided financing for 
industries producing consumer goods such as soap, textiles, shoes and 
alcoholic beverages, and intermediate goods such as cement (Perez Sainz 
& Zarembka 1979).
In 1946, the Venezuelan Development Corporation (Corporacion 
Venezolana de Fomento (CVF)) was founded, soon becoming the state 
entity most responsible for the financing of industrialization (Sonntag 
St de la Cruz 1985). At the same time, various regional development 
corporations such as the Corporation Venezolana de Guyana were 
established to channel state funds towards the exploitation of the 
resources of the nation's regions (Martz St Myers 1986).
State support for private industrialization was also provided 
through the creation of regional development banks such as the Banco de
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Fomento Regional in Coro, created in 1950. Other regional banks were 
created in the Andes region in 1951, in Guyana in 1955, and in Zulia in 
1956 (Sonntag & de la Cruz 1985).
The enormous growth of petroleum income in the 1970's produced 
unprecedented levels of income for the Venezuelan state and served to 
deepen the process of import substitution through increased investment 
into basic and intermediate industry. At its peak in 1977 and 1978, 
government investment levels reached 40% of GDP (IMF 1990).
The oil boom of 1973-74 also stimulated the creation of an 
institution with few precedents in the rest of the world, the 
Venezuelan Investment Fund (FIV, or Fondo de Inverslones Venezolanas). 
The FIV was established as a result of the enormous amounts of foreign 
exchange flowing into Venezuela. The initial purpose of the FIV was to 
protect the economy from the inflationary pressure of exorbitant 
amounts of available money by holding that money in overseas accounts. 
The FIV served to freeze part of additional oil revenues, to accumulate 
foreign reserves, and to act as a development bank (LAER 2/4/76; Martz 
& Myers 1986). During the Fund's first three years, it received 
twenty-three billion dollars, which represented nearly twenty percent 
of total government revenues for that time period (Petras & Morley 
1983).
The resources of the FIV were to be used for two purposes, to 
create conditions supporting the purchase of Venezuelan exports by 
lending money to international institutions such as World Bank, IMF, 
and the Andean Development Corporation, and to support the state's 
development projects within Venezuela (Marquez 1983; Perez Sainz &
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Zarembka 1979).
The state also worked to promote the development of the 
agricultural sector. Before Venezuela became a petroleum-led economy 
in the 1930's it was an agricultural export economy, based on coffee 
and cacao (Levine 1978; Viernes 1990a). With the collapse of demand 
for these exports during the depression, Venezuelan agriculture lost 
its leading role in the economy. The percentage of total GDP 
contributed by agriculture dropped from one-third in the 1920's to less 
than one-tenth by 1950 (Karl 1986; Martz 1980). The emergence of the 
petroleum industry contributed to the demise of agriculture by creating 
an over-valued bolivar which reduced the international competitiveness 
of coffee and other traditional exports, and by stimulating a major 
movement of the population from rural to urban areas (Karl 1986; Levine
1978).
Agriculture traditionally has been characterized by extreme land 
concentration, with the state as one of the large landholders (Herman 
1986). This concentration resulted in inefficient use of the land and 
hindered development by constraining the growth of the internal market 
(Herman 1986).
Following the introduction of democratic government in 1958, 
sustained attempts were made to further agricultural development (Martz 
1980). In 1960 the state passed an Agrarian Reform Law aimed at 
"putting the land into the hands of those who worked it" (Herman 1986). 
The objective of the reform emphasized improving the social well-being 
of the rural population, promoting social justice and opportunity in 
rural areas, stimulating productivity to meet domestic demand and
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generating employment (Herman 1986; Martz 1980).
Throughout the 1960's agricultural policy remained focused toward 
social goals. In the early 1970s, however, the focus became the 
development of agriculture as a means of economic growth (Herman 1986; 
Martz 1980; Petras & Morley 1978). Successive administrations 
invested substantial amounts of petro-dollars in agriculture and 
created various state enterprises to support, regulate and promote 
growth (Herman 1986; Martz 1980; Roberts, Gorriz and Bolling 1990).
Besides its role as investor in agriculture and industry, the 
role in economic development played by the Venezuelan state also 
included the creation of demand for the domestically-produced goods.
One method of assuring strong local demand was by protecting local 
industry and agriculture from competition.
This protection was provided through trade policy restricting 
foreign imports. In Venezuela, a tariff structure was established, but 
due to the Commercial Treaty with the U.S., the tariffs had limited 
ability to restrict imports. Instead, quantitative quotas limited 
imports and protected a portion of the local market for domestically 
produced goods.
Licensing, another method of protection, required applicants to 
prove 1) potential absorbability in the internal market, 2) use of 
domestic inputs, and 3) impact on employment, prices and amount of 
value added. By 1962, 269 commodities were affected by licensing, 
while by the end of 1969 the total number rose to 599. (Perez Sainz & 
Zarembka 1979).
In addition to the use of tariffs and licensing quotas to
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regulate trade, the state also served to protect the development of 
local industry by regulating foreign capital. By the end of the 1960s
it was evident that the use of licensing and duty exemptions to protect
nascent industry from the competition of foreign goods was not serving 
to protect local industry from foreign capital. Increasing 
nationalistic feeling caused government to begin to regulate foreign 
participation. The milk industry was one of the first industries to be 
affected by the force of "venezolanizaclon". Direct action of the 
state resulted in the foreign ownership of the Nestle-Borden
corporation to be reduced to 40% (Perez Sainz & Zarembka 1979).
Venezuelan entry into the Andean Pact in 1973 further 
strengthened the nationalization of industry, especially through the 
24th article, which laid out clear guidelines for the registration of 
foreign capital, and limited the repatriation of capital and profits.
To enforce compliance with Article 24, Venezuela created the 
SuperIntendencla de Inversiones Extranjeras (SIEX) for the purpose of 
classifying firms as national, foreign or mixed, regulating foreign 
investment, controlling technology and patents, and controlling 
internal and external loans (Perez Sainz & Zarembka 1979). In 1976, 
commitment to the process of venezolanizaclon was made clear when the 
government decreed that major foreign manufacturers would eventually be 
required to sell 80% of their stock to Venezuelans. The forced 
nationalization of these firms was never completed since the 
administration changed the requirements at various times and eventually 
the process became bureaucratically stalled (Martz & Myers 1986).
State protection of the agricultural sector was extensive. While
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considerable amounts of state investment were spent to develop 
agricultural infrastructure, the majority was spent on production 
subsidies (Maxim Ross 1990). Interest rates for agriculture were 
subsidized, providing long-term loans at very low interest rates 
(Delgado 1991; Roberts et al. 1990; Viernes 1990d). With the exception 
of the early years of the Luis Herrera CampIns' administration (1979- 
1983), the government regulated agricultural prices by guaranteeing a 
return to growers and subsidizing the products in order to guarantee 
cheap food for urban consumers (Delgado 1991; Herman 1986; Martz 1980).
In addition, imported agricultural inputs were subsidized by the 
over-valued bolivar and price-support programs 5 (Carlos Gonzalez 
1990). Domestic production was protected by high import tariffs 
(Herman 1986; Martz 1980), and domestic consumption was guaranteed 
through mandatory purchases by large agro-industrialist before import 
licenses would be granted (Delgado 1991; Carlos Gonzalez 1990; Roberts 
et al. 1990) .
The final important role of the state was to create demand in the 
internal market through its role as provider and distributor of wealth. 
The state was not only "all-powerful and authoritative, but also 
generous, to improve the welfare of all its members" (BCV 1988).
This role was reflected in a social redistribution policy 
supported partly through state expenditure on public works and the 
creation of a state bureaucracy. This was focused especially in 
education, public health facilities, housing programs, and the
fertilizers, for example, were produced in Venezuela exclusively 
by one state enterprise which sold to farmers at reduced prices (Carlos 
Gonzalez 1990) .
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construction of water and sewage systems (Hein 1980; Perez Sainz & 
Zarembka 1979).
Petroleum provided sufficient funds for the state to stimulate
growth through investment, while at the same time supporting the middle
and working classes (Myers & Martz 1986).
Each government granted extensive subsidies, contracts, and 
infrastructure to entrepreneurs while charging the lowest 
taxes on the continent and allowing some of the highest 
profits. At the same time... governments could afford to 
support... price controls, huge food subsidies, and an 
agrarian reform. (Karl 1986:215).
Finally, the state also served as a protector of wages by 
guaranteeing the rights of unions to collective bargaining and benefits 
(Ibarra 1990; Llambi 1982).
EXHAUSTION OF THE INWARD-ORIENTED MODEL
Although some early success of the inward-oriented model was 
evident throughout the sixties and seventies (Hirschman 1968), by the 
end of the 1970’s and.early 1980’s, there was increasing agreement that 
the sembrar el petroleo model had not eliminated the primary structural 
problems of the economy. In spite of extensive state intervention and 
considerable petroleum revenue, it was clear that the economy under the 
inward-oriented model had succeeded in none of its three primary goals: 
1) creating a sectorally-balanced economy; 2) stimulating sufficient 
internal market demand to generate a more equitable social situation; 
nor in 3) decreasing vulnerability to external forces (Alvarez 1988;
BCV 1988; Marquez 1983; Morales 1983).
Persistent structural problems, exacerbated by conjuncture shocks 
resulted in the exhaustion of the inward-oriented model. One of the 
primary structural limitations remaining, in spite of considerable
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effort, was the persistence of sectoral imbalance.
Venezuela had been characterized by external vulnerability almost 
since the discovery of petroleum in the 1920's (Alvarez 1988). Even 
though consensus had existed among Venezuelan leaders for four decades 
to exploit petroleum in order to develop the other sectors of the 
economy, Venezuela's dependence on petroleum remained high (Martz 
1986).
Since 1930, when petroleum replaced coffee and cacao as the 
primary export, petroleum has never accounted for less than 90% of 
total exports (IMF 1990; Maza Zavala 1985). This dependence continued 
through the 1970's and early 1980's, with petroleum accounting for an 
average 94% of total exports (IMF 1988, calculations by author), and 
two-thirds of government revenue (Alvarez 1988; Morales 1983). In 
1983-84, oil accounted for 96% of foreign exchange income, and 
Venezuela depended on petroleum to make payments on its foreign debt 
(LAWR 1/6/84).
Investment in manufacturing and other non-petroleum industries 
under the inward-oriented model was substantial, yet by the 1980's the 
non-petroleum sector had not developed sufficiently to lessen the 
importance of petroleum to the economy (Morales 1983).
In the fourth national plan (1970-74), it was decided that the 
public sector would develop export potential, while the private sector 
focused on import substitution (Morales 1983). Strong state 
intervention in the development of industry was concentrated in basic 
industries, resulting in substantial production capacity and expanded 
exports in steel and aluminum (Morales 1983), but not the
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diversification of exports. The export of manufactured goods increased 
steadily through the 1970's but from a very low beginning level, and by 
1980 still represented only 3.8% of total exports (Morales 1983).
The development of industry in Venezuela was hindered by its 
concentration in the hands of the public sector (whose management was 
inefficient and ineffective (BCV 1988), and whose investment was 
concentrated in a few select industries). A limited domestic market, 
and the fixed exchange rate which limited international competitiveness 
(Morales 1983) also served to retard industrial growth. As a result of 
price controls, private sector investment in Venezuela was largely 
focused toward the service sector (BCV 1988; Morales 1983).
When the first oil boom hit Venezuela in 1973 and 1974, 
manufacturing infrastructure and industrial potential existed but were 
undermined by a "gold-rush" demand (Rangel 1983). The petro-boom 
created a demand greater than supply capacity, resulting in an import 
boom which "drowned domestic production" (BCV 1988; Morales 1983; 
Salazar-Carrillo 1986). Venezuela's manufacturing capability, which 
had grown steadily from the 1930's through the early 1970's, was 
weakened by imports that were financed by the oil booms (Salazar- 
Carrillo 1986).
Despite major efforts by the Venezuelan state to stimulate and 
protect agriculture, the sector proved to be "one of the most notable 
disappointments" of the sembrar el petrdleo plan (Roberts et al. 1990).
Growth in the sector was limited by some inherent climatic 
limitations. A substantial portion of the Venezuela territory is 
mountainous and difficult to cultivate. The highest percentage of
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crops are grown in the Llanos region which makes up one-third of the 
total land area and is subject to recurring floods and droughts. The 
uncertainty of climatic factors, and the time lag between investment 
and return (planting and harvesting) makes the supply of agricultural 
products inflexible and private sector investment unlikely (Delgado 
1991; Herman 1986; Martz 1980; Maxim Ross 1990).
Structural factors also served to limit the growth of the 
agricultural sector. The Agrarian Reform was moderately successful, 
but overall the results were not what had been hoped (Martz 1980; 
Viernes 1990b). The program had generated substantial redistribution, 
albeit less than proposed; had increased funding specifically destined 
for agriculture, and supported an expansion of government services 
(Martz 1980). However, by 1970 it was clear that the class 
differentiation in the countryside had worsened rather than improved 
(Martz 1980). Problems in land tenure remained, including land misuse, 
and problems with title grants (LAWR 22/3/85). By 1985, it was 
estimated that of the 40 million hectares of arable land, less than two 
percent was under cultivation (Herman 1986; LAWR 5/7/85). Although 
producers had permanent use privileges, ninety percent of the land 
still legally belonged to the government, leaving producers with no 
collateral for loans (Delgado 1991; Herman 1986). The seasonal nature 
of agricultural production created periodic shortages of labor, 
frequently filled by illegal Colombian immigrants (LAER 7/5/76).
The "paternalism" of the state also contributed to the problems 
of agriculture as the proliferation of state agencies created a 
confusing, disorganized network of agencies with overlapping
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responsibility (Herman 1986; LAER 7/5/76; LAWR 5/7/85; Martz 1980). 
Price regulations limited profitability and thereby discouraged 
production and investment (LAER 3/6/77; LAWR 5/7/85; Martz 1980; Maxim 
Ross 1990). Likewise, inefficiency and corruption in government 
agencies, particularly the agricultural credit agencies, resulted in 
ineffective use of state investment, and the channeling of loans to 
large farmers who could afford to bribe officials (LAER 7/5/76, 3/6/77; 
Herman 1986; Martz 1980).
Several forces competed for priority in agricultural policy and 
resulted in inconsistent and contradictory policy (Martz 1980; Viernes 
1990a). The conflict between social and economic objectives was 
evidenced in priorities varying between small-scale peasant development 
and large-scale technocratic support for agro-industry and commercial 
farming. Ranchers competed with farmers for available credit (Petras & 
Morley 1978), and price controls providing cheap food for urban workers 
conflicted with private sector forces seeking to free prices to 
increase profitability (Herman 1986; Martz 1980; Roberts et al. 1990).
The result of these factors was an agricultural sector 
contributing less to the nation's GDP than any nation in Latin America 
(Martz 1980). Venezuela experienced stagnation of national food 
production and growing import dependence. In 1971, food made up 46% of 
total imports, rising to 71% in 1979 (Martz 1980) before dropping in 
1982 to 65% and 50% in 1985 (Herman 1986).
The problems of agriculture were illustrated by the food crisis 
in early 1977, precipitated by the halting of all Colombian exports. 
Both countries were suffering from shortage caused by prolonged drought
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after widespread flooding. In Venezuela the shortage led to an 
emergency decree allowing duty-free import of staple foods for three 
months (LAER 13/5/77).
The inability to diversify the economy and provide other sources 
of national income left Venezuela highly vulnerable to an unstable 
world economic context and volatile oil markets (Alvarez 1988).
In addition to persistent petroleum dependency, Venezuela 
continued in its vulnerability to external forces through its 
dependency on the U.S. for trade and technology. Hughes (1984) defines 
trade dependency as the condition when a nation depends heavily upon 
one other nation for most of its trade. Simply put, Venezuela is 
trade-dependent upon the United States.6 Since 1946, the U.jS._has 
received over 30% of all Venezuelan exports, replacing the Dutch 
Antilles as Venezuela's major trade partner in 1960. During the 1960's 
the U.S. received for over 40% of all Venezuelan exports. Although 
that percentage dropped to around 33% during the oil-boom years of the 
1970's, the U.S. remained the major trading partner, with the nearest 
competition accounting for only 10% of Venezuelan exports (Maza Zavala
1985).
Venezuelan dependence on the U.S. as a source of imports is even 
more marked. Since 1913 the U.S. has supplied the vast majority of 
Venezuelan imports. Reaching a peak of 70% of all imports in 1946, the 
U.S. percentage dropped through the 1960's and 1970's to around 40%.
6A s Maza Zavala (1985) argues, this trade-dependence is a natural 
result of two factors: Venezuela is one of the world's leading
producers of petroleum, and the United States is the world's single 
largest consumer of petroleum.
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The nearest single nation competitor is Germany which provides less 
than 10% (Maza Zavala 1985). During the import substitution period, 
this trade dependence, evidenced by the terms of the Commercial Treaty, 
limited Venezuela's ability to regulate imports and thereby protect 
developing national industry.
The continued vulnerability created by trade dependence is 
illustrated by the threat presented to the Venezuelan economy by a bill 
proposed in the U.S. Congress in 1986 which sought to tax petroleum 
imports. At that time, the U.S. accounted for 46% of Venezuelan 
exports. Had the bill passed, 7 with OPEC-bound Venezuela unable to 
raise prices to make up the loss, the import tax would have cut sharply 
into the national economy (LAWR 14/3/86).
Venezuelan development also continued to be hindered by 
persistent technological dependence, a side effect of the import 
substitution model that Venezuela shares with many of its Latin 
American neighbors (BCV 1988). Besides the enormous aggregate cost, 
the need to import technology to support industrialization frequently 
required foreign borrowing. Much of the imported technology was 
inappropriate for Venezuela's needs, involving the "transplant of 
technology rather than the transference (Marquez 1983:32; Morales 
1983).
Besides being capital-intensive and therefore having limited 
ability to absorb labor, the knowledge of maintenance and use of the 
machinery frequently remained with foreign technicians (Marquez 1983;
Venezuela set up a powerful Washington lobby group to work to 
prevent the bill's passage (LAWR 14/3/86).
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Perez Sainz & Zarembka 1979). Consequently, Venezuelan 
industrialization was hindered by limitations of its labor force. 
Venezuela lacked skilled workers and technicians, as well as managerial 
capability (LAER 14/5/76; LlambI 1982; Marquez 1983; Morales 1983).
Through sembrar el petroleo, Venezuela sought to reduce its 
vulnerability to the world economy by developing its own national 
industry. Instead, development of its industry, dependent on expensive 
foreign technology and foreign knowledge, only contributed to the 
overall problems of vulnerability.
Venezuelan development was also hindered by persistent 
limitations of its internal market. Although by the 1970's it could be 
said that all Venezuelans had benefitted to some degree by the oil 
wealth (Martz 1980) through subsidized food and gasoline and government 
regulation, the internal market was proving inadequate to stimulate 
sufficient demand for manufactured goods. This was due to two primary 
factors— a worsening in the distribution of income, and the inherent 
structural limitation of Venezuela's size.
Venezuela previously had a low average income, but petroleum 
contributed to making it a nation with a highly unequal distribution of 
wealth (LlambI 1982; Sonntag & de la Cruz 1985). Due to the 
inappropriate nature of the imported technology, job creation had not 
kept up with population growth or the trend toward urbanization (Baer 
1972). Although by 1981 Venezuela had reached one of the highest per 
capita incomes in the region, the income remained unevenly distributed 
(Hirschman 1968). In 1980, it was estimated that 40% of the population 
lived at or below the subsistence level (Morales 1983). While some
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Venezuelans benefitted from the petroleum booms and evidenced 
"consumption habits which were distant from reality" (Alvarez 1988), 
these benefits clearly did not extend to the entire population, thereby 
limiting the growth of the internal market.
Secondly, Venezuela was affected by one of the limitations of the 
structuralist model that was identified in hindsight— that of its size. 
Venezuela is a medium sized country in a Latin American context, larger 
than the Caribbean and Central American nations, but smaller than the 
giants of Brazil and Mexico. A nation's size affects potential 
development through the size of the internal market. Nations such as 
Mexico and Brazil were relatively successful in their import 
substitution programs, completing the various phases and emerging with 
heavy industry and capital-building capability. The smaller countries 
grouped together to form regional markets such as the Central American 
Common Market. Venezuela, and its similar sized neighbors of Chile and 
Colombia were not as successful in import substitution, a result 
theorists now attribute partially to its size (Williamson 1990).
As has been shown, while the sembrar el petroleo strategy in 
Venezuela was supported by abundant petroleum income and strong state 
intervention, due to various structural limitations, the model failed 
to provide for sectorally balanced growth, development of the internal 
market, and reduced vulnerability to the world economy. The eventual 
demise of the inward-oriented economic growth model was sealed by the 
conjuncture of negative global and domestic economic factors that acted 
upon the Venezuelan economy in the 1970's and early 1980's.
Since 1970, the world international economic climate has been
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volatile and uncertain. The industrial countries have experienced two 
recessions, both deeper than any period since the Great Depression, 
including unsteady international exchange rates, destabilizing 
inflation, record interest rates (Dornbusch & Helmers 1988), and 
falling commodity prices (Cypher 1989; Ibarra 1990; Williamson 1990). 
These variables created an environment of instability, leading to 
"shocks" that strongly affected vulnerable developing economies 
(Dornbusch and Helmers 1988). Venezuelan economic development has been 
drastically affected by the world economic climate. Three 
international factors in particular contributed to the exhaustion of 
the inward-oriented model: the instability of the world oil market;
Venezuela's external debt; and changes in international interest rates.
As the world's ninth largest petroleum producer and fourth 
largest petroleum exporting country, Venezuela’s economic health is 
unduly tied to the petroleum market (Republic of Venezuela 1990).
World oil prices are directly affected by world economic events, such 
as recession in the industrialized countries, by global political 
events such as war in the Middle East, and by environmental and 
climatic events such as mild winters in the northern hemisphere and new 
petroleum discoveries. Since its discovery, Venezuelan petroleum has 
alternated between "boom" and "bust" syndromes in spite of direct 
attempts to control world petroleum prices through OPEC membership.
During the oil boom of the 1950's, Venezuela accumulated more 
foreign exchange than any nation in the world except West Germany, 
while Treasury reserves tripled and oil exports increased 2.5 times
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(Karl 1986). During the decade of the 1960's, the Middle Eastern 
countries emerged as world petroleum producers as well as attractive 
investment prospects for oil transnational (Perez Sainz & Zarembka
1979). Facing increased competition, Venezuela took the lead in the 
founding of OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) 8 
(Republic of Venezuela 1990; Martz 1986). The Venezuelan purpose in 
seeking official cooperation with other Third World oil-producers was 
to increase the power of the oil-producing countries over that of the 
transnational petroleum companies (Hein 1980).
The decade of the 1970's recorded major changes in the world 
petroleum market, foremost of which was the drastic rise in global 
prices. The price of oil on the international market jumped from 
US$3.00 per barrel in 1973 to US$29.00 in 1980. The impact of the 
price increases was made more severe in that increases were 
concentrated in the two "boom" periods of 1973-74 and 1979-80 (Twomey 
1988).
The 1973-74 boom, a trebling of prices in one year, was a 
consequence of the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, the resulting Arab oil 
boycott (Hein 1980), and of OPEC market manipulations (BCV 1988;
Salgado 1987). In 1973, OPEC member countries acted together to raise 
oil prices by adopting a plan known as "the challenge of sudden 
wealth"9 (McLrquez 1983:13) in which prices were raised collectively in
8Juan Pablo Perez Alfonzo, President Betancourt's oil minister, 
served as the "principal architect" in the development of the cartel 
(Martz 1986:246), founded in 1960 (Republic of Venezuela 1990).
9In response to the 1973 OPEC price hikes the rich consumer 
nations bonded together and created the International Energy 
Association, a consumers cartel which continues to oppose and challenge
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order to increase petroleum revenue and thereby stimulate the internal 
development of their respective nations (Marquez 1983). By early 1978 
the market had weakened as a result of a world oil surplus due to a 
mild winter in the US, increased US access to petroleum from Alaska and 
the North Sea (LAER 27/1/78), and a conscious conservation policy in 
the industrialized nations (Hein 1980).
The second "boom" for the oil-producing nations was a surge in 
oil income in 1979 stimulated by the Iranian Revolution (LAER 14/9/79; 
Rangel 1983). The boom was followed by another world oil glut in late 
1979 and early 1980 (LAWR 22/8/80). By mid-1981, the health of the oil 
industry was weakened by a crisis of OPEC unity, as well as by the 
impact of another mild winter in the industrialized countries (Martz
1986). Venezuela was forced to cut its prices by more than six dollars 
per barrel, and to lower production by 10% in conjunction with other 
OPEC members. At a time when Venezuelan oil accounted for 95% of total 
exports and 72% of government income market, these changes represented 
an estimated loss of government income of roughly 10-20 billion 
bolivars (LAWR 24/7/81). The market recovered again in early 1984 as 
the Iran-Iraq war stimulated a temporary increase in prices, but this 
was followed by a progressive decline throughout the 1980's (Twomey 
1988).
During the last quarter of 1985, world oil output stood at about 
1.1 million barrels per day above demand, an especially negative 
situation because th& surplus occurred in the middle of winter in the 
northern countries, and before OPEC producers increased their
OPEC (Green 1979).
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production by about 400,000 barrels per day (LAWR 17/1/86). Thus by 
1986 the wholesale export price for crude petroleum had leveled out at 
less than half its 1985 level (IMF 1990, 1991). The export price of 
crude dropped from an average of $26.89 per barrel in 1985 to $12.82 
per barrel in 1986, which meant that PDVSA contributed $5.7 billion 
less in foreign exchange to the central bank in 1986 than 1985, and 
that the government received 35% less petroleum revenue than had been 
budgeted (Republic of Venezuela 1990). In 1988 the petroleum market 
dropped further, with the average export price dropping from $16.32 per 
barrel in 1987, to $13.51 per barrel in 1988 (Republic of Venezuela 
1990).
The financial problems created by a roller coaster petroleum 
market were worsened in the 1980's by the impact of Venezuela's 
external debt. The Venezuelan government is frequently criticized for 
its borrowing policy and its contraction of a large public sector debt 
at the same time that Venezuela was profiting from the oil booms 
I International Currency Review 1983; LAWR 17/10/80; Rangel 1983; 
Salazar-Carrillo 1986).
Persons who defend the original contraction of Venezuela's 
foreign debt for development projects (LAER 19/8/77, 16/12/77) divide 
the borrowing into two major periods. The first period, from 1974-78, 
was characterized by public sector debt that allegedly was covered by 
sufficient savings domestically, so that the debt incurred was not 
destabilizing (Alvarez 1988; Rodriguez 1985). The second period, from 
1979 forward, was undertaken to finance the capital flight of the 
private sector and those taking advantage of the overvalued bolivar
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(Alvarez 1988; Rodriguez 1985).
Borrowing had been encouraged by a world climate of negative or 
very low international interest rates (Cypher 1989; Twomey 1988) more 
favorable than rates available from Venezuelan banks (LAER 1/1/11), and 
by Venezuela's excellent world credit rating (Alvarez 1988; LAER 
7/1/77; McCoy 1986).
Regardless of the placement of blame, debt service on the 
contracted loans had risen to 17% of the entire government budget by 
1978 (LAER 19/8/77). With the change of administration in 1979, the 
total debt stood somewhere between 19.2 and 26 billion dollars (LAER 
5/10/79).
In late 1980, Venezuela began to have problems servicing its 
foreign debt. The majority of the foreign debt was short-term, poorly 
structured and not well accounted for (International Currency Review 
1983; Rangel 1983). Annual debt servicing obligations (amortization of 
principal and interest payments) had risen to nearly 15% of total 
exports, compared to less than 5% in 1976, and foreign bankers began to 
express concern about Venezuela's ability to make payments (LAWR 
14/11/80).
At the beginning of 1983, the terms of maturity of Venezuelan 
public sector external debt were such that over 50% of the total 
outstanding debt of $29.2 billion was due by December 31, 1983 
(International Currency Review 1983; Republic of Venezuela 1990). At 
the same time, the economy had been weakened by relatively low 
petroleum prices and a large public sector deficit, resulting in a 
substantial decrease in international reserves and capital flight
(Republic of Venezuela 1990). The result was the Venezuelan "debt 
crisis" (BCV 1988), less than six months after Mexico had developed the 
same syndrome.
The problems of the direct public sector debt were compounded by 
the unauthorized borrowing of state enterprises (Alvarez 1988; 
International Currency Review 1983; McCoy 1986; Morales 1983; Rangel 
1983). In order to bypass government limits on medium and long-term 
loans, state companies took out billions of dollars worth of short-term 
loans for projects that could not produce returns for several years 
(LAWR 29/10/82). The result was a failure to meet scheduled debt 
repayments by some of these state companies, which eventually affected 
the creditability of all Venezuelan borrowers, including the government 
which had a consistent record of payment (LAWR 29/10/82, Republic of 
Venezuela 1990).
By February of 1983, concentrated efforts were underway to 
refinance the public debt, and thereby obtain new terms for all of its 
short-term foreign debt (LAWR 11/2/83). Venezuela declared a
10One example of the extent of the indirect public sector debt is a 
loan guaranteed by Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento (CVF). Early in 
January 1983, Nordic Asia Bank, an international bank based in Hong 
Kong, filed suit against the CVF because of failure to meet repayment 
obligations. Within the week, seven other banks also brought suit 
against the CVF. At the same time, it became known that several other 
government agencies such as Sidor and Centro Simon Bolivar had been 
late with payments or ignored communications from their creditors (LAWR 
21/1/83). While the Venezuelan government was not legally responsible 
for these indirect loans, in practice the government acted as guarantor 
of last resort (Alvarez 1988; International Currency Review 1983).
These loans generated a lower credit rating for all of Venezuela, 
resulted in new loans contracted on less favorable terms.
Eventually, the Republic of Venezuela assumed the obligations of nearly 
40 state companies (Alvarez 1988).
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moratorium on its debt payments (LAWR 1/7/83) while restructuring was 
underway. Discussions began in March of 1983, and were concluded in 
February of 198611 (Republic of Venezuela 1990). The agreement reduced 
the debt service burden over a five year period based on a new payment 
schedule, lower interest rates and the cancellation of commissions and 
fees (LAWR 8/6/84).
Throughout the negotiation period tensions increased between the 
commercial banks and Latin American debtors because of growing 
animosity against the debt burden. The debtor countries began to 
associate their repayment problems with destructive macro-economic 
policies within the industrialized nations, particularly interest rate 
hikes in the U.S. Debtor nations began to discuss collective 
bargaining, including setting their own repayment level as an annual 
percentage of export earnings (Ewell 1986; LAWR 18/5/84).
Venezuela's rescheduling position during the period was bolstered 
by fears in Washington of a debtor's cartel, and the desire to "reward" 
nations willing to negotiate directly with the banks (Ewell 1986; LAWR 
8/6/84). In Venezuela, domestic pressure was increasing against the 
rescheduling terms. Led by Fedecamaras and CTV (Venezuela's largest 
labor union), calls were made to tie debt payments to export earnings, 
a condition explicitly rejected by creditors (LAWR 23/8/85, 2/5/86).
As part of the negotiations, Venezuela had obtained the inclusion 
of a "contingency clause" which allowed for future renegotiation of
“Although an agreement covering public sector debt was reached in 
September of 1984, the signing and implementation of the agreement was 
postponed until February 1986 due to the difficulties of reaching 
agreement on conditions covering private debt (LAWR 24/1/86).
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debt terms in the event of a economic "catastrophe" such as an oil 
price drop (LAWR 25/10/85; Republic of Venezuela 1990). Two months 
after signing the agreement, President Jaime Lusinchi invoked the 
"contingency clause" to demand new repayment terms in light of a soft 
world oil market (LAWR 2/5/86, 2/10/86). The action was initially 
resisted by commercial banks which eventually agreed to defer payment 
of principal but rejected the Venezuelan attempt to link payments to 
oil income (LAWR 29/1/87; Republic of Venezuela 1990).
Disagreement continued through 1988. Bankers refused to make new 
loans until Venezuela implemented an adjustment program (LAWR 1/9/88). 
As Venezuela experienced reduced petroleum revenues, critical levels of 
foreign reserves and an expected balance of payments deficit, the 
Finance Minister warned that unless new loans were granted, Venezuela 
would look for an alternative "in wiping out the foreign debt" (LAWR 
4/8/88).
The last attempt at forming a debtor's cartel 12 to strengthen 
the debtor nation's position failed in early 1989, and, in February, 
Venezuela submitted its first letter of intent to the IMF, which opened 
the door for new loans and negotiations with commercials banks. 
Venezuela's debt increased its vulnerability to moods and changes in 
the international financial community, reduced its resistance to 
outside political and economic influence, weakened the buoyancy of the
12After his election, President Carlos Andres Perez had planned to 
make his inauguration ceremonies a "debt-event", attempting to bring 
together debtor countries (the Group of 8, the association of the 
region’s largest debtor nations) to make a united stand against 
creditors. The attempt failed when leaders from Mexico and Argentina 
failed to attend (LAWR 19/1/89).
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economy in light of petroleum fluctuations, encumbered important 
foreign currency, and transferred vital capital abroad.
Once loans had been contracted, Venezuela's susceptibility to the 
fluctuations of the international petroleum market was increased by 
greater vulnerability to the fluctuations in global economic variables, 
particularly interest rates in the developed countries.
On October 6, 1979, U.S. Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul 
Volcker announced changes in U.S. monetary policy designed to moderate 
domestic inflation. The measures included a record raise in interest 
rates to 12% and changes in monetary policy to restrict aggregate money 
supply (LAER 19/10/79). The policy changes caused the immediate 
appreciation of the U.S. dollar against other currencies, as well as 
corresponding increases in U.S. private bank's prime lending rate and 
in the Euro-currency lending rate (LAER 19/10/79). Results for Latin 
America included an immediate jump in debt servicing costs, as most 
debt was held in dollars. For Venezuela the estimated immediate 
increase in loan service was more than $200 million (LAER 19/10/79).
After the sudden rise in 1979, interest rates continued to 
increase, so that loans contracted when real interest rates (interest 
rates adjusted for inflation) were very low were suddenly much more 
costly. Short-term interest rates such as Libor (Euro-currency rates) 
jumped from 8.8% in 1978 to 16.9% in 1981 (Twomey 1988), eventually 
rising to a peak of over 20% (Williamson 1990). Estimates of the 
change in "real” interest rates suggest a jump from one to five percent 
in 1978, to eleven to fifteen percent in 1982 (Cypher 1989; Twomey 
1988).
76
The longer term effects of the increased interest rates included 
a tighter money supply. U.S. bankers exercised increased caution in 
making loans, facilitating the implementation of stricter criteria, and 
causing a contraction in the total money available internationally for 
loans (LAER 19/10/79) as the "flood of loanable funds of the late 
1970's suddenly turned into a drought during the early 1980's" (Twomey 
1988:7).
There was a shift in lending patterns as international bankers 
evidenced preference to loan to industrialized nations rather than 
developing countries. The United States combined its tight monetary 
policy with an expansionary fiscal policy, financed from abroad with 
loans of nearly $60 billion, competing directly with Latin American and 
other Third World countries for international financing (Twomey 1988). 
These factors contributed to an "absolute collapse" in new private bank 
lending to the Third World as a whole (Cypher 1989:53). Any money 
available to Latin American borrowers was accompanied by higher 
interest rates and shorter repayment periods for their new loans (LAWR 
17/10/80).
International financial agencies emerged as new sources of loans 
for developing nations, therefore creating a change in primary lending 
agencies to the Third World. Between 1975 and 1981 over 75% of 
external financing provided to developing nations was from private 
transnational banks, while by 1986, 96% of new debt came from official 
sources such as the IMF, World Bank and the Inter-American Development 
Bank (Cypher 1989). With the growing dominance of the international 
financial agencies as the primary sources of new loans, necessary to
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timulate economic growth and support debt repayment, came increasing 
intervention by these agencies in opening up the domestic economies of 
debtor nations.
In addition to the powerful international forces affecting the 
Venezuelan economy, several national factors were also acting upon the 
situation, particularly the exhaustion of Venezuela's international 
reserves and fiscal disequilibrium.
With small variations, Venezuela's international reserves13 had 
grown steadily throughout the 1960's, from $208 million in 1960 to $637 
million in 1970. In 1970, the reserves nearly doubled to the $1 
billion mark where they remained until 1974. With the 1973-74 oil 
boom, the reserves jumped in one year from the 1973 level of $1.9 
billion to an average level of 6.0 billion. Reserves reached their 
highest level in history in 1975, but then progressively declined (IMF 
1990). Two primary forces created this drain of reserves: balance of
payments deficits and capital flight.
Capital flight became a serious problem in the late 1970's and 
early 1980's. Encouraged by a weakened petroleum market, government 
measures to combat inflation (Myers & Martz 1986), uncompetitive 
domestic interest rates, and the ability to profit from the overvalued 
bolivar (Alvarez 1988; Rangel 1983) Venezuelan private capital was sent 
abroad in search of a higher return.
Beginning as a serious problem in 1977, several record "rushes" 
of capital flight occurred during August and September of 1977, (LAER
^International reserves are defined as total reserves minus gold, 
based on IMF procedures and statistics (IMF 1990).
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16/12/77), June to September in 1981, (Petras & Morley 1983) and in 
February of 1982 (LAWR 5/3/82). Estimates of losses reached 100 
million dollars daily (Petras & Morley 1983).
Various attempts were made to stem the outward flow of capital, 
beginning with the restructuring of interest rate controls, including 
the end of a 40 year regime of fixed interest rates controlled by the 
Venezuelan Central Bank (Alvarez 1988; LAWR 4/9/81).
In response to these losses, the government moved to increase the 
international reserves in 1982 by placing under Central Bank control 
4.51 billion bolivars of PDVSA reserves14 (LAWR 1/10/82; Martz 1980).
At the same time, action was taken to revalue Venezuelan gold reserves 
in an attempt to improve Venezuela's financial image abroad during debt 
restructuring (LAWR 1/10/82, 15/10/82). By mid-September of 1982, 
foreign reserves stood at just over $5 billion. The gold revaluation 
raised this level to $8 billion and the takeover of PDVSA reserves 
increased it further to $15 billion (LAWR 1/10/82).
In February 1983, international reserves again dropped 
drastically (LAWR 25/2/83). The government responded by suspending all 
foreign exchange operations for over a week (International Currency 
Review 1983; LAWR 25/2/83; Marquez 1983; Rangel 1983), after twenty 
years of free exchange convertibility (Alvarez 1988). The decisions 
made during the suspensions of exchange resulted in the adoption of a 
three tier exchange system which included a floating exchange rate
l4Beginning with the nationalization of the petroleum industry in 
1976, PDVSA had been given 10 percent of the net value of petroleum 
exports to provide for self-financing. By the close of 1981, the fund 
had grown to over nine billion dollars (Martz 1986).
(International Currency Review 1983; Marquez 1983).
In 1985, while a report in El Nacional estimated that Venezuelans 
held over thirty billion dollars in deposits abroad (September 11, 1985 
as cited in Ewell 1986), a profitable oil market allowed growth of 
international reserves, rising to an all time average high for the year 
of 10.3 billion dollars (IMF 1990) By early April of 1986, when the 
price of oil sold for half what it had in January, reserves had dropped 
by $600 million since the beginning of the year (LAWR 2/5/86). After 
the peak in 1985, the continual decline of oil prices was mirrored by 
the steadily decline international reserves. In 1986, the average 
level for the year had dropped from the 1985 of $10.3 billion to $6.4 
billion, followed by an average 1987 level of $5.9 billion, and in 1988 
the reserves reached the lowest level since 1973, standing at an 
average annual level of $3.1 billion (IMF 1990). The low point 
occurred in August of 1988 when operational international reserves 
stood at $2.5 billion, scarcely above the $2 billion "critical level" 
(LAWR 4/8/88).
Compounding the problem of the exhaustion of international 
reserves, three other factors served to create fiscal disequilibrium in 
Venezuela: current account deficits, rising inflation, and the public 
sector deficit.
Having enjoyed trade surpluses for 50 years, Venezuela began 
experiencing current account deficits15 in the late 1960's, when
15Three similar terms are used to designate the basic idea of the 
difference between exports and imports. "Trade balance" is the most 
simple measure, reflecting the difference of merchandise imports 
subtracted from merchandise exports (IMF 1990). "Current account" or 
"balance of payments" (interchangeable) is a more comprehensive
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steadily growing imports began to outdistance relatively constant 
levels of petroleum exports. After small deficits in 1968-1972, 
Venezuela recovered a positive current account balance with the 
extraordinary increased in petroleum prices in 1973 (IMF 1990). After 
the boom years, however, Venezuela faced recurrent balance of payments 
deficits based on booming imports and stagnating exports (Petras & 
Morley 1983).
The positive balance regained in 1973 lasted only four years 
before quadrupled amounts of imports negated the benefits of the 
increased petroleum income (IMF 1990). The structure of imports 
changed from the trends of the fifties and sixties, with the increased 
import of consumer goods and capital goods (such as large capital 
equipment for development projects (LAER 16/12/77), while decreasing 
intermediate imports, (Llambi 1982). During 1974-78, the ratio of 
imports to GDP rose from 17% to 37%, while the ratio of exports to GDP 
dropped from 44.7% to 25.6% (Petras & Morley 1983). A growing 
percentage of imports was made up of foodstuffs. Stagnating 
agricultural production was creating a situation of imported food 
dependency. In 1971, Venezuela imported 46% of its basic foodstuffs, 
but by 1978 the percentage had grown to nearly 70%, including 70% of 
caraota negra, Venezuela's staple black bean (Martz 1980).
Inflation also became a problem in the early 1970's. From 1960 
until 1973, the average annual rate of inflation in Venezuela was 1.2%, 
at or below international levels (Rangel 1983). The flood of income
measure, consisting of total national receipts minus total national 
payments (Dornbusch & Helmers 1988), and will therefore be used as the 
basis of analysis in this thesis.
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generated by the petro-boom resulted in record amounts of money 
circulating in an economy with few goods to buy, except imports. The 
result was inflation (Rangel 1983). A moderate annual level of 8.2% 
was maintained from 1974 through 1978, but was followed in 1979 by 
12.4%, 21.5% in 1980, and 16.2% in 1981 (IMF 1990). A slight 
moderation was experienced between 1983 and 1986 with an annual average 
rate of around 10%.
The problem of inflation then became more severe following the 
devaluation of the bolivar in December 1986, which changed the exchange 
rate for imports from Bs. 7.50 to 14.50 (LAWR 5/2/87). This 
precipitated three years of unprecedented high rates of inflation, 
reaching 28.1% in 1987, 29.5% in 1988, and 84.5% in 1989 (IMF 1990).
Finally, the economic outlook of Venezuela included frequent 
fiscal deficits. Between 1973 and 1986, there was a public sector 
deficit during seven of the fourteen years (IMF 1990). The excess 
state expenditure also seems to be linked to the overwhelming influence 
of the petroleum booms. Before 1974, according to the Central Bank, 
public sector expenditure was related to economic growth. There was a 
direct relationship between the annual amount of state expenditure and 
the level of gross domestic product growth for that year (BCV 1988). 
After 1975, however, that relationship disappeared (BCV 1988). A three 
year trend of fiscal deficit began in 1976, followed by small budget 
surpluses in 1979 and 1980 (due to a second oil boom), but deficits 
reappeared in 1981, 1982 and 1983 and then again in 1986 (IMF 1990).
While consecutive deficits in the balance of payments operated to 
reduce Venezuela's international reserves and thereby its financial
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independence, the combined pressures of inflation and public sector 
deficits weakened the domestic economy and made capital flight a 
profitable course of action. The result was fiscal disequilibrium and 
an economic crisis for the nation as a whole.
CONCLUSION
The fact that the inward-oriented model had failed to achieve its 
goals was not disputed. Venezuela's non-petroleum sectors had not 
developed sufficiently to lessen petroleum dependence, and by the end 
of the 1980's they had actually stagnated. Domestic demand was hungry 
for imported goods, and while unionized labor and the middle classes 
had prospered, efforts to increase employment and reduce poverty had 
not succeeded. The public sector bureaucracy was excessive and 
wasteful and state intervention had extended too far. The result was 
an economy still dependent on petroleum and vulnerable to external 
forces. The inward-oriented model had failed to meet its goals.
A neo-liberal analysis of the Venezuelan situation might be 
entitled "I told you so." Wrong policies, based on an uncompetitive, 
protected economy and demand stimulation by the state resulted in 
crisis. Venezuelans had no one to blame but themselves, for the 
problems of Venezuelan development were completely internal. Excessive 
protection had resulted in a pampered agricultural sector that could 
not provide enough food for its own population, as well as an 
overprotected, inefficient, and uncompetitive manufacturing sector. 
Excessive state intervention had resulted in an overgrown, inefficient, 
corrupt, mismanaged state, and an over-consuming, unrealistic 
population used to the populist distributions from petroleum rent.
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A proponent of structuralism could argue, on the other hand, that 
the inward-oriented model in Venezuela was a textbook example of 
structural bottlenecks. Development in Venezuela was proceeding 
through the late sixties. In spite of international interference in 
the form of the Commercial Reciprocal Treaty, industry and agriculture 
were growing steadily, and domestic manufacturing was progressively 
substituting for imports. Under state regulation, the internal market 
was developing.
The demise of the inward-oriented model, therefore, is directly 
related to the impact of the petro-boom on structural bottlenecks that 
still remained in the Venezuelan economy. The four-fold price increase 
during 1973 and 1974 created a situation in which a population of 
twelve million annually took in around ten billion dollars (Abente 
1990). While the state tried to allocate the resources toward 
development and protect the economy, structural obstacles kept the 
bonanza from effective use, contributing instead to the proliferation 
of decentralized state agencies, waste, and use of petro-dollars to 
build consensus among competing privileged groups.
If Venezuelan agriculture and manufacturing were indeed pampered, 
it was the result of huge amounts of petro-dollars backed up behind 
bottlenecks such as slowly progressing agrarian reform. If industry 
was unproductive, it was a result of the inherent limitation on the 
internal market created by Venezuela's national size. If Venezuelan 
consumers were unrealistic and import-hungry, it was a result of 
unprecedented amounts of money in the economy. The petro-boom 
undermined employment creation by supporting the import of unsuitable
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technology and machinery. If the Venezuelan state apparatus was 
inefficient, it was due to a lack of still—developing human resources 
and professional managers (Rangel 1983).
Although Venezuela supported the OPEC price manipulations, it did 
not seek the petro-boom. The "challenge of sudden wealth" policy was 
the result of frustration with the relative positions of core and 
periphery nations. It was the natural attempt by a peripheral nation 
to benefit in relation to the rich nations. The response of the world 
market was unpredictable and an example of market failures.
Venezuela's position as a peripheral nation made it vulnerable to 
external market forces— as much to a petro-boom as to a drastic price 
drop. The petro-boom, generated by the outside world, undermined slow 
structural reform and the consensus for national development.
While the neo-liberal and structuralist perspective differ on the 
underlying causes of what went wrong with the inward-oriented model, it 
is important to understanding the emergence of a neo-structural 
development plan to recognize that they do not dispute the 
manifestations of these causes in the form of unproductive, 
overprotected industry and agriculture, the existence of a consumptive 
rather than productive population and the problems of an over-grown, 
wasteful public sector bureaucracy.
The import substitution model in Venezuela was supported by 
revenue from petroleum and extensive state intervention. Due to 
various national and international factors it never achieved its goals 
of sectoral balance, a fully developed internal market or reduced 
vulnerability to world economic forces. Conjunctural forces of the
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world economy, combined with internal structural limitations, led to 
the eventual demise of the model and a change to an outward 
orientation. By the end of the 1980’s, Venezuela experienced the 
coming together of many different factors to precipitate the end of an 
era (Alvarez 1988; BCV 1988; Martz & Myers 1986).
CHAPTER 4
THE EMERGENCE OF THE VENEZUELAN OUTWARD-ORIENTED MODEL 
In 1989, after over thirty years of an explicitly inward-oriented 
development model, the Venezuelan government implemented an outward- 
oriented model based on traditional IMF adjustment policies. The new 
model was based on competitive, free-market principles, focused toward 
trade on the international market. Outward-orientation had developed 
as a result of an increasingly global economy, in which growing 
pressure was exerted on protected economies to open their borders and 
participate in international trade. The growing dominance of the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank, in conjunction with Latin 
American debt, resulted in direct pressure on Venezuela to open its 
economy to a greater extent. A national climate of increased 
competition between previously harmonious groups weakened Venezuela's 
resistance to this external pressure and made "opening up" a necessity.
Although an outward-oriented economy had essentially been decided 
for Venezuela, the newly inaugurated administration of President Carlos 
Andres Perez, in connection with the international financial 
organizations, implemented large-scale, "big bang", neo-liberal changes 
in Venezuelan economic policy (Hausmann 1990).
After the initial period of adjustment, however, domestic 
resistance to neo-liberal policies and the continued intervention of 
the Venezuelan state indicates the emergence of a uniquely Venezuelan 
development model. The model is based on a synthesis of the theories 
of neo-liberalism and structuralism. The new Venezuelan plan uses the
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outward-oriented IMF model while preserving structural perspectives and 
goals.
EVOLUTION TOWARD AN OUTWARD ORIENTATION
Three trends contributed toward the evolution of outward- 
orientation in Venezuela: 1) the growing dominance of the IMF and
World Bank; 2) the progressive opening of other regional economies; and 
3) increased disharmony and competition among groups acting in the 
Venezuelan economy.
The international climate during the progressive exhaustion of 
the import substitution model in Venezuela was characterized by the 
growing dominance of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
in the financial affairs of the world's developing nations. The result 
for developing nations was persistent pressure to participate in 
international trade under a prescribed and homogenous model for 
national economies (Canak 1989).
The importance of the international financial agencies for 
developing nations is not easily overestimated. In additional to 
acting as a direct lending institution, the IMF also serves to validate 
a country's credit rating for commercial banks interested in lending 
directly to the debtor nation. This "seal of good housekeeping" on a 
country's economic policies can be crucial in initial obtention of 
loans, as well as in restructuring terms of a loan (Mittelman & Will
1987).
The IMF and the World Bank, both products of the 1944 Bretton 
Woods International Monetary Conference, are multilateral lending 
agencies that make loans with "conditionality" (Mittelman & Will 1987;
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Streeten 1988).* The original purpose of the IMF was to promote 
international monetary stability by making funds available to member 
nations on a temporary basis to correct short-term imbalances (Sidell 
1988).2 Establishment of the Fund was based on the basic neo-liberal 
philosophy that stable economic development and equitable income 
distribution would only improve in a climate of economic liberalism and 
with limited intervention by the state (Marquez 1983). Conditionality, 
or the acceptance of Fund economic policies as a condition for 
financial assistance, was implicitly introduced to lending policies in 
the early 1950's as a result of pressure by the United States, the 
largest creditor country at that time (Buira 1983; Guerra 1989; Sidell 
1988).
The IMF traditionally advocated economic stabilization policies, 
especially short-term corrections of balance of payments disequilibrium 
(Streeten 1988). Fund conditionality called for short-term, rapid 
adjustments of money supply, restricted government spending, 
deregulation of prices and subsidies, the elimination of tariffs, and 
exchange rate devaluation (Sidell 1988). Conditionality requirements 
hardened throughout the 1970's, and by the 1980's, the demands made 
were more extensive than at any time in Fund history (Buira 1983).
‘Even though both the IMF and the World Bank are international 
organizations, strong influence by the United States is evidenced in 
the placement of the both offices in Washington D.C., near the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, and in the constitutional stipulation that 
allows an American veto on policy issues (Mittelman & Will 1987).
2Although acting as a direct lending agency, the IMF does not have 
huge resources of its own, but serves as coordinator of the resources 
of industrialized countries and as intermediary between developed and 
underdeveloped nations (Mittelman & Will 1987).
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The World Bank, on the other hand, has traditionally been geared 
towards long-term structural adjustment, supporting policies geared 
toward maintaining steady economic growth (Cypher 1989). Until 1980, 
the World Bank focussed its lending toward specific projects and, while 
an open proponent of free market forces, for the most part accepted the 
institutions in place within the debtors countries. Beginning with the 
implementation of Structural Adjustment Loans in 1980, however, the 
Bank began to apply conditionality measures to recipients of its loans 
(Cypher 1989).
The World Bank is the largest lender of money in the world. By 
1984, 54 countries around the world had accepted or were negotiating 
World Bank conditionality loans, many of the same countries that were 
already under the conditionality of the IMF (Cypher 1989). The 
differences between the IMF and the World Bank became less distinct in 
the 1970's when the IMF increased its support for structural adjustment 
programs over longer time periods. As the two grew in dominance and 
more similar in purpose, the conditionality measures have essentially 
merged into a single model.
Under this adjustment model, short-term economic adjustment 
measures included the following: 1) control of money supply through
credit restrictions, especially to government and public sector 
businesses; 2) the reduction of government deficit through various 
means such as raising taxes, raising prices on revenue-creating 
products, or cutting expenditure on military, public consumption or 
public sector investment; 3) exchange rate devaluation or depreciation 
of currency, either gradually through a series of small devaluations or
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by means of a "maxidevaluation"; 4) liberalization of trade through 
deregulation of prices, reduction of consumer subsidies and elimination 
of tariff and non-tariff barriers (Burkett 1990; Marquez 1983;
Mittelman & Will 1987; Petras & Brill 1986; Sidell 1988; Streeten 
1988).
Over the longer term, structural adjustment was geared toward 
reducing the size of the public sector, transferring resources and 
emphasis for production from the public to the private sector, and 
promoting savings and investment by increasing real interest rates 
(Sidell 1988). Development strategies were to be oriented toward the 
external market through the exploitation of the nation's comparative 
advantage, while wages, social programs and attention to the internal 
market were to be abandoned to market forces (Cypher 1989). The 
economic development triggered by the implementation of the two-step 
model of adjustment and reform would free the forces of the market, 
providing for social development which, through the "trickle down" 
effects of growth, will increase per capita income and thereby 
alleviate poverty (Burkett 1990).
The expectation was that for the previously inward-oriented 
economies of Latin America, the initial adjustment would be difficult 
and would require major sacrifices by all sectors of the economy. But, 
proponents argued, the flexibility created for market forces would 
provide for the creation of a strong productive foundation and generate 
long-term changes worth the "growing pains" (Streeten 1988).
Throughout the 19801s the role of the IMF and the World Bank 
expanded. The growth of these institutions was been both a cause and a
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result of the Latin American debt crisis. Latin America during the 
1980's was characterized by the progressive opening of the region's 
economies as the IMF and World Bank used the debt burden to force 
reform. Called a "lost decade" for Latin America (Perez 1990), during 
the 1980's the entire region suffered its worst economic depression 
since the Great Depression of the 1930's (ECLAC 1985; LAWR 2/10/86).
The nations became progressively poorer, were unable to earn or borrow 
the capital they needed for economic recovery, fell deeper into debt, 
and carried an increasingly heavy debt burden (LAWR 2/10/86; Latin 
American Bureau 1988).
In 1974, the region as a whole had contracted less than 100 
billion dollars of debt, while by 1985 that amount had quadrupled to 
nearly 400 billion dollars (Latin American Bureau 1988). In 1985, ten 
of the world's top fifteen debtors were Latin American countries, with 
Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Venezuela holding the top four positions 
(Latin American Bureau 1988; LAWR 29/6/84). With the sharp rise in 
international interest rates in the 1980's, the burden of this debt 
grew overnight, thus precipitating the onslaught of the Latin American 
debt crisis when Mexico declared it could not service its debt in 
August of 1982 (Canak 1989; Latin American Bureau 1988). Latin 
American interests payments alone represented nearly five percent of 
the regional gross product and 30% of foreign exchange earnings, 
(compared to two percent and eight percent respectively for non-western 
hemisphere developing countries (Fishlow 1986). Sharply reduced new 
lending as a result of the debt crisis meant that debt costs were 
unmatched by new capital inflow which resulted in net transfers of
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resources out of the continent (Fishlow 1986).
While a large part of the debt had been contracted with 
commercial banks, the need to adhere to IMF recommendations as a 
condition for new money or for eligibility to reschedule a nation's 
debt with its commercial bankers meant obtaining the IMF seal of 
approval. By 1982, nearly all of the countries in Latin America, 
except Venezuela and Colombia, had implemented outward-oriented reform 
and adjustment as part of an IMF stabilization program (Canak 1989; 
Fishlow 1986; Ground 1986; Williamson 1990). Only Nicaragua and Cuba 
had managed to reschedule their foreign debts without the IMF (LAWR 
6/7/84). Hopes of concerted Latin American resistance to international 
interference in their domestic economies faded by the end of the 1980's 
as numerous attempts to create a debtor's cartel failed 3 (LAWR 
18/5/84, 8/6/84, 6/7/84, 7/3/86, 4/8/88, 19/1/89, 16/2/89; Latin 
American Bureau 1988).
As more and more of its neighbors opened their economies and 
implemented IMF reforms, direct IMF pressure on Venezuela increased. 
Venezuela has had a long relationship with the IMF, and a long history 
of resisting IMF pressure on its domestic economic policy.
In 1945 Venezuela joined the International Monetary Fund as a 
creditor member, a position it maintained until 1989. From the time of 
its entrance as a member, Venezuela had been in conflict with IMF 
statues. Since 1940 Venezuela had a system of differential exchange
3The idea of a debtor's cartel was to bargain collectively with 
creditors, potentially allowing the debtor nations to determine for 
themselves what percentage of their export earnings they would devote 
to debt servicing (LAWR 18/5/84).
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rates to compensate for the sectoral imbalance between petroleum and 
the rest of the economy (Marquez 1983). IMF statues prohibited its 
members from maintaining differential exchange rate regimes, although 
Article 14 allowed for the maintenance of exchange systems already in 
place when the member joined. Based on this, Venezuela maintained its 
differential exchange policy until 1976 when it unified the exchange 
rate— as much in response to domestic pressure to take the best 
advantage of the newly nationalized petroleum industry as to accede to 
IMF policy (Marquez 1983).
In 1983 Venezuela once again implemented a differentiated 
exchange system, a multi-tiered system with two preferential rates and 
a floating rate. At almost the same time, as a result of a deficit of 
balance of payments, capital flight, low international reserves, and a 
poorly structured external debt, Venezuela sought negotiations with its 
commercial bankers to restructure the terms of its debt (Marquez 1983). 
The foreign commercial bankers began to pressure Venezuela to sign an 
economic adjustment agreement with the IMF for a "certificate of good 
conduct" (LAWR 31/3/83). An IMF commission visited Caracas, and 
advised banks not to continue lending to Venezuela until the multi­
tiered exchange rate policy was changed and public spending cut (LAWR 
31/3/83).
Later IMF missions made more specific and extensive 
recommendations (LAWR 1/7/83, 5/8/83, 28/10/83). Anticipating 
Venezuelan acquiescence, the IMF went so far to propose an official 
calendar of negotiations.
The decision by the administration, supported by the private
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sector and labor, was to avoid agreement with the IMF and attempt to 
force the private banks to reschedule the debt on an individual basis 
(LAWR 26/8/83, 9/9/83, 2/12/83, 9/12/83). President Lusinchi 
implemented an austerity program of his own designed to pacify the 
commercial banks and eliminate the need to negotiate with the IMF, by 
implementing some of the IMF stipulations (LAWR 2/3/84, 29/6/84).
Strengthened by a renewed domestic accord and by a regional 
climate threatening a debtor's cartel, Venezuela managed to obtain the 
rescheduling of the foreign debt without accepting an IMF adjustment 
program (Myers & Martz 1986) although the IMF maintained a high profile 
in Venezuela. The IMF was represented at the formal debt negotiation 
talks, and eventually gave approval to Venezuela's adjustment plan, 
partially to present Venezuela as a "model child" and demonstrate the 
benefits of direct bilateral dealings to other Latin American debtors 
(LAWR 6/7/84).
Even after the restructuring was completed, the IMF continued to 
send missions to Caracas to review economic performance. IMF 
recommendations continued to criticize government spending (LAWR 
22/2/85) and urge the application of a comprehensive adjustment policy 
(LAWR 27/11/86). Through 1988, Venezuela continued to resist IMF 
intervention. During the time of increased IMF pressure, however, 
Venezuela's ability to resist this intervention was weakened by the 
dissolution of domestic solidarity.
From the restoration of democracy in 1958, domestic policy in
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Venezuela was characterized by a spirit of cooperation.4 Supported 
through the 1970's by sufficient petroleum income to distribute 
benefits to all sectors of the domestic economy (LAPR 14/5/76), the 
social pact began to come apart with the economic crises of the 1980's 
(Bond 1987; Kelly de Escobar 1987; Ewell 1986; Karl 1986). With the 
decline of petroleum revenue, relations between the state, the private 
sector, 5 and labor 6 worsened considerably as the economic health of 
the country deteriorated (Becker 1990; Ignacio Arrieta 1989; McCoy
1986).
An attempt at renewing the Social Pact was made by the Lusinchi 
administration under the threat of the forced agreement with the IMF 
(LAWR 19/7/85; Martz & Myers 1986). The renewed Social Pact managed to 
put off an agreement with the IMF and reschedule directly with the 
commercial banks in 1986. By the mid 1980's, however, the new accord 
was essentially abandoned (Becker 1990, Ellner 1989; LAWR 19/7/85;
McCoy 1986), thereby eroding Venezuela's tradition of economic and
4Under the terms of the Social Pact of Punto Fijo, the private 
sector, labor unions, the military, church leadership, and the major 
political parties had agreed to preserve the electoral process and 
share power under a "prolonged political truce" (Karl 1986).
5The primary representative of the private sector in Venezuela is 
Fedecamaras (Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Production), 
founded in 1944 as a confederation of local chambers of commerce 
(Becker 1990; Hughes 1984; Ignacio Arrieta 1989; Salgado 1987).
Unionized labor in Venezuela is primarily represented by the 
Confederaclon de Trabajadores de Venezuela (CTV), [Venezuelan Worker's 
Union] (Ellner 1989; McCoy 1986) which represents between 90 and 95% of 
the unionized work force (LAER 21/9/79). Since its creation, CTV has 
been closely aligned with Acclon Democratica, one of the two major 
political parties, and traditionally has worked through government 
channels to achieve its goals (Abente 1990; Ellner 1989; LAER 10/8/79, 
21/9/79; McCoy 1986).
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political consensus and weakening its opposition to IMF/WB enforced 
outward-orientation.
THE OUTWARD-ORIENTED MODEL IN VENEZUELA
In February 1989, Venezuela signed its first Letter of Intent 
with the IMF, agreeing to implement a short-term adjustment program and 
long-term structural reform under the auspices of the IMF and the World 
Bank. The initial implementation of the program was characterized by 
"shock" measures, defined by the Perez administration in conjunction 
with the IMF, and greeted in Venezuela by several days of rioting.
While various neo-liberal policies had been implemented previously, the 
sudden adoption of IMF adjustment policies generated an angry domestic 
response.
The evolution toward neo-liberal policies in Venezuela had begun 
in the late 1970's and continued through the 1980's in the form of 
various experiments with isolated neo-liberal policies. The 
inauguration of President Luis Herrera Campins in 1979 and the 
implementation of the Sixth National Plan marked the first steps toward 
a neo-liberal model (Llambi 1982; Sonntag & de la Cruz 1985).
President Herrera appointed several neo-liberal economic advisors, the 
"Venezuelan Chicago Boys"7, and announced the need for economic 
austerity and discipline in state spending (Martz & Myers 1986). The 
goal was to reduce state spending, stimulate domestic production, and 
increase efficiency in domestic manufacturing through increased 
competition. The plan included a reduction in public sector
7So named for their advocacy of the conservative Chicago School of 
Economics.
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investment, a restrictive monetary policy to control inflation, and a 
reduction in government expenditure (Llambi 1982). Steps were also 
taken to reduce state regulation through price controls and tariffs.
For the first time since 1974 there was a change in the consumer prices 
controlled by the government. Herrera freed prices from nearly 200 
consumer products (leaving nearly 60 basic products still regulated), 
lowered import tariffs on some household goods by fifty percent, and 
lifted bans and licensing restrictions on others (LAWR 27/3/81; Martz & 
Myers 1986).
After two years of experimenting with the neo-liberal policies,
President Herrera announced that the "Chicago school" theories had been
discarded due to their limited success in stimulating the private
sector to replace public sector economic activity (Republic of
Venezuela 1984). President Herrera, commenting on the neo-liberal
policies, reinforced the traditional importance of the Venezuela state
in the economy:
Our decision to free prices has been a healthy and 
patriotic economic objective, but it cannot simply be left 
to the market to impose efficiency. The state will 
continue to stimulate competition, but it can never 
renounce its regulatory function (Herrera, as quoted in 
LAWR 27/3/81:5).
Import protection on more than 400 items was increased (Martz & 
Myers 1986), and a new program of state investment was put into place 
to return the emphasis to state intervention as the major stimulus to 
the economy (LAWR 27/3/81; Republic of Venezuela 1984).
In 1983, under pressure from the IMF and its commercial 
creditors, Venezuela implemented changes in economic policy sufficient 
to temporarily pacify its creditors. The changes, while not exactly
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matching those recommended by the IMF adjustment model, were neo­
liberal in nature. The major macroeconomic policy adjustment was the 
floating of the bolivar against the dollar, implementation of exchange 
controls, (Martz & Myers 1986; Republic of Venezuela 1984) and a multi­
tiered exchange system that was unique to Venezuela (Marquez 1983). The 
currency was allowed to float to restore parity between the dollar and 
the bolivar, thus creating a devaluation of 30% (Hausmann 1990). The 
devaluation was accompanied by an adjustment in the controlled prices 
for the domestic consumption of gasoline and petroleum products (LAWR 
2/3/84; Republic of Venezuela 1984). The partial devaluation and 
correction of domestic price levels was accompanied, however, by 
continued expansionary policy, in an attempt to promote economic growth 
and import substitution to reduce petroleum dependency (Republic of 
Venezuela 1990).
After nearly ten years of partial neo-liberal experiments, a 
full-scale, or as Hausmann (1990) characterizes it, a "big-bang" change 
to an outward-orientation was implemented in Venezuelan economic policy 
in 1989. Immediately following the inauguration of President Carlos 
Andres Perez, the new administration implemented a major structural 
adjustment program known throughout Venezuela simply as "El Paquete"
[the package]. The IMF adjustment program, neo-liberal in nature, is 
geared toward opening the long-closed Venezuelan domestic economy to 
market forces and competition. The new program, articulated in the 
Eighth National Plan, entitled "El Gran Viraje", [the Great Turn], is 
depicted as a 180 degree turn from the inward-oriented economic model 
of the previous decades to a new outward-oriented program (CORDIPLAN
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1990).
The adjustment program included agreement to nearly all of the 
stipulations contained in an IMF adjustment model. This included 
immediate action to: 1) float the exchange rate; 2) free interest
rates, and 3) remove protectionist barriers to trade (CORDIPLAN 1990; 
Hausmann 1990; Republic of Venezuela 1990).
Since the major industrialized nations introduced the floating 
exchange rate regime in 1973, developing countries have had to adjust 
to "a monetary system neither of their own choosing nor of their own 
design" (Siegman 1981). Developing nations argued against the change 
to the floating system, pointing out that the system was inappropriate 
to the characteristics of developing economies, and was biased in favor 
of the industrialized nations, who had the ability to influence the 
floating regime through financial manipulation (Siegman 1981).
The system was implemented, however, leaving developing nations 
with three primary options within the exchange regime: 1) pegging the
national currency to a single major currency (such as the dollar or 
pound) 2) pegging the national currency to a "basket" of industrialized 
currencies, or 3) floating independently. Most developing countries, 
(including Venezuela until 1989), chose the first option of pegging 
their currency against the dollar, pound or French franc. Pegging 
allowed the currency to be controlled, with the government making 
periodic devaluations or revaluations in small steps or in major 
adjustments (Siegman 1981). Exchange rate adjustments were used as 
policy measures to equilibrialize balance of payments or to encourage 
the development of some sectors over others (Ibarra 1990). While the
Articles of Agreement of the IMF state that each country is free to 
chose the exchange rate system best suited to its own needs (Siegman 
1981), the elimination of controlled exchange systems is one of the 
primary focuses of contemporary IMF policy. The neo-liberal model, as 
articulated by the IMF, advocates a free-floating exchange system as 
the best regime (Marquez 1983).
In 1989 the exchange rate regime was unified and allowed to float 
against the dollar, stabilizing in 1990 around 45 to 50 bolivars per 
dollar (Republic of Venezuela 1990).8 Devaluation of the bolivar 
removed the anti-export bias that exists with an overvalued currency. 
Over-valuation focuses the economy toward the internal market, so that 
only left-overs are available for export, frequently in small amounts 
and characterized by erratic supply (CORDIPLAN 1990). The elimination 
of the multi-tiered exchanged regime also abolished the subsidy for 
certain importers, thereby restoring market-based prices for imports 
(Republic of Venezuela 1990) and removing the possibility of 
speculative profit from the system through over-invoicing of imports at 
the preferential rate (Hausmann 1990).
Venezuela is the only developing country to maintain a free 
floating exchange system (BCV Economist 2, 1991). Allowing the 
exchange rate to float implies a renunciation by the administration of 
the use of the exchange rate as a policy instrument (Siegman 1981) and
8Prior to the implementation of the multiple exchange regime of 
1983, Venezuela had enjoyed a period of nparly 50 years of relative 
stability of the bolivar. After 1933, the value of the bolivar had 
fluctuated minimally, being periodically revalued between 3 to 4.5 
bolivars per dollar. From 1973 until February 1983, the bolivar was 
valued at 4.3 per dollar (Republic of Venezuela 1990).
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represents the clearest move to market-orientation.
While one of the goals of floating the exchange was to promote 
non-petroleum exports, previously controlled interest rates were freed 
to encourage private sector participation in the economy, domestic and 
foreign investment in Venezuela and the repatriation of flight capital 
(ILDIS 1989). Previously set by the Central Bank, the rates were 
allowed to fluctuate to reflect market changes, although minimum and 
maximum levels remain controlled (Hausmann 1990; Republic of Venezuela
1990).
The major outward-oriented change in the role of the state has 
been its withdrawal as protector of the economy. This was accomplished 
through a progressive reduction of tariff protection and the 
elimination of quantitative restrictions (BCV 1990; Republic of 
Venezuela 1990), leaving Venezuelan industry and agriculture on its own 
to compete in the global market economy.
Commitment to an open economy was sealed with Venezuelan 
membership in the GATT 9 in 1990. Although Argentina had been a member 
since 1967, Brazil and Cuba since 1948, and Colombia and Mexico joined 
in 1981 and 1986, respectively, membership in the GATT had never been
9The General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade or GATT is an 
international organization indirectly spawned from the Bretton Woods 
conference that created the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank. GATT works to liberalize world commerce based on neo-liberal 
principles of potential benefit to all from world trade (Tussie 1987,
1988). Membership in GATT involves agreement to an international 
contract stipulating that each signatory commits itself tn treat all 
other signatories to the most favored nation (MFN) standard (Tussie 
1987). GATT also provides a forum where countries negotiate the norms 
of trade and settle disputes and accusations of unfair trade practices 
(Grupo Consolldado 1990b; Prestowitz, Tonelson & Jerome 1991; Tussie
1987).
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important to Venezuela. As a mono-exporter of petroleum with "natural 
markets" nearby, and as a member of OPEC, most of whom are not members 
of GATT, membership signified interference with non-commensurate 
benefits (Grupo Consolidado 1990b).
Willingness to join GATT was one of the stipulations of 
Venezuela's original Letter of Intent to the IMF (Grupo Consolidado 
1990b; CORDIPLAN 1990). Venezuela presented its application in 
September of 1989. The application was rejected and returned to 
Venezuela in March of 1990 due to "insufficient concessions offered by 
Venezuela" (Grupo Consolidado 1990b, translation by author). The 
application was then approved in June of 1990 (Grupo Consolidado 
1990b). Venezuela officially became a member of the GATT in September 
1990 (Republic of Venezuela 1990).
The Venezuelan state also withdrew from its role of protecting 
Venezuelan consumers through the elimination of most price controls and 
freeing prices to market levels. As part of the adjustment program, 
the government freed all previously controlled prices except a dozen 
basic food items and medicines, which would be regulated under a new 
process by which the prices were reviewed and adjusted for inflation 
levels (Hausmann 1990; Republic of Venezuela 1990). This policy is 
expected to be updated again in a second stage adjustment which 
includes replacing the indirect subsidies of a generalized system of 
price controls with a direct subsidy to the purchase of the products in 
the basic consumption basket (Republic of Venezuela 1990). Prices on 
public sector goods and services (electricity, telephone, aluminum, 
iron) were also raised, and a similar price system implemented to more
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closely adjust prices to actual costs (Republic of Venezuela 1990).
After thirty years of a protected, introverted economy, Venezuela 
introduced important reforms, opening its economy to market forces.
The elimination of protective tariffs and relinquishing control of the 
exchange regime and interest rates clearly served to open up the 
Venezuelan economy, one of the primary objectives of the IMF/World Bank 
adjustment model.
The short-term results of the outward-oriented change in the 
Venezuelan economy reflect elements of both the neo-liberal and 
structural perspectives. Some of the benefits of the change in model 
are those promised by neo-liberal theory, while many of the costs are 
also clearly predicted by structuralists.
The adoption of the outward-oriented model was a clear success in 
improving macroeconomic performance. External equilibrium was restored 
when the 1988 current account deficit of 7.5% of the GDP was replaced 
by a surplus of 4.6% of the GDP in 1989 (Latin American Times 1990).
The 1989 surplus of 2.5 billion dollars exceeded the target levels set 
by the IMF (Purroy 1990a), and the 1990 surplus of 7.4 billion dollars 
represented one of the largest nominal surplus in Venezuelan history 
(EIU 1991a).
This balance of payments surplus had a positive effect on the 
level of international reserves which began to increase following a 
drop to their lowest level since pre-boom 1973 levels (EIU 1990; IMF 
1990, 1991; MetroEconomicaa 1991; Purroy 1991). The public sector 
deficit, identified by neo-liberals as the primary cause of inflation, 
declined from 9% of GDP in 1988, to less than 2% in 1989 (LAER 31/5/90;
104
Latin American Times 1990; Purroy 1991). This fulfilled another IMF 
stipulation contained in the original Letter of Intent that required a 
fiscal deficit of less than 4% of GDP (Purroy 1989b). Finally, 
implementation of the adjustment package opened the door for Venezuela 
to restructure its foreign debt. Implementing the adjustment program 
and signing the Letter of Intent with the IMF put Venezuela on the list 
of "good countries" that were eligible for the Brady-style debt 
renegotiation and reduction (Alvarez 1991). 10
Venezuela was also eligible for new loans. The IMF agreed to
provide 5.1 billion dollars over a three year period, as well as 700
million dollars to support debt reduction. The World Bank supplied 400
million dollars for the liberalization of imports and industrial
reconversion, and 750 million to be used over five years for sectoral 
reform such as for the agricultural and financial sectors. The total 
World Bank financial commitment between 1990-93 amounted to nearly 4 
billion dollars in loans (LAWR 11/10/90). BID (Banco Inter-Americano 
de Desarrollo) made available 4 billion for infrastructure and 
development projects (Purroy 1989c) and an additional 800 million 
dollars in 1990 to support the reactivation of the nation's productive 
apparatus (El Nacional 30/11/90).
From the neo-liberal perspective, application of competitive 
market forces to petroleum-dependent Venezuela was a desperately needed
10The Brady Plan, proposed by U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas 
Brady in 1989, is a plan of partial debt forgiveness (Economist 1990d). 
The program was made available to a small group of "reformed debtors" 
who were successfully carrying-out market-oriented reforms that met 
with IMF approval (Buiter, Kletzer & Srinivasan 1989; Economist 1991a; 
LAER 30/6/90; LAWR 20/4/89, Sachs 1989).
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adjustment to reality— a "blow to the rentistic system" (Purroy 1990a) 
in which petroleum provided easy money for all Venezuelans. Whereas 
life before the change was fiction, life after the adjustment was real. 
The "birth pains" of the adjustment were a "sacrificial stage”, 
temporary and necessary, but only made worse by the privilege 
Venezuelans had enjoyed under the inward-oriented regime. From the 
neo-liberal perspective, the current standard of living corresponds 
exactly with the level of real productivity of the petroleum-dependent 
economy (Purroy 1990a). From the structural perspective, however, the 
immediate costs of the adjustment were the direct result of the 
imperfections of the neo-liberal model, and were in fact predictable 
and consistent with the experience of other countries' adjustment 
experience (LAWR 5/8/83).
The immediate impact of the adjustment in Venezuela was 
depressive and "anti-social" (Purroy 1990a; Ugalde 1990), creating a 
slowdown in economic activity and significant social consequences. The 
cornerstone of the adjustment package was the devaluation and floating 
of the bolivar, and this devaluation of 150% had significant 
consequences throughout the economy (LAWR 19/5/89, Purroy 1990a). One 
of the primary impacts was on the level of inflation. Traditionally 
Venezuela had enjoyed a relatively low rate of inflation. Throughout 
the boom years of the 1970's and the neo-liberal experiments of the 
1980's, inflation was generally around 10%, with a jump to nearly 30% 
in 1987 and 1988 (IMF 1990, 1991). In 1989, however, Venezuela 
experienced an inflation rate of 84.5%, followed by nearly 40% in 1990 
(EIU 1991a, 1991b; IMF 1990, 1991; Purroy 1991), and projections of
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continued high rates through 1995 (MetroEconomica 1991a).
Devaluation also resulted in an immediate drop in consumer 
demand. In the first half of 1989, industry and commerce reported a 
45% drop in sales, with the auto industry alone experiencing a 70% loss 
(LAWR 8/6/89). Overall private demand dropped from a growth rate of 
8.7% in 1988 to show negative growth of 7.5% in 1989, while public 
demand declined from its 1988 level of 6.8% to -1.4% (Purroy 1990a).
The combination of the impact of devaluation, inflation and lack 
of demand resulted in an "unprecedented" recession. Real GDP dropped 
from its 1988 growth level of 5.8% to a negative 1989 real growth rate 
of -8.3% (EIU 1991a; MetroEconomica 1991a; Purroy 1990a; Ugalde 1990). 
This level of negative growth was accompanied by a trend of 
disinvestment as firms liquidated, choosing not to invest to take 
advantage of very high interest rates, or finding themselves unable to 
obtain money to support investment (Latin American Times 1990; 
MetroEconomica 1991a). While, in 1988, public investment had grown by 
5.3% and private by 6.4%, in 1989, the public sector experienced 
negative growth of 33.9% and the private of 24.6% (Purroy 1990a).
The depressive nature of the adjustment package contributed to 
its anti-social effects, resulting in a deterioration of real income, a 
regressive effect on the distribution of income, and an increase in 
unemployment (Espana & Gonzalez 1990; Fundacion Cavendes 1991; 
International Law Practice 1991; Ugalde 1990).
The greatest impact of adjustment, therefore, fell on the lower 
and middle classes. These groups are the most affected by the negative 
impact of inflation (MetroEconomica 1991a). Within the overall 1989
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inflationary rate of nearly 85%, the largest increases were in food, 
beverages and tobacco, which jumped 125.8% (Fundacion Cavendes 1991; 
MetroEconomica 1991a; Purroy 1990a). For the most vulnerable groups, 
the combination of devaluation and the removal of price subsidies had 
the potential to raise to 70% the amount of income spent on food 
(Fundacion Cavendes 1991).
An inflation rate of over 80%, when combined with salary raises 
of only 40%, creates a deterioration of real income. The per capita 
income of the nation as a whole dropped to levels of the late 1950's 
and early 1960's (Purroy 1990a, 1991; Ugalde 1990).
Employment was another casualty of the new program. The 
government was forced to lift a firing freeze and there was an 
immediate contraction in some sectors as 65,000 industrial jobs or 
12.5% of that sector's work force were lost (Latin American Times
1990). Official unemployment in 1989 reached 9.6% and then rose to 
10.9% in 1990 (EIU 1990; International Law Practice 1991;
MetroEconomica 1991a; OCEI 1990). Unofficial estimates, however, argue 
that the actual rate of unemployment is between 15-20%, while 
subemployment, including all members of the working population earning 
salaries under the minimum wage level, both in the formal and the 
informal sector, is estimated at an additional 30% (Purroy 1989c,
1991).
There is evidence of the impoverishment and disappearance of the 
middle classes (International Law Practice 1991; El Nacional 8/8/90).
In September, 1990, it was estimated that 85% of the population could 
be identified as being in the lower or lower middle class, compared to
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8% in the upper middle and 3% in the upper class (International Law 
Practice 1991).
Announcement of the adjustment package was greeted in Venezuela 
with four days of rioting and looting (LAWR 16/3/89). On February 27, 
1989, riots broke out in Caracas and spread across the country, sparked 
by the attempt to raise gas prices to market levels, and they left an 
official toll of 250-350 dead1 and nearly 2000 injured (EIU 1990; Latin 
American Times 1990; LAWR 16/3/89, 19/5/89).
The adjustment package implemented in Venezuela was a "shock" 
program, representing sudden immersion in a competitive market economy, 
closely following the traditional neo-liberal/IMF model. Since that 
time, however, domestic resistance and the continued economic 
intervention of the state have contributed toward a modification of the 
traditional neo-liberal model.
VENEZUELA'S NEO-STRUCTURAL ADAPTATION OF THE OUTWARD-ORIENTED MODEL
The international, regional, and domestic climate in which 
Venezuela found itself in the late 1980's, as well as the direct and 
persistent pressure of the IMF, made adoption of an outward-oriented 
model, based on neo-liberal principals, the only short-term alternative 
for the Venezuelan economy. Over the longer-term, however, while still 
outward-oriented, the model emerging in Venezuela is not purely neo­
liberal. The methods remain neo-liberal while the goals and 
assumptions about the world economy are preserved from structuralism. 
Maintenance of a powerful state to regulate a market-based economy
Unofficial estimates of the casualties of the riots claim more 
than 1,000 people died (Latin American Times 1990; LAWR 16/3/89).
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indicates the emergence of a neo-structural, market-and-state model.
Analysis of the long-term trends indicates that the reform is 
indeed continuing toward outward orientation, in spite of political 
opposition within Venezuela. However, the emerging model of reform 
differs from the pure IMF model in that its outward-orientation remains 
strongly directed by the state. The state has acted to improve market 
functioning by removing protection that exposes previously-protected 
sectors to competition and market forces. Three recent issues have 
been identified as "test cases" of continued commitment to the neo- 
liberal/IMF model: 1) management of the private sector debt; 2) the
privatization of state enterprises; and 3) emerging agricultural 
policy.
The issue of Venezuela's private sector debt dates back to 1983 
when the bolivar was devalued and the government established a multi­
tiered exchanged system. After protest from the private sector, 
allowance was made to permit access to the preferential rate for debt 
payments (EIU 1991a; LAWR 15/11/90). In 1987 a new repayment agreement 
was reached, in which eligible debtors signed contracts with the 
Central Bank guaranteeing a repayment exchange rate of 12-14 bolivars 
per dollar (EIU 1991a). With the implementation of the adjustment 
program, President Carlos Andres Perez unified the exchange system at a 
single floating rate, by which the government was exposed to huge 
losses if it honored the previous agreement. Since honoring the 
agreement would have "derailed" the economic adjustment program, 
President Perez suspended the pre-adjustment agreement and removed all 
special treatment for the private sector until negotiations could
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determine how the losses could be split between the government, private 
sector and foreign creditors (EIU 1991a? LAWR 15/11/90).
Agreement was reached in November of 1990 with a compromise that 
reduced government losses considerably. Had the original terms been 
respected, the central government would have faced losses of around 7% 
of GDP. Under the new terms, losses were cut to around 1% of GDP in 
1991, transferring the burden to the private sector (EIU 1991a; LAWR 
6/12/90). The solution to the private sector debt stand-off 
illustrates the state’s resolve to remove its protection for business 
and open the economy to competition, while reducing public sector 
spending.
Further evidence of increasing market orientation with state 
direction is provided by the plans for privatization. The Venezuelan 
privatization program was officially announced in early 1990 as part of 
the Eighth National Plan (CORDIPLAN 1990). Initial plans were made to 
privatize over 50 of its 200 state companies within two years. Since 
the announcement, the program has been criticized for too much 
discussion and planning and few actual sales (Latin American Times 
1990; LAWR 20/9/90, 22/11/90; Freije 1991). Admitting in June of 1990 
that the program was behind schedule (LAER 30/6/90), the government 
argued that Venezuela has been laying the essential groundwork for the 
adjustment package (such as stabilizing the floating exchange rate, and 
achieving equilibrium to its balance of payment account), and creating 
a favorable environment for foreign investors to participate (Daily 
Journal 8/5/91; El Nacional 30/11/90).
The privatization program began with the sale of a state-owned
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bank, the Banco Occidental de Descuento, which was sold in December of
1990. Purchase was made by a consortium of bank workers, customers and 
private Venezuelan investors (EIU 1990; Economist 1991b; El Nacional 
5/12/90). A second bank, Banco Italo Venezolano, was sold in early
1991, also purchased by a group of private Venezuelan investors 
considered to be relatively small players in the financial sector (LAWR 
25/4/91; El Universal 27/3/91).
Initial action has been taken toward the privatization of the 
national telephone company (CANTV), with the acceptance of qualified 
bids from 12 foreign companies in June of 1991 (Daily Journal 18/3/91; 
EIU 1990, 1991b; LAWR 9/5/91). Stipulations of the sale include the 
reservation of 10% of the stock for workers (El Universal 3/2/91) and 
the continuation of state influence through the retention of preferred 
shares (Daily Journal 19/3/91; EIU 1991a).
Negotiations for the sale of the state-owned airline, VIASA, 
initially scheduled for sale in late 1990, were getting underway in 
June and July of 1991 (Daily Journal 19/3/91, 14/5/91; El Nacional 
1/3/91; LAWR 25/4/91). Bids were to be accepted under an agreement in 
which 49% of the stock will be sold to foreign interests, 20% retained 
by the state, 20% sold to company employees, and 11% retained for 
private Venezuelan investors (Daily Journal 6/5/91; EIU 1991b; LAWR 
22/11/90). Another state-owned airline, Aeropostal, is scheduled to be 
sold after completion of the VIASA deal (Daily Journal 20/3/91), and 
plans are to privatize state-owned sugar mills (Daily Journal 14/5/91) 
hotels (Daily Journal 8/5/91) national ports (Daily Journal 19/3/91),
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water companies and other state-owned enterprises2 such as the Caracas 
race track (Daily Journal 25/3/91; Economist 1991b).
In spite of opposition, the privatization program has progressed. 
(Daily Journal 19/3/91; Economia Hov 27/2/91; EIU 1991b; LAWR 
22/11/90). Negotiation between the government and worker 
representatives has resulted in employee participation in the sales, as 
well as reservation of company shares for employees, as was the case 
with CANTV and VIASA (Daily Journal 19/3/91; Economia Hov 27/2/91; LAWR 
9/5/91; El Nacional 1/3/91} El Universal 3/2/91). Opposition from the 
major political parties (El Nacional 4/2/91; EIU 1991b; LAWR 20/9/91;
El Nacional 3/3/91; El Universal 5/3/91) has resulted in the 
development of guidelines for the privatization process, as well as 
continued oversight after the entities have been sold (El Nacional 
21/2/91, 3/3/91). The government minister in charge of the 
privatization program has stated that while privatization is something 
most Venezuelan's do not desire, it is something they see as a 
necessity, to improve efficiency and finance the public deficit (Daily 
Journal 25/3/91; El Universal 7/2/91).
As the public sector enterprises have been exposed to competition 
and privatization to increase quality and efficiency, agricultural 
policy under the new model also illustrates the market-orientation of 
the Venezuelan economy. Previously a highly protected sector, 
agriculture was one of the sectors mostly affected by the adjustment
2A11 together, "three banks, six cement works, two food processing 
businesses, a new sugar factory, five dairies, four metal-bashers, one 
shipbuilder, one plastics factory, two steel works, three textile 
factories and 34 tourist complexes are ready for privatization" (LAER 
30/6/90).
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package (Purroy 1990a) . Former President Rafael Caldera charges that 
Venezuela has "turned its back on the agriculture industry" (Daily 
Journal, 8/5/91), while economist Purroy (1990a) described the sector 
as "abandoned to its own luck". Agriculture has indeed lost many of 
its special privileges. Tariffs protecting domestic production were 
gradually reduced. All quantitative restrictions were eliminated and 
the interest rate subsidy on agricultural loans was set first at 85% of 
market rate and then completely eliminated (Delgado 1991; EIU 1990).
Government commitment to an agricultural sector based on market 
forces was tested in early 1991. Within a period of a few weeks, meat 
prices had risen 30% and consumers threatened a beef boycott. The 
administration reacted angrily, charging that the industry was taking 
advantage of its recently deregulated state (Daily Journal 13/5/91).
The Minister of Agriculture, Jonathan Coles3, threatened to drop all 
remaining tariff protection for beef and immediately fly in foreign 
beef to increase competition. The situation ended with the meat 
industry agreeing to stabilize prices, (Economla Hoy 13/5/91; Daily 
Journal 13/5/91, 14/5/91) and with a market-oriented reminder to 
consumers that "the community has the last word on controlling prices" 
(Daily Journal 14/5/91).
In addition to the commitment to expose the Venezuelan economy to 
market forces and competition, the Venezuelan government's resolve to 
maintain an outward-oriented economy is illustrated by its
3Minister of Agriculture Jonathan Coles is an agro-industrialist 
and Yale University graduate who in late 1990 replaced Eugenio de Armas 
when the former Agricultural Minister did not support the 
administration's policy of opening the agricultural sector up to 
external competition (EIU 1990).
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participation in the formation of regional market blocs. As a response 
to the rapid trend toward regional trade blocs evidenced in the 
European Economic Community, and the U.S., Canada and Mexico free trade 
agreement (Prestowitz et al. 1991, Streeten 1991), Latin American 
countries have rapidly created smaller regional trade blocs.4 While 
Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay formed Mercosur, the Southern 
Cone Common Market (Daily Journal 25/3/91; Scott 1991; El Universal 
21/2/31), and the Central American Nations agreed to a region-wide free 
trade zone by 1992 (LAWR 16/8/90) with the inclusion of Mexico by 1996 
(Scott 1991), Venezuela made free-trade agreements with the Group of 
Three (Venezuela, Mexico, Colombia) (EIU 1990; Scott 1991; El Universal 
7/2/91) and the Andean Pact (Venezuela, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador,
Peru) (Daily Journal 19/3/91; Scott 1991; El Universal 5/3/91). 
Venezuelan President Perez has also proposed an agreement between the 
Group of Three and the Central American Common Market (Emling 1991).
Regional integration has required the reduction or elimination of 
protective tariffs that under import substitution were as restrictive 
to neighboring Latin American nations as to the rest of the world. The 
speed and extent of the regional integration indicates the ubiquity of 
outward-orientation in a previously "closed" region. While Venezuela's 
participation indicates its commitment to outward-orientation and a 
market-based global economy, the nature of its participation also 
illustrates the maintenance of the role of the state as the state acts
4Although traditionally rejected by neo-liberal economists as an 
impediment to the formation of a truly global economy (Economist 
1991c), proponents argue that a world of blocs might be the forerunner 
to global integration (Dornbusch 1991).
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toward free markets regionally in order to strengthen Venezuelan self- 
determination in light of the developed nations.5
As the Venezuelan government continues to implement free market 
policies, it has also maintained its own role in the economy, in 
opposition to neo-liberal principles. There is a clear trend of 
continued state intervention both to improve market functioning and to 
compensate for the problems of a market economy.
While a stated part of the Adjustment Program was "reducing the 
role of the state in the economy" (Republic of Venezuela 1990), after 
two years, the net effect has been a consolidation of the state's 
position, although there has been a change in focus of the intervention 
toward an outward-orientation. The only role that the state has given 
up completely is that of protector. The state remains involved in 
centralized planning, in direct production, and in the stimulation of 
demand.
Besides the Letter of Intent to the IMF, the most comprehensive 
outline of the new development model is in the Eighth National Plan, 
published by the state planning agency. The state continues to plan 
for development, but based on the development of non-traditional
5U.S. President Bush applauds the formation of Latin American 
regional blocs, interpreting the action as the first step toward his 
goal of a hemispheric free trade zone (Daily Journal 25/3/91; LAWR 
20/9/90). The Ibero-American summit held in July 1991, however 
suggests that the Latin American nations are looking for alternative 
arrangements. Twenty-one Latin American leaders, including Fidel 
Castro, met with leaders from Spain and Portugal to discuss Ibero- 
American integration. The leaders are seeking to define for themselves 
how they will participate in the "new world order" and are hoping Spain 
will provide a bridge between Latin America and the European Economic 
Community (Emling 1991; Scott 1991).
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exports from the petroleum, agricultural and industrial sectors rather 
than for import substitution or production for domestic demand. To 
date, the petroleum and most important mineral industries in Venezuela 
remain as state enterprises. Investment and planning for these 
sectors, however, reflect a new interest in production for external 
markets (CORDIPLAN 1990). State enterprises were to undergo 
restructuring, however, to impose market discipline and increase 
efficiency.6 Other, non-strategic state enterprises are to be 
privatized, thereby contributing to the development of private 
initiative and private sector investment in Venezuela (Banco Central de 
Venezuela 1990; Republic of Venezuela 1990).
Under the inward-oriented model the state promoted industry and 
agriculture through investment and structural reform for the creation 
of goods for the domestic market. Under outward-orientation, the role 
of the state is to stimulate the supply of goods oriented toward 
external markets through export promotion and the attraction of foreign 
investment. A major goal of the adjustment program is to increase non- 
traditional exports. In addition to trade reform and the elimination 
of the controlled exchange rate's anti-export bias, (CORDIPLAN 1990; 
Republic of Venezuela 1990), the strategy to increase Venezuelan 
competitiveness internationally included a program of incentives and 
subsidies provided by the state to stimulate the production of these 
exports. The program of incentives includes export subsidies and tax 
credits (CORDIPLAN 1990; Republic of Venezuela 1990) the establishment
6The restructuring process is supported by policy loans from the 
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (Republic of 
Venezuela 1990).
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of various support agencies to give financial and technical assistance 
to producers, to facilitate international market access of Venezuelan 
products (ILDIS 1989), and finance export creation (CORDIPLAN, 1990).
Upon introduction of the adjustment program, the government 
agreed to a program of public sector reform (EIU 1991a; El Naclonal 
5/12/90) As officially explained in the Eighth National Plan 
(CORDIPLAN 1990), the new role of the Venezuelan state under the 
emerging Venezuelan model was to be different, but in no way weakened 
in relation to its previous role. The state no longer served as 
protector of the domestic economy and reduced its activity as producer 
and promoter of non-strategic economic activities, thus transferring 
certain political functions to state and local governments. The public 
sector bureaucracy was to be rationalized, modernized and 
professionalized (El Naclonal 4/2/91), to increase administrative 
capacity and reduce the arbitrary decision-making ability of government 
Officials (CORDIPLAN 1990).
Partially as a result of considerable domestic opposition to neo­
liberal policies, and in spite of IMF pressure to reduce public 
expenditure and deregulate the economy, the Venezuelan state continues 
to stimulate demand and promote participation in the domestic economy. 
State action to compensate for the redistributive failings of a market 
economy is evidenced in three contemporary issues: 1) the preservation
of regulated domestic gas prices; 2) Congressional approval and 
implementation of a new labor law; and 3) maintenance of public sector 
investment.
Raising fuel prices in Venezuela is a volatile issue, as
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demonstrated by the February 1989 riots that were sparked in part by
announced increases in fuel prices (EIU 1990; Latin American Times
1990; LAWR 9/3/89, 19/5/89). An issue with symbolic as well as
economic importance, petroleum-product prices in Venezuela are the
lowest in the world (LAER 30/6/90) and represent a prime target of IMF
"recommendations". According to neo-liberal observers of the economy,
cheap gasoline in Venezuela represents
one of the vestiges of a system in which Venezuela's oil 
revenues were used to finance wasteful consumption,
patronage and subsidies to inefficient industries" (Latin
American Times 1990).
Venezuela had agreed in its original Letter of Intent with the 
IMF to raise domestic gas prices from their 1989 level of around 30 
cents per gallon (LAER 31/5/90). After the February riots, increases 
in gasoline prices were postponed until June of 1989, when it was 
announced that prices would be raised by 9 cents per gallon, over a six 
month period (Latin American Times 1990). Crowds again took to the 
streets and the increase was postponed indefinitely (Latin American 
Times 1990; LAER 31/7/90).
In March of 1990, the government again announced price increases, 
but again postponed hikes in gas and diesel while raising "industrial 
fuels" such as kerosene and natural gas (LAER 30/6/90). In July, the 
IMF mission visiting Caracas made an increase in fuel prices a 
condition of disbursement of a 700 million dollar loan (LAWR 26/7/90).
In response, the government planned staggered rises in gas prices 
of 30% over six months, a measure which began to be implemented in 
August (EIU 1990; LAER 31/7/90), counter-weighted by increases in the 
transportation subsidy and gradual taxi and bus fair increases (EIU
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1990). After the forced increase in 1990, there has been no further 
state action to bring gas prices to their market value. Even with the 
1990 price increases, gas prices in Venezuela remain the lowest in the 
world, and the government has announced no increases in domestic gas 
prices for 1991 (EIU 1991c).
While the current administration claims it is "forced" to retain 
the subsidy on domestic gas prices by the threat of renewed social 
protest, it also "failed" to block the implementation of a progressive 
labor law. An issue of debate since 1985, a new labor law increasing 
worker benefits and protection was passed by Congress in late 1990 and 
implemented on May 1, 1991. The law, which increased benefits for 
child-bearing women, raised mandatory overtime pay, shortened the work 
week, and increased protection against firing, had faced considerable 
opposition. Supported by the majority of Congressional Representatives 
and the major labor unions, the law was seen as one method of reducing 
the negative impact of neo-liberal adjustment on workers. The law was 
opposed by the administration (EIU 1991a; El Nacional 20/2/91), by 
international investors (El Nacional 30/11/90) and by the domestic 
private sector (EIU 1991a, 1991c). They argued that the new law would 
reduce labor market flexibility, increase production costs, require 
considerable public funds (El Nacional 20/2/91a, 20/2/91b) and increase 
the power of the unions, all detrimental to the objectives of the 
adjustment program (EIU 1991a; El Nacional 30/11/90). Despite the 
objections, the law was passed, increasing employment security, one of 
the objectives of the structuralist perspective.
Despite public statements to the contrary, (Latin American Times
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1990), the Venezuelan state also continues its traditional role as the 
"chief engine" of economic growth (MetroEconomlca 1991a; Purroy 1991), 
using public sector investment to stimulate economic growth, as well as 
the growth and recovery of demand (EIU 1991a; Maxim Ross 1991b; 
MetroEconomlca. 1991a) .
After negative economic growth in 1989 of -8.3%, the Venezuelan 
economy recovered in 1990 with 4.4% growth (EIU 1991a, MetroEconomlca 
1991a). The state, however, was the major cause of economic growth in 
1990, with an increase in real state investment of 16 to 22% (EIU 
1991a; MetroEconomlca 1991a; Purroy 1991). The expanded investment was 
covered by a petroleum windfall generated by the Gulf crisis, and 
therefore did not affect the elimination of the fiscal deficit (EIU 
1991a; Purroy 1991). The plan for strong public investment continues 
through 1993 and includes public spending in social programs, 
infrastructural development, and support to increase the participation 
of the private sector in the economy (CORDIPLAN 1991; Maxim Ross 1991b; 
VenEconomla 1991a).
CONCLUSION
The short-term adjustment program implemented in 1989 was neo­
liberal in nature, closely resembling the IMF/World Bank adjustment 
model. The implementation of a floating exchange regime, market- 
determined interest rates, and the elimination of protectionist 
barriers set the economy on a long-term outward-orientation; future 
growth is targeted toward international trade, the development of non- 
traditional exports and the expansion of the private sector.
While the initial outward-oriented adjustment closely resembled
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the neo-liberal model by opening the Venezuelan economy up to global 
market forces and competition, over the long-term the model emerging in 
Venezuela more closely resembles that proposed by the neo-structural 
perspective. The neo-structural model proposes an outward-oriented 
development strategy regulated by a powerful state to fulfill 
structuralist goals. The goals of Venezuelan development under an 
outward-oriented economy remain the same as under the inward- 
orientation of the structuralist's import substitution model. Three 
objectives remain primary: 1) achievement of sustained economic
growth; 2) better distribution of income within the economy; and 3) 
greater national autonomy (CORDIPLAN 1990, 1991). The specific 
discussion of Venezuelan goals contained in the Eighth National Plan 
closely parallels the major points of the CEPAL plan for Productive 
Transformation with Equity (CORDIPLAN 1990; Lander 1990).
Venezuelan development in the 1990's continues to rely on state 
intervention. The crucial role of the Venezuelan state as active 
participant in the economy is clear. While the state has relinquished 
its role as protector of the domestic economy, it retains its role in 
production, planning, and distributor of petroleum rent. 7
In direct opposition to neo-liberal principles and in clear 
support of the goals of the original structuralists, the state 
continues to act not only to maximize the operation of the market, but 
to compensate for market failures (i.e. distribution). The resistance
7State intervention in the economy does not automatically prevent 
the identification of a model as neo-liberal. While the neo-liberal 
perspective is essentially opposed to state intervention, a certain 
amount of state intervention is permissible when the state is acting to 
maximize the operation of the market (Low 1991; Sundrum 1990).
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to pressure to raise domestic gas prices, as well as the active 
participation of the state in the allocation of resources evidenced in 
the public investment plan, indicate the state’s interest in 
stimulating domestic demand and balanced sectoral growth.
For those measuring the role of the state against a traditional 
neo-liberal model, the continuing dominance of the state threatens the 
potential success of the adjustment program (Freije 1991; Purroy 
1990b). The Venezuelan state retains its dominant position in the 
economy— in contradiction to neo-liberal philosophy (Purroy 1991; 
Wilfred 1988), against the direction of the IMF and World Bank, and to 
the dismay of many Venezuelans. Critics frequently express the feeling 
that consumers, workers and producers have all sacrificed for the 
success of the adjustment program while the state has not (Freije 1991; 
Lopez 1991; Purroy 1990b).
From a neo-structural point of view, however, continued 
intervention by the state provides a means to regulate a market economy 
and use it to reach structuralist goals. The potential exists for a 
neo-structural model to overcome the criticisms of both a traditional 
structural model as well as a neo-liberal model. Structuralism was 
frequently criticized for paying too little attention to monetary and 
fiscal factors, and for overlooking short-term problems and offering no 
short-term solutions (Kay 1989). Implementation of the neo-liberal 
adjustment model addresses short-term problems and provides short-term 
solutions. In Venezuela, the adjustment model succeeded in restoring 
economic equilibrium.
The neo-liberal model, on the other hand, is criticized for
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providing only short-term solutions, failing to address structural 
problems, and contributing to unbalanced sectoral development and 
social problems, including a regressive distribution of income and 
wealth.
The Venezuelan state is clearly maintaining a strong role in the 
direction of Venezuela's development, acting toward the achievement of 
the primary neo-structural goals. Neo-liberalism asks whether the 
state should participate in the economy. The real question, according 
to the neo-structuralist perspective, is whether in a global economy 
the state can intervene to compensate for market failures.
CHAPTER 5 
VIABILITY OF THE VENEZUELAN MODEL 
The development strategy emerging in Venezuela is built upon a 
synthesis of neo-liberal, market-based methods, regulated by an 
outward-oriented state for the purpose of achieving structural goals.
Is such a model potentially viable? Is it possible for Venezuela as a 
nation to set its own course of development and choose its methods of 
attainment in a context of a global economy? Can the global market and 
the Venezuelan state work compatibly toward the attainment of social 
and national goals?
Three goals for economic development have been set forth in the 
context of the new Venezuelan model: 1) sustained economic growth, 2)
growth with equity and 3) national self-determination (CORDIPLAN 1990, 
1991; Gonzalez 1989). Analysis of the viability of the new model 
suggests that although the outward-oriented model has produced short­
term improvements, the Venezuelan economy is likely to remain highly 
vulnerable to international forces, unable to eliminate structural 
problems and generate sustained growth and equity.
SUSTAINED ECONOMIC GROWTH
The short-term results of the Venezuela adjustment program shows 
clear improvements in economic equilibrium. Two areas particularly 
evidenced success: the attainment of balance of payments equilibrium;
and the elimination of the public sector deficit. These early macro- 
economic successes need to be examined more closely. Under careful 
analysis, the neo-liberal "successes" of the adjustment program are
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seen to be little more than temporary improvements in the context of a 
favorable world economic situation. Over the long-term, unchanged 
structural factors maintain Venezuela’s vulnerability to disequilibrium 
and deficit.
Immediately after the new model was implemented in 1989,
Venezuela achieved external equilibrium, and generated successive 
current account surpluses. As long as Venezuela’s economy remains 
dependent on petroleum, however, its susceptibility to balance of 
payments deficits will remain. The health of Venezuela’s current 
account depends on the price of petroleum, its export capacity and its 
production capacity. As a founding member of OPEC, Venezuela has 
worked to influence prices on the world petroleum market for many 
years. The volatility of that market was highlighted again in the 
roller coaster of prices during the Gulf War 1 and the potential for a 
more stable petroleum market in the future seems unlikely. As analysts 
seek to explain the impact of the Gulf War, the geo-political 
rearrangements in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and an 
increasingly global economy, projections vary from future shortage 
(Daily Journal 7/5/91); to world-wide glut (Energy Economics Research
‘The price of oil had begun to climb in response to pre-war rumors 
during July of 1990, and when Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, there 
was a sudden price hike. Higher prices, aided by a UN embargo on all 
oil exports from Iraq and Kuwait, were followed by sharp fluctuations 
(EIU 1990). Venezuelan hopes of another oil bonanza disappeared when 
prices dropped due to the effects of speculation, the over-supply 
caused by increased production of OPEC and the IEA, and expectations 
for a quick solution to the conflict (EIU 1991a, 1991b; Energy 
Economics Research 1991; International Energy Journal 1991; El Nacional 
113/91} Sweensy 1991a).
126
1991; VenEconomla 1991c) a stable world situation2 (El Nacional 
14/2/91) to a highly unstable situation (Gelb 1991).
Venezuela's export capacity is limited by the OPEC quota system 3 
and its production capacity. Of its proven reserves, two-thirds are 
heavy or extra-heavy crude, which require special refinery capability 
and long-term supply contracts (Daily Journal 16/5/91; LAWR 28/3/91; 
Sweensy 1991a; VenEconomia 1991c). Venezuela also has a number of 
inactive fields that require advanced technology (EIU 1991b; LAWR 
28/3/91). When OPEC quotas were suspended, Venezuela increased its 
daily production by 500,000 barrels. The increased level was reached 
over a period of six months, more slowly than had been hoped (EIU 
1991a; LAWR 6/9/90).
The potential to lessen the importance of the petroleum on the 
balance of payments equilibrium depends on export diversification and 
import management. It is generally accepted in Venezuela that while 
efforts are made to diversify exports, the economy will remain 
petroleum-led for several more years (LAWR 6/6/91; Sanchez & Paez
1989). Early results from the impact of the devaluation and lowering 
of tariffs indicate that after an initial spurt of growth (Republic of
2E1 Universal (27/3/91) reported that there is a proposal on the 
table of the IMF that would allow the organization to establish limits 
on fluctuations of the price of crude in international markets.
3Before the Gulf War, Venezuela's OPEC quota was set at 1.945 
million barrels per day (Daily Journal 13/3/91; LAWR 6/9/90). After 
the beginning of the war, quotas were suspended and Venezuela increased 
its production by 500,000 barrels per day (LAWR 6/9/90). OPEC 
reinstatement of quotas generated considerable debate in Venezuela (EIU 
1990), as interest in withdrawing from OPEC grows, but Venezuela 
complied, lowering production to its post-war quota of 2.235 million 
bpd (Daily Journal 13/3/91; EIU 1991b; Sweensy 1991a).
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Venezuela 1990), the long-term development of non-traditional exports 
will be a slow process (Daily Journal 17/2/91; Gil 1990; El Universal 
14/2/91, 22/3/91). The potential for lowering import levels also seems 
to be a long-term goal. Although import demand dropped immediately as 
a result of the February 1989 devaluation (Republic of Venezuela 1990), 
a large proportion of Venezuelan imports are raw materials (40%) and 
machinery and equipment (28%) (Republic of Venezuela 1990). Reducing 
industrial inputs such as these would have a negative effect on 
industrial output. 4 With continued dependence on petroleum as primary 
export and little potential to reduce current import demand, the 
balance of payments equilibrium achieved by the IMF adjustment model is 
clearly an isolated result. Future potential for consistent balance of 
payment deficits is unaffected.
The second major short-term success of the neo-liberal adjustment 
model was the elimination of the public sector deficit. Since 1976, 
Venezuela has had a central government deficit in nine out of thirteen 
years (IMF 1990). Following the adjustment program implemented in 
1989, however, the deficit showed considerable reduction in a short 
period of time (from 9% of GDP in 1988 to 2% in 1989), exceeding by a 
considerable margin IMF expectations (Purroy 1990a).
In Venezuela, "there is nothing easier than eliminating the 
fiscal deficit" (Purroy 1990a). With the state as the principal
4Food products and other consumer goods generally make up around 
13% of all imports (Republic of Venezuela 1990). In an attempt to 
reduce consumer imports, the government has identified its goal of 
changing the imported pattern of consumption to one more in line with 
the agricultural strengths of Venezuela, potentially contributing to a 
long-term reduction of imports (CORDIPLAN 1990).
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exporter and determiner of prices on exports, modifying the exchange 
rate produces greater state revenue. Quite simply, devaluation permits 
an increase in public income, allowing the deficit to be eliminated.
The Venezuelan government recognizes this effect of manipulating the 
exchange rate, and it chose to retain that privilege against IMF 
recommendation when it mandated that PDVSA currency be sold directly to 
the Central Bank, therefore rejecting the IMF stipulation that PDVSA 
currency be sold on the open market (BCV Economist 2, 1991). In fact, 
current Planning Minister Miguel Rodriguez has identified the ability 
to use currency exchange as a policy, one of the primary "structural 
advantages of Venezuela" (Purroy 1990a).
The risk of using devaluation to eliminate the fiscal deficit is 
inflation. The neo-liberal perspective argues that the elimination of 
the public sector deficit will bring about the end of high rates of 
inflation. Structuralists, on the other hand, argue that inflation is 
caused by structural imbalance, such as that seen in Venezuela in the 
sectoral imbalance between the petroleum and non-petroleum sectors, and 
will not disappear with the public sector deficit. The perseverance of 
high rates of inflation through 1990 and into 1991 (BCV 1991; LAER 
31/8/90; EIU 1991b; Purroy 1991; VenEconomla 1991c), even when the 
public sector deficit has been well within acceptable IMF levels 
provides evidence for the structural critique of the neo-liberal 
panacea.
Curbing inflation was identified as the government's tnp priority 
during 1991 (Daily Journal 6/5/91), and Central Bank officials 
predicted that the inflation rate would be under 20%. By March,
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estimates had to be revised to 25%, with the government publicly 
claiming that inflation was under control (El Nacional 21/2/91,
19/3/91). By mid-May, however, Central Bank figures indicated that the 
1991 inflation rate was keeping pace almost exactly with the 40% rate 
of 1990 (BCV 1991).
One of the primary methods of controlling inflation is through 
monetary control by the Central Bank. The Bank exerts indirect control 
over interest rates through monetary policy to avoid the inflationary 
pressure of excess demand (MetroEconomlca 1991b; El Universal 24/2/91). 
The problem with this form of inflationary control is that if the bank 
maintains high interest rates to stabilize the exchange rate and 
prices, economic activity is inhibited by the unavailability of 
investment credit. If the bank chooses to stimulate the economy 
through low interest rates, a trade off is made with inflation 
(MetroEconomico 1991). Therefore, despite early success, evidence 
suggests that the achievements made following the implementation of the 
outward-oriented model were short-term at best and do not guarantee 
long-term stability of the public sector account.
In addition to maintaining economic equilibrium, a greater task 
toward the development of a stable economy is long-term economic 
growth5. After the negative growth rate of 8.4% in 1989, and a 4% 
recovery during 1990, President Perez predicted that 1991 would be the 
first year of reactivation of the economy (El Nacional 3/3/91). He 
projected a growth rate of 8%, which would represent the highest growth
Economic growth is defined as the increase in an economy's real 
per capita level of output over time and is measured by the rate of 
change (Miller 1988).
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rate in Venezuela during the last 15 years (Daily Journal 18/3/91; El 
Universal 27/3/91).
The petroleum sector continues to be the primary source of 
economic growth, and under the outward-oriented plan is expanding and 
developing new possibilities for exports. As the center of the 
Venezuelan economy since its discovery, the state petroleum company 
(PDVSA) is a highly efficient, professional enterprise. Shortly after 
the implementation of the outward-oriented model, PDVSA developed an 
investment plan for 1991-95 that has the potential to make PDVSA one of 
the world's largest transnational oil companies. The emphasis has 
switched from the conception of petroleum as supporter of import 
substitution to the use of petroleum to drive export development 
(Hernandez 1991).
The purpose of the plan is to maintain secure markets and 
increase Venezuela's strategic position within OPEC, as well as 
increasing production potential (Maxim Ross 1991b). The primary goal 
is to increase production to 3.25 million barrels per day by 1993 and 
then to 3.5 million bpd by 1995 (El Diario 2/3/91; Maxim Ross 1991b). 
The plan includes an increase in the output of basic crude, natural 
gas, increasing refining capacity of domestic and Venezuelan owned 
refineries abroad, and increasing petrochemical production (LAWR 
6/6/91).
In addition to significant investment, PDVSA is looking toward 
greater "internationalization" by developing its capacities both 
"upstream" and "downstream." Venezuela is already the largest owner of 
overseas refining of all the OPEC nations (EIU 1991b), with full
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ownership of three major refineries in the U.S. (Citgo, Champlin and 
Seaview). PDVSA is currently exploring joint ventures with the France, 
Spain, Germany, Czechoslovakia and Amoco in the U.S. (Daily Journal 
12/4/91, 8/5/91; El Diario 23/3/91; VenEconomia 1991a). These 
"downstream" activities allow Venezuela greater access to markets and 
provide the refineries with a steady, predictable supply. At the same 
time, Venezuela is developing its "upstream" capability through 
agreements with Guatemala and Peru for exploration and development of 
their petroleum potential. Exploration has already begun in Aruba and 
discussions are being conducted with Trinidad, Grenada, Netherlands 
Antilles and Honduras (LAWR 7/2/91).
Venezuela's outlook for long-term production of petroleum is 
optimistic. A significant increase in proven reserves was made in 1985 
and 1986 as a result of exploration and development programs especially 
in the Orinoco River belt. Venezuela is now estimated to control six 
percent of the world's proven petroleum reserves, with a theoretical 
reserve life of over 80 years (Republic of Venezuela 1990).
Venezuela's ability to depend on a petroleum-led economy is 
secure, although at the cost of external vulnerability that is partly a 
result of weak non-petroleum and agricultural sectors. Venezuela's 
manufacturing capability had grown steadily from the 1930's through the 
early 1970's. The petroleum booms undermined this manufacturing 
capability by drowning domestic production in a flood of imports and 
reduced demand for domestic goods (BCV 1988; Moralpa 1983; Salazar- 
Carrillo 1986).
Venezuela possesses sufficient national resources such as
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petroleum, coal, iron ore and bauxite to support the development of 
manufacturing (Morales 1983), and its proximity to the U.S. suggests 
potential markets to allow Venezuela to compete (Morales 1983). 
Venezuela's ability to reduce its dependence on petroleum must come 
from other sectors in the economy (Marquez 1983). After four years of 
solid growth at an average 4.6% annually, (Hausmann 1990) the non­
petroleum sector experienced a sharp contraction in 1989 of -9.4% as a 
result of the devaluation, and then showed signs of recovery with a 
3.8% growth level in 1990 (EIU 1991a; International Law Practice 1991; 
Purroy 1991). Government projections for 1991 expect 6% growth in the 
non-petroleum sector, based on large industrial projects to be 
initiated during the year (Daily Journal 18/3/91) and early recovery in 
capacity utilization and manufacturing output (Daily Journal 20/3/91; 
EIU 1990, 1991b; El Nacional 1/3/91; Purroy 1990b, 1991).
Besides their importance to the domestic economy of providing 
employment and GDP, the non-petroleum sectors are of special interest 
as the sources of non-traditional exports6, the neo-liberal solution to 
dependence on petroleum as the main source of foreign exchange (EIU 
1991c; Republic of Venezuela 1990).
An evolving system of incentives for non-traditional exports has 
been in place since 1970, including tax advantages and attempts to 
increase potential markets through membership in the Andean Common 
Market and other means (Morales 1983). Approximately 55% of 
Venezuela's non-traditional exports are produced by state-owned
6Non-traditional exports in Venezuela include all exports except 
petroleum, iron ore, coffee and cacao (Republic of Venezuela 1990).
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enterprises and include aluminum, steel products, and chemical products 
(Republic of Venezuela 1990). Following implementation of the 
adjustment program, non-traditional exports grew vigorously due to the 
removal of the anti-export bias inherent in the overvalued bolivar, as 
well as to an incentive program designed to stimulate new exports 
(Purroy 1991; Republic of Venezuela 1990). In 1990, the expansion of 
new exports slowed with the removal of the export subsidy,7 and failed 
to reach projected levels (EIU 1990; LAWR 13/9/90; Purroy 1991). Non- 
traditional exports continued to decline in early 1991 as rising 
domestic demand and real appreciation of the exchange rate discouraged 
exportation (EIU 1991b).
The focus of Venezuela's plan to increase non-traditional exports 
is through the expansion of manufacturing exports, with emphasis on 
expansion of the private sector (CORDIPLAN 1990). One way of achieving 
this goal that proved to be "successful" in the newly industrialized 
nations of Asia and Mexico is through the development of manufactured 
exports based on a "cheap supply of labor", such as the Mexico-style 
maquiladoras. This approach has been suggested in Venezuela as a way 
to attract foreign investment and increase non-traditional exports.
The Venezuelan Foreign Trade Institute has identified prospective sites 
for maquiladoras, which are "well-suited" for areas with high 
unemployment and poverty, basic infrastructure and access to ports
7Further analysis suggested that the 1989 figures had been 
inflated by over-invoicing and fraud to benefit from the incentive 
program (EIU 1991a).
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(Daily Journal 18/3/91).8
For the short-term, however, the actual development of new 
exports is centered around intensification of the use of Venezuela's 
petroleum. The greatest strides toward export promotion have been 
taken in the petroleum-related sector of petrochemicals. The 
development of the petrochemicals industry makes up 21% of the entire 
PDVSA investment plan, surpassed only by production and refining (EIU 
1991a; Hernandez 1991; Maxim Ross 1991b). As a sub-sector of 
petroleum, the petrochemical industry is not subject to the same 
restrictions of foreign participation (Hernandez 1991). Nine new 
petrochemical projects have been approved by PDVSA, in partnership with 
both foreign interests and the domestic private sector (Daily Journal 
2/5/91, 6/5/91, 7/5/91, 13/5/91; EIU 1991a).
The agricultural sector, like the manufacturing sector, was 
strongly affected by the 1989 adjustment program. Unlike the 
manufacturing sector, however, agriculture is not recovering and shows 
little evidence of increased growth or productivity in the short or
medium-term future (Carlos Gonzalez 1990; EIU 1991c).
With the implementation of the adjustment program, Venezuelan 
agriculture was exposed to foreign competition, the removal of
8The desirability of maquiladoras is controversial (Grupo 
Consolidado 1990a; Munarriz 1989). In Venezuela at least, the long­
term viability of this approach may be inherently limited. As Cartaya
and Marquez (1990) argue, Venezuela is not, nor does it wish to be, a 
supplier of cheap labor. The extent of urbanization, the broad base of 
basic education and the tradition of democratic participation all 
mitigate against a permanent reduction in real wages. The goal of the 
export promotion program should be to move away from exploitation of 
Venezuela's natural resource base toward the development of "human 
capital intensive goods exports" (Cartaya & Marquez 1990:10).
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government subsidies for loans, and higher prices for fertilizer and 
other inputs (Carlos Gonzalez 1990; EIU 1991c; Maxim Ross 1990; Morales 
Espinoza 1990; Roberts et al. 1990; MAC 1990). The result was a drop 
in production and an increase in consumer prices (Morales Espinoza
1990). During 1988, the sector as a whole had shown a level of growth 
of 4.6%, while 1989 ended with a -5.1% growth level (International Law 
Practice 1991).
Attempts at structural reform in the agricultural sector are 
being made. A loan from the World Bank is supporting a program of 
"title search" to give producers legal title to their land (Delgado 
1990; MAC 1990). Efforts to identify and support the production of 
non-traditional agricultural exports exist,9 although early results 
are not encouraging (Carlos Gonzalez 1990; Maxim Ross 1990).
Recovery and growth of the agricultural sector will by nature 
take longer. To the dismay of even strong supporters of the market 
reforms, Venezuelan agriculture was largely abandoned by the state 
(Delgado 1991, Freije 1991). Private sector participation in the 
sector is not likely to fill the gap as agricultural returns are long­
term and risky (Delgado 1991). Early evidence for 1990 shows that 
agriculture is not recovering and it shows a second year of negative 
growth at -1.3% (International Law Practice 1991; Purroy 1991).
Despite the initial growth and recovery of the non-petroleum 
sectors, the extreme differential between them and the petroleum sector 
makes their emergence as a major source of growth a long-term goal.
Possibilities for non-traditional agricultural exports to be 
developed in Venezuela include pears, apples, plums, peaches, potatoes 
and garlic (Carlos Gonzalez 1990; Maxim Ross 1990).
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The Venezuelan economy will remain petroleum-led and therefore 
vulnerable to external markets and forces for several more years (LAWR 
6/6/91; Morales 1983; Sanchez & Paez 1989).
Venezuela's potential for long-term economic growth is limited by 
two factors: its ability to attract foreign investment and its
persistent sectoral imbalance.
Foreign investment is an important pillar in Venezuela's move 
toward outward-oriented growth. Investment is needed to provide access 
to technology and expertise, as well as market access for Venezuelan 
exports. The global climate, however, has created a "global credit 
crunch" as developing countries in Latin America must compete with each 
other, with Eastern Europe, the newly industrializing countries of 
Asia, as well as the developed countries of Europe and the United 
States. The competition for foreign investment was highlighted in a 
recent speech by President George Bush regarding his "Initiative for 
the Americas".
The competition for capital today is fierce, and the key, 
the key to increased investment, is to be competitive, to 
turn around the conditions that have discouraged both 
foreign and domestic investment, reduce the regulatory 
burden, clear away the thicket of bureaucratic barriers 
that choke off Latin America's aspiring new 
entrepreneurs... Investment reform is essential to make it 
easier to start new business ventures and make it possible 
for international investors to participate and profit in 
Latin American markets (Bush 1990).
The Venezuelan government is actively promoting investment in 
Venezuela through consultation with international business interests 
(Daily Journal 11/2/91; El Nacional 11/3/91, 21/3/91; El Universal 
9/3/91).
Considerable interest has been expressed in investment in Venezuela,
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particularly since the Gulf War. Most interest is in the area of 
petroleum and petroleum-related industries (Daily Journal 25/3/91a, 
25/3/9lb; El Nacional 19/12/90, El Universal 9/3/91; 21/3/91; 22/3/91). 
Foreign investment in Venezuela has grown, showing an increase in 1990 
of $355-$500 million dollars over 1989 (Daily Journal 25/3/91, El 
Universal 5/3/91).10
In addition to the limitations placed on potential growth by the 
need for foreign investment, Venezuela's growth potential is also 
limited by the sectoral imbalance between petroleum and non-petroleum 
sectors. Attempts to generate development in the non-petroleum sectors 
by using the abundant resources provided by the petroleum sector 
creates an "exchange contradiction" (Gomez & Ross 1986). This exchange 
contradiction is related to, but distinct from the idea of the Dutch 
Disease discussed in chapter three.
According to the postulates of the Dutch Disease, and supported 
by the Venezuelan experience, the "unproductive profit" of the 
petroleum rent translates into an elevated amount of imports and 
overvaluation of the currency and is directed toward the development of 
non-transferable (and therefore non-exportable) goods— at the cost of 
stagnation of the productive sectors (Hein 1980; Karl 1986; Lopez 1989; 
Scherr 1991). In Venezuela, petroleum income supported the consumption 
of imports and investment in communal services including transportation
10Recent investments have been made in hotels (Daily Journal 
2/5/91), the newspaper industry (Daily Journal 20/3/90), communications 
(Daily Journal 13/5/91), petrochemicals (Daily Journal 18/3/91), and 
aluminum I El Nacional 30/11/90). Preliminary joint venture agreements 
in petroleum have been made with Texaco and a German company (Daily 
Journal 16/5/91; El Nacional 14/2/91).
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and communications (Lopez 1989). The Dutch Disease, therefore 
highlights the dangers of a petroleum boom to the growth of the non­
petroleum sectors. It was on this basis that the Venezuelan state 
justified its strong intervention in the economy as a distributor and 
regulator of the petroleum revenue to the rest of the economy.
The idea of an inherent exchange contradiction, however, goes 
beyond the Dutch Disease by considering the impact on an unregulated 
exchange rate of a dominant sector. If allowed to float according to 
market forces, petroleum revenue, which is produced at a very low cost 
in relation to the cost of manufacturing goods, will press the exchange 
rate toward overvaluation. The forces of the market, therefore, tend 
to establish a rate of exchange that is overvalued, while stimulation 
of the non-petroleum economy depends on devaluating the bolivar to 
stimulate exports. 11
Considered to be one of the three or four most important 
decisions to be made in Venezuela, state control of the exchange regime 
permitted two basic choices: 1) to allow the bolivar to be overvalued,
permitting the best use of petroleum income; or 2) to maintain a sub­
uVenezuela has been aware of this contradiction almost since 
petroleum became an important part of the economy, and has attempted to 
compensate by state control of the exchange rate regime. At the advice 
of German economist Herman Max, Venezuela had put in place in 1940 a 
system of differential exchange rates, in an attempt to deal with the 
problems inherent between the two diverse sectors of the economy 
(Marquez 1983). From 1940 until 1976, Venezuela maintained an exchange 
policy which was a system of differential exchange rates (Sistema de 
Cambios Diferenclales (SCD). Despite pressure from the IMF and critics 
within Venezuela, the system remained in place until 1976 when 
Venezuela unified the SCD into a single rate (Marquez 1983). The 
multi-tier exchange rate implemented in 1983 restored a differentiated 
system until February of 1989 when the bolivar was allowed to float 
freely against the dollar.
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valued rate that stimulated the development of non-petroleum sectors 
and exports and contributed more completely to development. An 
overvalued bolivar allowed for the nation's short and medium-term 
enjoyment of petroleum revenue, at the cost of development in the rest 
of the economy, while the sub-valued bolivar "condemned" Venezuelans to 
buy expensively what could be obtained cheaply, but would produce long­
term results and reduce vulnerability to international forces and the 
exhaustion of petroleum resources (Gomez & Ross 1986).
The impact on Venezuela of implementing a free floating exchange 
rate, and thereby renouncing state control of the exchange regime, 
could be a negation of the intent to stimulate non-petroleum exports.
In the absence of state control, petroleum market forces could cause 
the appreciation of the bolivar. Initially stabilized against the 
"normal" levels of petroleum income, an increase in the value or volume 
of petroleum exports could negate the effects of the 1989 devaluation 
for stimulating non-traditional exports (Gomez and Ross 1986).
The phenomenon of exchange contradiction suggests that the 
massive expansion of PDVSA is not compatible with the maintenance of a 
floating exchange rate— implemented to favor the competitiveness of 
non-petroleum exports (El Nacional 2/3/91; El Universal 7/2/91;
Vivancos 1991). Considering the exchange contradiction, Venezuela's 
potential to develop non-petroleum sectors and non-traditional exports 
could be limited by the exchange impact of a new "boom" or "mini-boom" 
in the petroleum sector. Early evidence of the existence of this 
possible phenomenon is provided by the decline in non-traditional 
exports in early 1991 as a result of the real appreciation of the
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exchange rate which discouraged exportation (EIU 1991b; El Universal 
1/2/91).
In conclusion, Venezuela's potential for maintaining economic 
equilibrium and achieving long-term stable growth remains inhibited by 
the dominance of petroleum, in spite of the promises of the neo-liberal 
model. The implementation of market devices such as a free floating 
exchange rate and the inflow of foreign investment will limit the 
growth of the economy to the sector of petroleum, deepening Venezuela's 
dependence on the ebb and flow of the world petroleum market. Gains 
made since the switch to market principles are short-term only and the 
potential for achieving non-petroleum sectoral growth is limited by the 
growing dominance of petroleum.
GROWTH WITH EQUITY
The second major goal of the Venezuelan neo-structural model is 
growth with equity. Preserved as an important goal of the import 
substitution model, growth with equity implies using market mechanisms 
to generate growth, which the state will then redistribute as a 
stimulus to fuller participation in the internal market.
The definition of equity in the emerging strategy is an important 
indicator of the nature of Venezuelan neo-structuralism. The neo­
liberal and structural perspectives define equity and the importance of 
equity differently. Once again, the Venezuelan model retains the 
structural definition and goals of equality but is implementing neo­
liberal methods of redistribution.
From the neo-liberal perspective, inequality is both necessary 
and just. In order to stimulate economic growth, wealth must be
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concentrated in order to provide for investment and the development of 
industry. Progress toward economic development is defined as an 
increase in per capita income, not in real individual income (Sunkel & 
Zuleta 1990). Redistributive programs are evaluated in terms of their 
impact on economic efficiency rather than their impact on poverty (Wolf 
1988). Inequality is just because it is a result of differing levels 
of individual talent and motivations. The poor are poor because they 
are inefficient and choose not to work harder (Gilpin 1987; Wilfred
1988).
Structuralism, on the other hand, identifies a concentrated 
structure of income distribution as one of the three primary 
bottlenecks hindering Latin American development (Lander 1990; Sunkel & 
Zuleta 1990). An unregulated economy over the long-term generates its 
own demise through unsustainable social differentiation in which wealth 
becomes too concentrated and markets are exhausted (Ibarra 1991; Wolf
1988). Economic development, they would argue, depends on increasing 
participation in the domestic economy, putting money in the hands of 
consumers to generate demand and stimulate industrial and agricultural 
growth.
The goal of redistribution within the new Venezuelan development 
model is to improve equity of opportunity, and while avoiding mention 
of equity of outcome, seeks to improve the distribution of income and 
wealth for all Venezuelans, and provide for the satisfaction of basic 
needs (CORDIPLAN 1990, 1991).
Primary responsibility for achieving these objectives remains 
with the state. According to the administration, Economic reform must
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be linked with broad social programs to cushion the impact of 
adjustment, combat critical poverty and develop human resources (Perez 
1990; El Universal 22/3/91). In the Eighth National Plan, a commitment 
to the social welfare of Venezuela is discussed as a "fundamental 
priority" and involves dealing with poverty, improving employment, 
income and social security, and improving social services (CORDIPLAN 
1990).
To soften the impact of the adjustment program the government 
announced new social programs (Republic of Venezuela 1990). The "Plan 
to Confront Poverty" (Plan de Enfrentamiento de la Pobreza) was aimed 
at the needs of the most vulnerable groups (Fundacion Cavendes 1991, 
Marino Gonzalez 1990). Benefits for the working poor included across- 
the-board wage increases, an increase in the minimum wage and 
unemployment insurance, while the most vulnerable groups were supported 
by targeted subsidies12 and an employment program (Cartaya & Marquez 
1990; Republic of Venezuela 1990). The social programs were supported 
by a promise of two billion U.S. dollars (LAWR 2/3/89). While delayed 
by several months in their implementation (Purroy 1989c), they were 
"impressive” in relation to past efforts and to the organizational 
capability of the state (Cartaya Sc Marquez 1990) . Although softening 
the impact of the adjustment program, the measures where short-term and 
insignificant in relation to the problem of poverty in general (Cartaya 
Sc Marquez 1990).
In addition to the short-term measures to stabilize the social
12Indirect subsides were maintained for fertilizers, student 
transportation fares and a basic basket of food including milk (Cartaya 
Sc Marquez 1990).
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situation during the initial adjustment to the outward-oriented model, 
the Eighth National Plan set forth the long-term priority of working 
toward equity and satisfaction of basic needs (Marino Gonzalez 1990). 
The goal of growth with equity would be reached through the integration 
of all Venezuelans as participants in the economy as producers and 
consumers (Cartaya & Marquez 1990; Ugalde 1990). The strategy set 
forth included the constant increase in employment opportunities, the 
protection of fair levels of wage remuneration, and the reorientation 
of state spending from its productive activities to the more efficient 
development of human capital (CORDIPLAN 1990, 1991; Marino Gonzalez 
1990). Through the structural transformation of the state, maximizing 
the capacity of the public sector through privatization and the 
reduction of state bureaucracy, the state would move from the 
distribution of rentistic income to concentrate on creating the 
educated, healthy work force capable of satisfying their basic needs 
(Espana & Gonzalez 1990; Marino Gonzalez 1990; Ugalde 1990).
While the goals of the growth with equity program reflect 
structuralist principles, the emerging method of redistribution 
resembles that found in neo-liberal, market economies. The nature of 
subsidies is being changed. Government policy is moving away from 
indirect subsidies of general prices controls in favor of direct 
subsidies. Described by neo-liberals are a more efficient use of 
"welfare" resources, indirect subsidies are targeted to the poorest 
groups. In Venezuela, resources are being channel ed through existing 
institutions such as the schools (Cartaya & Marquez 1990, Marino 
Gonzalez 1990), and are taking the form of food stamps, a milk bonus
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for school children and allowances for school supplies for poor 
families (Daily Journal 17/2/91; EIU 1991a, 1991b; El Nacional 
18/5/91).
While the effects of the 1989 adjustment created a considerable 
worsening of conditions for the lower and middle classes in 1989, the 
social situation in Venezuela had been worsening for nearly a decade.
The cost of living had risen sharply, with a greater percentage 
of income going toward the purchase of food (El Nacional 8/5/91), from 
28.4% in 1981 to 48.1% in 1989 (Fundacion Cavendes 1991). There was a 
progressive and sharp descent in real salaries until, in 1989, they 
equaled the levels of 1964 (Fundacion Cavendes 1991; Espana & Gonzalez 
1990; Ugalde 1990).
A growing percentage of the population was identified as 
impoverished, with a reported 57.3% increase during the 1980's (LAWR 
9/8/90). Official statistics estimated the number of Venezuelans in 
the state of poverty at 51.5% (Ugalde 1990), while unofficial estimates 
ranged to 60-69%, with 30-43% in an extreme state of poverty (Daily 
Journal 20/4/91; Economia Hoy 23/5/91; Fundacion Cavendes 1991; Ugalde 
1990; El Universal 11/3/91).
Planning Minister Miguel Rodriguez recognized that by the 
beginning of 1991, over three million people were living in sub­
standard barrios [squatter settlements] in Caracas alone (El Mundo 
7/5/91). Nutritional levels deteriorated throughout the 1980's as the 
drop in imports resulted in a decline in the availability of some basic 
foods and a subsequent drop in the consumption of eggs and meat (-45%), 
milk and dairy products (-68%), vegetables (-50%), and an increase in
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cereal consumption of 11% (Fundacion Cavendes 1991). The overall level 
of caloric consumption decreased 18% between 1988 and 1989 alone 
lEconomia Hoy 23/5/91), while the National Nutrition Institute reported 
that one in every five Venezuelans suffered from chronic malnutrition 
(Daily Journal 20/4/91).
In spite of its steady income from petroleum, the social 
situation in Venezuela is not markedly different from that of other 
Latin American nations. A recent United Nations study found that 
nearly 50% of all Latin Americans live in poverty (LAER 31/7/90, LAWR 
9/8/90), while official Venezuelan statistics set the level within 
Venezuela at 51.5% (Ugalde 1990).
Three factors will affect the potential of the Venezuelan model 
to reach its goal of growth with equity: 1) achievement of economic
growth; 2) actual redistribution by the state; and 3) tolerance of the 
poor for inequality.
Achievement of the goals depends first of all on the economy's 
ability to achieve stable, sustained growth. Critics suggest that the 
program, as outlined in the Eighth National Plan, sounds as though it 
had been written during another part of Venezuelan history when there 
were sufficient resources for everybody (Ugalde 1990). The potential 
for the state to invest in human development and social services, as it 
has planned, will continue to be limited by the conditionality imposed 
by the IMF, the World Bank and other international financial agencies. 
These institutions, who continue to make loans to support the economy 
and lessen the impact of the adjustment (Daily Journal 3/13/91) also 
seek to further neo-liberal principles in Venezuela and limit public
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sector expenditure. In the short and medium-term, the potential funds 
for public sector investment will continue to be limited by fluctuating 
petroleum revenue, and by the percentage of state income that must go 
for payment of the international debt 13 (Ugalde 1990; Valecillos
1989). Over the long-term, the ability to integrate all Venezuelans 
into the economy as producers and consumers will depend on the 
development of the non-petroleum sectors, and the ability to generate 
some measure of sectoral balance within the economy.
More importantly, the actual achievement of equity in the 
Venezuelan society will depend on the state's true commitment, and to a 
lesser degree its ability, to redistribute petroleum income.
Whether the Perez administration has preserved structuralist principles 
and the role of the state for its own benefit, for legitimacy purposes 
as it aids in accumulation "up and out", on the basis of a legitimate 
concern for the welfare of Venezuelans, or as a result of domestic 
pressure, is difficult to determine.
Rhetorical evidence for governmental commitment to social 
redistribution is plentiful. In a recent speech before a conference of 
the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL), 
President Perez identified the redefinition of the role of the state as 
one of the fundamental issues facing Latin America (Perez 1990).
13Through its debt rescheduling under the Brady Plan, Venezuela 
spread its debt payments over a longer period of time and lowered 
interest rates (LAWR 10/1/91; Ruitort 1990). The amount of principal 
owed was reduced by 20% and annual debt service by 50%, lowering the 
annual service payments from nearly three billion dollars per year to 
1.3 billion (LAWR 6/9/90; El Nacional 5/12/90, 19/12/90; Republic of 
Venezuela 1990; Ruitort 1990; El Universal 6/12/90).
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We need a State which, if it intervenes in the economy, 
does so through market-compatible mechanisms. We cannot 
accept the concept of the State as the negation of the 
market. It is the State's responsibility to guarantee that 
the market does not indulge in monopolistic or 
oligopolistic practices which end up by distorting it. We 
must get away from the false dichotomy between the State 
and the market...the State in our countries must gradually 
give up any involvement in the direct production of those 
goods and services which, by their nature, can be supplied 
by the private sector. This will give us a strong and more 
flexible State apparatus, concentrated on those activities 
which it cannot delegate (Perez 1990:14).
Although the emerging model is never specifically identified as
"neo-structural" by the central government, rhetorical rejection of the
market failures of neo-liberalism are frequent. President Perez has
declared that "I am completely against neo-liberalism" (Gonzalez 1989).
We can't separate, as does neo-liberalism, social action 
and economic action— we can't think of the production of 
wealth without asking for what purpose and for whom (El 
Universal 27/11/88, as cited in Gonzalez 1989).
In a speech before the United Nations, Diego Arria, Venezuela's 
United Nations representative argued that Latin American countries have 
to consider more than just economic factors in seeking to overcome the 
region's problems. Because "the free market alone cannot guarantee a 
reasonable standard of living for Latin Americans" governments must 
also intervene to satisfy the needs for social justice and equality, 
"collective needs that cannot be met by market mechanisms" (Daily 
Journal 13/5/91).
The extent of poverty even after petro booms and generations of 
rhetorical commitment to equality brings into question the 
redistributive intention of the state (Ugalde 1990). Sonntag & de la 
Cruz (1985) charge that the developmental goals of CEPAL in Venezuela
were in fact a commitment to international "modernization" rather than
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social development of the domestic economy. Petras & Morley (1983) 
argue that there has consistently been a "divergence between the 
governments' 'populist' goals and their public practices".
Rather than working toward redistribution, growth with equity 
goals are to provide legitimacy among the populace while the state 
works to aid "capital accumulation and social reproduction" (Sonntag & 
de la Cruz 1985). The relationship between the state and the 
bourgeoisie in the periphery countries is the inverse of that in the 
core countries in which the state aids accumulation for the private 
sector. In the periphery, and particularly in Venezuela, the 
bourgeoisie needs the resources of the producer-state to aid its 
accumulation of capital (Petras & Morley 1983; Sonntag & de la Cruz
1985). In Venezuela, "the state acted just like a private 
capitalist...with a logic of capital" (Petras & Morley 1983).
A study of the impact of first oil booms on income distribution 
in Venezuela supports this view. As a result of the boom, the 
concentration of income increased with incomes rising faster at the 
higher levels of distribution, with the largest increases for the very 
rich, thus the gap between the poor and the non-poor increased. An 
analysis of price changes indicates that prices rose faster for the 
poor while the mean real income of those in poverty was left unchanged 
or declined (Musgrove 1981). In spite of significant government 
investment in regional development, large regional income inequality 
persisted (Jones 1982).
The new development model, therefore, is a continuation of the 
old. The IMF, neo-liberal model was implemented in coordination with
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international capital and the Venezuelan bourgeoisie and will continue
to benefit these groups, at the cost of social redistribution (Petras &
Morley 1983). In the past, the principal beneficiaries of the state's
role in the economy have been foreign investors, large manufacturers,
large commercial farmers and the financial sector (Petras & Morley
1983). The same groups stand to benefit under the outward-oriented
economy and were the primary supporters of the implementation of the
IMF adjustment model.14
A final factor that will affect the viability of the neo-
structural model of development is the tolerance for inequality among
the Venezuelan poor. Economist Jacob Viner has written that a
decisive test of the acceptability of a market economy 
depends on the extent to which markets can co-exist with a 
level of 'distributive justice' with which the electorate 
is 'tolerably content' (as cited in Wolf 1988:29).
Analysis of the Latin American situation frequently concerns
itself with the type of regime that can sustain the "discipline" and
"sacrifice" necessary for the success of the IMF adjustment measures.
Analysts suggest that the inability to meet the "dual challenge" of
sustaining viable democratic institutions and concurrently implementing
painful economic reform could lead to a form of authoritarian democracy
14Allied with the administration in the implementation of the IMF 
model were the IMF, commercial foreign creditors, and domestic and 
international business interests. The program was opposed by both the 
President's own party (AD) and the opposition (COPEI, MAS, etc.) and 
other domestic interests such as public sector bureaucrats and union 
leaders (Daily Journal 7/5/91; EIU 1991b; Economist 1990d; Purroy 
1990c). Within his own administration, Perez rearranged his cabinet, 
removing AD party leaders opposed to reform and replacing them with 
businessmen and "technocrats" with little party affiliation, 
reinforcing the administration's commitment to reform (EIU 1990, 1991b; 
LAWR 9/8/90; VenEconomla 1991a).
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"in which leaders will push for economic reforms at the top while 
relying on the military and security forces to suppress mounting 
popular protest below" (LAWR 10/1/91).
Two manifestations of social and political protest to the 
implementation of the IMF model were experienced in Venezuela in 1989. 
The first was the outbreak of rioting on February 27, 1989. Initially 
sparked by increases in public transportation, within hours the rioting 
had spread throughout Caracas and to cities across the country. For 
twenty-four hours looting continued unimpeded. When the government 
responded it suspended constitutional rights and sent the army into the 
streets (and went ahead with the official signing in New York of its 
Letter of Intent with the IMF). The army is charged with "unnecessary 
and indiscriminate" repression, the random detention of citizens, and 
the intentional arrest and harassment of Venezuelans known to be active 
in collective organizations, particularly in the barrios (Sosa A. 1989; 
Ugalde 1990). Official estimates set the death toll somewhere between 
250 and 350 with nearly 2000 injured (EIU 1990; Latin American Times 
1990; LAWR 16/3/89, 19/5/89). Unofficial estimates, however, claim 
that more than one thousand people died (Latin American Time 1990; LAWR 
16/3/89).
Analysis of the environment in which the riots took place 
identifies four primary factors which contributed to the situation: 1)
growing hunger and lack of the "bare necessities of life" on a massive 
scale; 2) growing systematic repression; 3) evolution of the social 
services into an agent of social discrimination (with access to 
education and health services, as well as transportation, water,
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lights, housing, and security dependent on income); and 4) the growing 
proletarianization of the middle classes (Trigo 1989).
The second wide-spread protest was in the form of electoral 
protest in December of 1989. The election was the first in which 
governors and mayors were directly elected, rather than appointed by 
the administration. The reform of the election process was supposed to 
be evidence of the benefits of state decentralization through neo­
liberal principles. Voters used the election as a form of protest, 
abstaining at very high levels compared to traditional voter 
participation (Ugalde 1990).
While the majority of social protest remained non-violent, 15 
with the riots of February 1989, the potential of violent opposition to 
government policies became a reality. As a "prominent Venezuelan 
businessman" described to the Latin American Times;
What we worry about is the social price. You see those 
people up there [pointing to the steep slopes surrounding 
the high-rise city centre, which are crowded to the 
bursting point with tin and cardboard shacks housing the 
poor]. Well, they were prepared to stay there for as long 
as there was hope— that one day they would be able to come 
down here and have their share of all this. It was always 
a delusion, but we had the wherewithal to keep it alive.
This is no longer the case. After last year's riots, many 
of my friends keep their families permanently in Florida 
(Latin American Times 1990:10).
The riots of February 1989 remain a topic of discussion among 
Venezuelans. The feeling is often expressed by some that the riots of 
1989 were unplanned and spontaneous. The next time, they say, they
15During the first half of 1990 there were 145 demonstrations 
reported. Of the 145, 114 were non-violent. One hundred and twenty 
three were demonstrations against the government, and three were labor 
demonstrations against private sector enterprises (Ugalde 1990).
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will be organized and more effective.16 Various rumors and discussions 
of possible a coup d'etat appear in the national media periodically 
(Daily Journal 9/5/91; Rangel 1991a, 1991b), although some analysts 
consider "improbable" the possibility of further social explosion 
(Ugalde 1990).
The recent historical distribution of income in Venezuela 
indicates that the state has not succeeded in its historical goal of 
stimulating the internal market and contributing toward the equity of 
Venezuelans. The percentage of Venezuelans in poverty equals that of 
other Latin American countries. The state has served to aid the 
accumulation of domestic and international capital rather than the poor 
it rhetorically targets.
If one could assume the "good intentions" of the Venezuelan state 
to contribute to redistribution and the maintenance of a democratic 
regime with a need to maintain legitimacy, Venezuela's potential to 
generate growth with equity is not optimistic. With thirty-nine 
percent of Venezuela's population under the age of fifteen (Republic of 
Venezuela 1990), the lack of sufficient education, nutrition, adequate 
housing and health services for those in poverty means a "sacrifice of 
the nation's future" (Latin American Bureau 1988). Without these basic 
services, the ability for half of the new generation to learn 
productive work skills is lost. As Ugalde (1990) writes, "a nation 
with fifty percent of its population in poverty will always be poor." 
NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION
16Based on personal conversations with Venezuelans during the 
spring of 1991.
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The third goal of the emerging Venezuelan model is the 
preservation and reclamation of its national self-determination. 
Specifically, self-determination could be defined as the right and 
ability to determine economic, social and political priorities; to use 
its resources appropriately; and to determine the conditions of its 
relations with other nations, both developed and developing.
The primary source of international influence in Latin America in 
general and in Venezuela in particular has been the result of the need 
for foreign capital, to provide for the importation of machinery, 
technology and management expertise, and access to export markets 
(Escobar 1988b). Through the 1940's this was in the form of foreign 
investment in primary products that resulted in the enclave development 
of that primary sector but did not spread to the rest of the economy.
As a response, the ideas of CEPAL promoted import substitution 
industrialization to stimulate development and protect national 
autonomy. Capital was needed for industrialization, but structuralist 
ideas forbade the continuation of foreign investment. The alternative 
was foreign borrowing (Freije 1991). Foreign debt, however, did not 
lessen the influence of international forces within the developing 
economy.
Some of the more obvious and direct foreign influence comes as a 
result of Venezuela's foreign debt, both as repayment is made on 
current debts, and as Venezuela continues to seek fresh money.17 The
17Between 1983 and 1989, Venezuela paid approximately $38 billion 
in principal and interest on its public and private debt, and reduced 
its external public debt in net terms by $2.4 billion (Republic of 
Venezuela 1990). As of June 30, 1990, Venezuela still carried external 
public debt amounting to $26.4 billion, including a debt service burden
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existence of the influence of the IMF and its principles in Venezuelan 
history is clear. Although Venezuela was one of last Latin American 
countries to sign a letter of agreement with the IMF, after putting off 
official submission for nearly a decade, avoidance of the IMF was 
largely possible by implementing an adjustment program of their own, 
loosely modeled on the IMF measures.
The influence of the international financial agencies is 
increasing as the portfolio of loans changes. Since 1989, the majority 
of Venezuelan debt is with bilateral or multilateral banks such as the 
IMF and World Bank, instead of private commercial banks18. By 1995, an 
estimated 75% of all foreign loans will be with these international 
financing agencies (BCV Economist 1, 1991).
One significant result of the growing role of the international 
financial institutions that has only recently been articulated is the 
phenomenon of cross-conditionality or interlocking conditionality. As 
the name suggests, cross-conditionality is the situation a debtor 
nation finds itself in as the result of relationships with more than 
one creditor agency (IMF, World Bank, BID 19, commercial banks) in 
which the borrowing nation must submit itself to the established 
guidelines of one agency as a prerequisite for the ability to assume
on total external debt representing approximately 47 percent of export 
earnings (Republic of Venezuela 1990).
18The loans from the IMF/WB have better terms, lower interest rates 
and lower fees than commercial banks (BCV Economist 1, 1991).
x9Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID) has loaned nearly 40 
thousand million dollars to Latin American over a period of 29 years 
without conditionality. Losses due to the debt crisis, however, 
stimulated the imposition of IMF-type restrictions in 1989 (Clemente
1989).
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new money from other lending agencies (Clemente 1989). In essence, the 
global capital crisis, the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980's, 
and the failure of many borrowing nations to service their debt created 
a recognition between lending agencies that the situation could not be 
solved individually and required concerted action (Banco Central de 
Costa Rica 1986; Clemente 1989). This has changed the nature of the 
relationship between debtors and creditors from a bilateral one to a 
multilateral one in which all players are involved with each situation.
The creditor agencies have agreed to informally act together so 
that the disbursement of any new loan depends on the approval of all 
other agencies involved. The IMF has largely taken the role of 
mediator, even when its own resources are not involved (Clemente 1989).
The problems created for developing countries are numerous. Each 
international lending agency has its own objectives and time schedules, 
creating incompatibilities and contradictions with the other agencies 
that the debtor nation must resolve 20 (Banco Central de Costa Rica
1986). The ability to make debt service and principal payments for 
deadlines at or nearly the same time, requires considerable liquidity. 
Whereas, previously, new loans from one agency would support the 
payment of an earlier loan, cross-conditionality ties up revenue. It 
is necessary to maintain a level of savings for payment of the debt 
that reduces the funds available for the investment that could 
stimulate net growth (Escobar Ramos 1991).
MThe effects of cross-conditionality on the developing nations are 
worsened by the disagreements and competition between the IMF and the 
World Bank (Economist 1989; SELA 1989).
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Consequences of foreign debt include not only the loss of 
political strength in light of direct intervention and measures of 
conditionality and cross-conditionality, but also a weakening of 
economic strength through the transfer of net resources from Venezuela 
(and other developing nations) to the rest of the world, generally 
through the medium of the international financing agencies (Lago & 
Perozo 1989; SELA 1989).
In addition to the influence of Venezuela's creditors and the 
international financial agencies, growth under the new outward-oriented 
model is dependent on direct foreign investment (Purroy 1990c). Latin 
American nations, including Venezuela, who rejected foreign investment 
in the past are seeking it again (Escobar 1988a). This time, however, 
there is the belief that Venezuela has learned from its experience. As 
one Venezuelan economist commented, "we are now smarter, we have 
learned our lesson, and are asking for partnerships, for a share in the 
capital, not enclave development" (Freije 1991). New agreements with 
foreign capital are to be in the form of joint ventures, with greater 
provision for the retention of important management decisions to 
Venezuelans.
In a global context of active competition for foreign investment, 
however, Venezuela's ability to set the terms of foreign investment 
within its borders may be limited. Potential investors openly comment 
on the reform measures in Venezuela, suggesting that creation of a 
climate "friendly to investment" depends on speedy privatization (Daily 
Journal 17/2/19), an independent Central Bank, a good relationship with 
the IMF and the World Bank (Daily Journal 25/3/91), as well as more
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government controls removed, and the opening of "important" parts of 
the economy such as petroleum, petrochemical and banking (Daily Journal 
17/2/91; El Diario 23/3/91). Venezuela has signed an agreement with 
OPIC (U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation), submitting to 
specific legal and economic terms to guarantee U.S. investments (EIU
1990). Investors want a revision of the national tax system under 
which foreign companies currently pay 60-85% of their earnings (Daily 
Journal 20/3/91; El Diario 23/3/91; Sweensy 1991b), insisting the rate 
be reduced to not more than 35% (Sweensy 1991b).21
A new way of attracting foreign investment to developing 
countries is through Brady-style "swaps" of foreign debt for equity in 
national companies. As part of the debt restructuring contained under 
the Brady Plan, Venezuela held three auctions that allowed investors to 
trade Venezuelan public debt for equity in Venezuelan companies. By 
March of 1990, nearly 300 million dollars worth of debt was traded for 
equity in agriculture, steel, cement and the forestry industry (LAWR 
31/3/90). During the auction process, however, Venezuela received debt 
conversion proposals that were too large to be handled by the auction 
process. A plan was developed for dealing with the "mega-projects", 
with investments identified in five priority areas: petrochemicals,
aluminum, pulp and paper, tourism and infrastructure. The investments 
represent around six billion dollars of total investment with two
21The agreed tax rate for the Cristobal Colon project involving 
Shell, Exxon and Mitsubishi has been set at 30-35%, but depends on 
Congressional passage of the government's tax reform bill (Daily 
Journal 20/3/91).
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billion in equity swaps (EIU 1990)
Investments made through the debt/equity swap share the same 
disadvantages as traditional direct foreign investment. Critics 
describe the debt/equity swap as another means of "allowing U.S. 
industry to exploit cheap labor and grab markets" (LAER 30/6/90).
Others argue that the debt/equity swap implies that the debtor 
countries are now borrowing directly from investors, thus extending the 
ability of foreigners to intervene in domestic business and industry 
indefinitely, whereas eventually the debt would have been paid off 
(Economist 1991d).
The trend of growing foreign influence in the key sectors of 
Venezuela's economy is reinforced by the early results of the 
privatization program. Many of the government enterprises are 
attractive buys, while many are not (Latin American Times 1990). The 
companies with the most potential for success are the ones receiving 
the most interest, such as the national airlines, while others will 
require considerable restructuring by the state before a private 
investor would be interested (Latin American Times 1990). Rather than 
being an opportunity to "rescue the state" so it can fulfill its duties 
of the care of society and development (Purroy 1990c), the 
privatization process will benefit investors and leave the state to 
deal with the unprofitable ones.
Privatization also highlights the impact of the global context on 
Venezuela's ability to set forth on a path of growth. Critics of the
^ h e  plan exceeds the 600 million debt/equity limit set by the 
IMF, but a request to raise the annual limit to one billion dollars has 
been submitted (EIU 1990; LAWR 31/3/90).
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delays in Venezuela's plans for privatization argue that rapid
execution is crucial in its success. With all of Latin America and
parts of the rest of the world opening up and turning toward a market-
orientation, there is competition for buyers for privatizing companies.
As a Venezuelan analyst commented:
All of Latin America is privatizing. If there are five 
airlines for sale now, when we are ready to sell ours, will 
there by any more buyers? (Freije 1991).
The major drawback of direct foreign investment and the
debt/equity swap is the loss of profit and control in Venezuela's key
sectors (Purroy 1990c). Potential investors "only want the good stuff"
and in a competitive climate are at liberty to specify under what
conditions they will participate.
Two current issues in Venezuela could have a significant impact
on the Venezuelan nation-state's ability to maintain its national self-
determination: 1) the potential of allowing foreign participation in
the petroleum sector; and 2) the possibility of withdrawing from its
membership in OPEC.
Since its discovery, petroleum has provided revenue for
Venezuela. Originally developed by transnational petroleum companies,
with the nationalization of the petroleum industry in 1976, the nation
of Venezuela became the sole owner and main beneficiary of the oil.
Under the outward-oriented model, however, the role of petroleum in
Venezuela is changing. The state oil company, PDVSA, is defining
itself increasingly as a profit-seeking transnational oil company and
less as the national source of income, including allowing foreign
participation in the formerly restricted sector.
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PDVSA plans investment of around 32 billion dollars between 1991 
and 1996 (Daily Journal 15/5/91; EIU 1991c), and there is clear 
recognition of the need for foreign investment to provide funds, access 
to markets, as well as necessary technology and expertise. The PDVSA 
investment plan is controversial within Venezuela, interpreted by 
critics as opening the door to foreign participation and investment in 
Venezuela's most strategic industry (Economia Hov 10/5/91; LAWR 6/6/91; 
El Nacional 4/2/91a, 4/2/91b, 8/5/91; Sweensy 1991b).
Proponents of the plan argue that Venezuela will have a 
petroleum-led economy for several years to come, and therefore should 
seek to maximize its potential (LAWR 6/6/91). In twenty years, 
analysts predict, the world will have developed alternate sources of 
energy and will no longer rely on petroleum, therefore Venezuela should 
take advantage of the situation before it is too late (Freije 1991).
When the petroleum industry was nationalized in Venezuela in 
1975, there was considerable controversy over Article 5 of the Law of 
Nationalization. While the Law of Nationalization reserved for the 
state the rights to produce and exploit petroleum and coal, Article 5 
allowed for the future participation of foreign interests in petroleum 
under the conditions that the participation be approved by Congress and 
limited to 15 years.
The test case for allowing foreign participation in an industry 
that has been closed to foreigners for sixteen years is the Cristobal 
Colon project to develop natural gas deposits (Daily Journal 25/3/91; 
Economia Hov 10/5/91; Maxim Ross 1991a). PDVSA signed a preliminary 
agreement for thirty years of joint participation with Shell, Exxon and
Mitsubishi (LAWR 9/5/91). The project was expected to require 
Congressional approval (Daily Journal 11/2/91; EIU 1991b; LAWR 20/9/90 
El Nacional 4/2/91) since Lagoven of Venezuela, while retaining the 
presidency and direction of the project, would control only 32% of the 
shares, compared to 68% foreign interest (Shell 31%, Exxon 29%, 
Mitsubishi 8%) (EIU 1990). Congressional approval or the amending of 
Article 5 was averted when the Supreme Court ruled in April 1991 that 
the project was legal because natural gas was not included within the 
petroleum rights (Hernandez 1991; LAWR 9/5/91).
While there is an opening for foreign participation in a 
petroleum-related industry, the battle has not yet been fought to 
determine what future participation in the direct exploitation and 
production of petroleum might be. Some members of Congress have 
proposed a joint venture strategy under which Venezuela would retain 
important management decisions as well as 51% control in all future 
joint ventures, a condition critics say foreign investors will not 
accept, and a responsibility that PDVSA cannot handle (Sweensy 1991b). 
While some analysts suggest there is a slow development of consensus 
for foreign involvement (Sweensy 1991b), the issue is an important one 
in Venezuela because it is closely identified with national 
sovereignty.
PDVSA, under the market oriented model, is seeking to reduce its 
financial responsibilities to Venezuela in order to use its profit for 
expansion and investment (Daily Journal 2/5/91). In a recent speech, 
Sosi Pietri, President of PDVSA, spoke of "PDVSA's right to expand, 
grow richer and be competitive so that it can compete alongside of
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large oil companies such as Shell and Exxon" (Daily Journal 2/5/91). 
This includes recent pressure exerted by PDVSA on the government to 
lower the nation's tax rate on the company, (currently about 80%), as 
well as lower the national export tax (El Nacional 6/3/91, 11/3/91, 
12/3/91).
The outcome of the debate over foreign participation in the 
petroleum industry is related to another factor affecting Venezuela's 
national self-determination: the future relationship between Venezuela
and OPEC. Membership in OPEC is an important issue in Venezuela, and 
debate has become particularly heated since the Gulf War. Venezuela's 
support of OPEC has long been a source of tension between the seemingly 
incompatible international policy goals of the desire to defend Third 
World interests and the need to strengthen ties with Washington (EIU
1990). Implementation of the outward-oriented model based on free 
market principles and the internationalization of PDVSA provide 
increasing ideological argument for a Venezuelan desertion, while the 
Gulf War highlighted the differences between Venezuela and the Middle 
Eastern Countries.
The War also served to return Venezuela to the role of the 
"reliable" source of oil, a role it enjoyed in 1973 when Venezuela 
refused to join the oil embargo imposed by the Arab nations (EIU 1990). 
President Bush used a pre-war trip to Caracas to "guarantee" Venezuela 
as a constant supplier of petroleum, and diplomatic moves were made by 
the European Economic Community to reinforce ties with Venezuela and 
Venezuelan petroleum (El Nacional 8/12/90, El Universal 22/4/91). The 
feeling is expressed that the war turned the international oil rules
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upside-down, leaving Venezuela with huge potential as the "safe source" 
of oil for the U.S., and perhaps Japan and the European Community 
(Sweensy 1991a).
At the same time, it is generally written that OPEC has emerged 
from the war with limited influence (MetroEconomica 1991b; El Nacional 
3/3/91; Sweensy 1991a; El Universal 27/3/91). Sosa Pietri, the 
director of PDVSA, has argued that OPEC no longer serves Venezuelan 
interests and should convert itself from an agency seeking to control 
the market to a source of technical support for oil-producing nations 
(EIU 1991b; El Universal 14/3/91).
President Perez reaffirmed Venezuela's commitment to OPEC in 
agreeing to comply with reinstated quotas following the Gulf War (Daily 
Journal, 13/3/91; Sweensy 1991a). At the same time, however, Perez 
used a speech before the United Nations to call for a meeting between 
petroleum consumers and producers, representing the first of its kind 
ever between OPEC and the IEA 23 (EIU 1991a, 1991b; Hernandez 1991; El 
Nacional 17/3/91; Sweensy 1991a; El Universal 27/3/91).
In February of 1991, President Bush announced his plan for U.S. 
energy independence based on exploration in Alaska and the development 
of alternate energy sources (El Nacional 21/2/91; Sweensy 1991a). 
Venezuelans who supported the PDVSA expansion reacted positively.
Rather than seeing the plan as a threat to future petroleum demand, 
proponents interpreted the plan a new opportunity for Venezuela to fit 
into the U.S. energy future (Economia Hoy 27/2/91, Hernandez 1991;
■^The idea received a cool reception in Washington (Daily Journal 
6/5/91; El Universal 22/3/91, 27/3/91).
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MetroEconomica 1991c). Venezuela could, they argued, take advantage of
its geographical proximity and become a source of oil as reliable as
Alaska— a move which would surely mandate Venezuela's exit from OPEC.
PDVSA's investment plan seeks to raise production potential to a level
that clearly exceeds the OPEC quota (Sweensy 1991a; VenEconomia 1991c).
It is obvious we are going to have to change our 
participation. The problems of the Persian Gulf War 
illustrate this. We are an oil nation and we have to take
care of our markets. OPEC nations are very unstable,
Venezuela is very different from these nations, we are 
western (Hernandez 1991).
Venezuela's petroleum policy shapes Venezuela. The debate over 
allowing foreign participation in the petroleum industry and 
Venezuela's future membership in OPEC are key issues that will affect 
Venezuela’s control of most strategic sector and its future potential 
for self-determination.
Latin America's need for foreign investment and technology has 
traditionally been the source of foreign intervention in domestic 
economies and continues to be. Foreign debt, contracted to support the
nationalistic industrial development of the inward-oriented model, has
opened a seemingly uncloseable door of direct foreign intervention.
Debt "reduction" schemes, such as the Brady Plan, trade short-term debt 
relief for long-term participation in a nation's production, thereby 
ensuring access to developing economies after the debt is paid.
Venezuela has used its petroleum-advantage in its dealings with 
international financial agencies and other external creditors, delaying 
an IMF adjustment program longer than almost any nation in Latin 
America. If Venezuela decides to allow, or is forced to allow foreign 
participation in the petroleum industry and withdraws from OPEC
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membership, its potential as a nation to resist international 
intervention will be significantly reduced. Although Venezuela has 
learned from its past experience and seeks to retain the advantage of 
participation with foreign investors, a competitive global climate may 
force Venezuela to relinquish much of this advantage.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of the potential viability of the Venezuelan neo- 
structural model indicates that the market forces implemented under the 
IMF model supercede state attempts to manage a market economy to attain 
the goals of growth with equity and national self-determination.
Success of the neo-structural model depends on maintaining an optimal 
balance between the state and market so that the market is free enough 
to provide growth while the state is strong enough to control and 
direct that growth.
As structuralists predicted, market policies have proven 
ineffective to generate sustained economic growth due to their failure 
to eliminate the structural bottlenecks that hinder economic 
development.
The early successes of the IMF adjustment model have proven to be 
isolated results. Structural problems in the economy, in particular, 
sectoral imbalance and petroleum dependence, have not been affected.
In spite of control of the public sector deficit, inflation, as 
predicted by neo-liberals, has not disappeared, but continues as free 
market profit is backed up behind structural bottlenecks.
Free market policies undermine the potential success of state 
intervention to generate sustained economic growth. The floating
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exchange rate works directly against the goal of reducing sectoral 
imbalance and petroleum dependency. Through an "exchange 
contradiction", the successes of petroleum continue to be to the 
detriment of agriculture and manufacturing. Foreign investment, either 
direct or through privatization and debt equity/swap, is primarily 
interested not in the potential of non-petroleum sectors, but in the 
immediate profits of petroleum and petrochemicals, leaving the 
Venezuelan state with the financial responsibility of unproductive, 
underdeveloped sectors. Future economic growth in Venezuela will 
continue to be based almost exclusively around petroleum.
The distribution of income already existing in Venezuela suggests 
that the state has not succeeded in its historical goal of stimulating 
the internal market and contributing toward the equity of Venezuelans. 
The social situation after thirty years of inward-oriented state 
redistribution policies reflects the concentration of wealth of a pure 
market economy. In spite of more than sufficient petroleum funds, the 
poverty level in Venezuela equals that of other Latin American 
countries. The role of the state as redistributor has not been to its 
rhetorical target of the poor but to aid the accumulation of domestic 
and international capital, and move petro dollars up and out. The 
implementation of market policies that have a clear history of aiding 
this process of concentration of wealth, mandate against an optimistic 
evaluation of future change in the domestic social situation. As the 
more efficient, sophisticated, neo-1 i.heral methods of welfare 
distribution are implemented, social protest becomes less likely as the 
poor are divided into categories, identified, and thereby made more
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"accountable" as a means of receiving benefits.
Venezuela's potential to preserve its current level of national 
self-determination depends largely on the ability of Congress and other 
domestic forces to maintain control over foreign participation in 
petroleum. If Article 5 is revoked, foreign participation will mandate 
Venezuela's withdrawal from OPEC, a redefinition of PDVSA as a 
transnational company instead of a national source of income, and the 
decrease of revenue paid to the state. The result will be neo-enclave 
development of the petroleum resources with little accompanying 
development of other sectors.
The ability of Venezuela to maintain its control over investment 
in petroleum and other sectors is unlikely. Having to compete for 
foreign investment on a global scale will mean relinquishing national 
sovereignty in economic matters. The continued weight of the debt 
burden means persistent "management from Washington" of strategic parts 
of the Venezuelan economy while Venezuelan officials are left to deal 
with the complexities of cross-conditionality and losses to the economy 
in the form of net transference of resources.
The emerging Venezuelan neo-structural model seeks state 
regulation of the benefits of a market system in order to achieve 
structuralist goals. The global economy, however, supersedes the 
ability of a nation-state to intervene for non-market goals.
CONCLUSION
In considering the simultaneously contradictory and complementary 
roles of the state and market in a global economy, this thesis posed 
several questions regarding a developing nation's ability to shape its 
economic destiny. Is it possible for a developing nation to resist 
global forces, maintain national self-determination, and yet achieve 
sustained economic growth? Under what conditions and in what balance 
can the economic benefits of a market-led economy be combined with 
state-led efforts toward self-determination?
In examining the nature of Venezuela's outward-oriented shift, 
various factors indicate an emerging synthesis of neo-liberal method 
directed toward structuralist goals, which was identified as a neo- 
structural model. In the two years since the model was implemented, 
two trends have developed concurrently. The first provides evidence of 
a continuing commitment to market forces. This is illustrated in 
Venezuela by the resolution of the private sector debt, the steady 
progress of privatization, and the exposure of the agricultural sector 
to international competition. The second trend illustrates continued 
state intervention toward structuralist goals as evidenced by the delay 
in increasing domestic gasoline prices, the implementation of the new 
labor law, and the significant public investment plan for 1991 and 
sub sequent year s.
It is unclear whether the preservation of structural goals is due 
to a true state commitment to equity, is a response to internal 
pressure, or a means of providing legitimacy while the state aids in
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capital accumulation for the elite. Evidence, in addition to plentiful 
rhetoric, can be found supporting a real state commitment to equity. 
Venezuela has a tradition of populist/socialist policies which 
benefitted all Venezuelans. The electoral stipulation preventing 
consecutive terms for Venezuela's presidents would seem to indicate a 
limitation on personal benefit for elected leaders.
Other evidence indicates state action on behalf of the elite, 
such as the progressively regressive distribution of income in light of 
thirty years of explicit redistributional policy. Regardless of the 
motives behind the administration's policy choices, however, it is 
clear that the emerging composite model seeks to balance market forces 
with social and nationalist goals. The primary question remains of the 
viability of such a model.
While the early results of the adjustment program were very 
positive in macroeconomic terms, the policies implemented did not 
generate long-term solutions for the basic problems of the economy. 
Venezuela remains vulnerable to the fluctuations of the world market. 
The petroleum sector continues to dominate the economy, limiting the 
potential to diversify and develop other sectors. Future development 
remains dependent on continued loans or direct foreign investment.
These factors indicate that the potential for sustained economic growth 
continues to be dependent on factors outside of Venezuela.
In terms of the social goal of growth with equity, while some 
steps have been taken to counteract the hardest blows of the adjustment 
program, most factors indicate that the shift has produced even wider 
distribution of wealth and greater percentages of the population in
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poverty. With the increasing marketization of the economy, the state 
stands to lose more of its ability to regulate the distribution of 
national wealth. Given the demands of foreign investors and the 
conditionality of lending agencies, the goal of growth with equity is 
likely to be reduced to welfare programs targeted to the very poor.
The results of the neo-liberal/IMF policies in Venezuela 
illustrate once again the failures of a market economy in the form of 
concentration of wealth and monopoly of capital. Regardless of neo­
structuralist attempts to overcome these deficiencies through state 
intervention, the nature of the global market undermines these 
intentions.
Structuralists assumptions about the nature of the world economy 
are confirmed in the case of Venezuela. An unequal insertion into the 
world economy created bottlenecks that both an inward- and an outward- 
oriented model have been unable to break. Unequal power relations 
between the United States as a member of the core, and Venezuela as a 
peripheral nation resulted in persistent dependence and limited self- 
determination for Venezuela. The appropriateness of the structuralist 
emphasis on balanced sectoral development as foundational to economic 
growth is reinforced through Venezuela's continued struggle with the 
dominance of petroleum and its dampening effect on the rest of the 
economy.
Theoretically, neo-structuralism seemed to present a good balance 
between state-led and market-led development, combining the realistic 
perspective of structuralism with the pragmatic economic model of neo­
liberalism. In reality, however, by opening the economy to market
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forces, Venezuela appears to be losing its power of self-determination.
This analysis suggests that neo-structuralism in Venezuela is not 
likely to meet its defined goals. The larger question then becomes 
whether the Venezuelan case is a good indicator of the viability of 
neo-structuralism in general. Looking at Venezueula's historical and 
regional context, certain factors can be identified as significant.
The Venezuelan economy is dominated by a strong sector, petroleum, 
which has definite market value in the world economy. The petroleum— 
advantage has given Venezuela economic "breathing space" not enjoyed by 
its regional neighbors. The result has been the opportunity to benefit 
from the observation of regional economic experiments. The petroleum 
sector is controlled by a strong state with a history of extensive 
intervention in the domestic economy. Finally, Venezuela has a strong 
populist tradition, having been committed to equity and more complete 
participation within the domestic economy.
These factors suggest that Venezuela enjoys a certain level of 
privilege in comparison with many other developing nations. This would 
seem to indicate that if the Venezuelan state is unable to compensate 
for the negative effects of global market forces it would seem that few 
less-well-endowed, less experienced, developing nations could succeed.
In other words, "If Venezuela can't do it, nobody can."
In the international political and economic context of 1991, 
developing nations appear to not have the potential to set their 
economic, social and national priorities, nor to choose their manner of 
insertion into the world economy.
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